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Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action
RALPa F. FucHs*
AUTHOR'S PREFATORY NOTE
The material which follows, on prerequisites to judicial review of
administrative agency action, is a small portion of a text on adminis-
trative law which I have long had underway, but which the burgeon-
ing ramifications of that subject have rendered it impracticable to
complete as planned. The text was intended to be introductory and
analytical, with incidental critical comments but without an attempt,
except in a projected final chapter, to assess over-all needs and trends.
I have not sought to assemble critical views and suggestions that have
been published elsewhere, but have cited material which I am conscious
of having used in specific ways. My general indebtedness to other
writers on the same topics, even though I do not pretend to have ex-
hausted their works, is too great to be acknowledged in explicit
terms.** This addition to the literature must find its justification in
whatever clarity its analysis may add to the prevalent understanding
of a rather abstruse area of law, and in leads for professional research
into sub-topics, which its citations should supply.
I am grateful to the editors of the Indiana Law Journal for
valuable editorial assistance, as well as appreciative of their judgment
that the following text has value which justifies its publication in a
medium that is largely devoted to innovative writing, such as I have
not attempted here.
*A.B., LL.B., 1922, Washington University; Ph.D. 1925, Robert Brookings Graduate
School; J.S.D. 1935, Yale University; University Professor Emeritus of Law, Indiana
University, Bloomington.
* See Appendix.
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THREE PREREQUISITES: AN INTRODUCTION
The availability of judicial review of agency action depends in
part on the effect given to three frequently-stated prerequisites to
such review. These are labeled, respectively, the "ripeness" of the
agency action for review (or of the controversy for decision), the
exhaustion of available administrative remedies before resort to a
court, and the "standing" of the person or persons seeking review
to secure it. Each of these will be examined in turn, but the inter-
relations among them must be recognized at the outset.
Ripeness'depends on the legal finality and force, particularly in
relation to the procedural stage which has been reached, and on the
practical consequences, of the action sought to be reviewed; exhaus-
tion involves resort to present or past administrative means of chal-
lenging or seeking modification of otherwise reviewable agency action,
prior to a resort to court; and standing turns on the strength and
relevance to the agency action of the interest asserted by the person
seeking review and of injury to that interest from the action.1 These
three prerequisites are not sharply distinguishable. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies for completed agency action may be a pre-
requisite to judicial review for the same reasons as deny ripeness for
judicial review to uncompleted action still lacking legal effect, Injury
to an interest which is asserted as a basis of standing to challenge
agency action may turn in part on whether the action carries legal
force and is therefore ripe, and if so, whether administrative remedies
still exist with regard to it.
Each of the prerequisites presents a facet of the solution so far
reached to the problems of limiting, the courts to the determination
of actual controversies and of allocating functions wisely between
agencies and courts, consistently with constitutional requirements, with
legislative prescriptions that are applicable, and with the require-
ments of fairness and effectiveness in the execution of laws. The
screening of court cases that results imposes its own burden of liti-
gation over the meaning of the three prerequisites. There is a
serious question, consequently, whether the game is worth the candle
and whether some other screening process, involving an avowed
exercise of judicial discretion under broad governing principles, to
meet the needs presented in particular situations, might be prefer-
1
"The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to
get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967).
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able. Instead, as matters stand, each of the three prerequisites has
continued to be recognized even though it overlaps the others. All
have received an increasingly relaxed application as the pressure for
easily accessible judicial determination of important controversies has
mounted. Restraint on litigants and the courts, stemming from the
three prerequisites, nevertheless remains significant.
The law of ripeness and standing has been much more fully
developed by the federal than by the state courts, largely because of the
concern of the Supreme Court over defining the role of the judiciary
properly, especially in relation to the responsibilities of the states and of
the other two branches of the federal government. Some degree of judi-
cial self-restraint in this respect is inherent in constitutional government;
hence state decisions dealing with ripeness and standing, as well as
exhaustion, are not infrequent. In addition, definition of the scope
of new or traditional judicial remedies and interpretation of statutes
providing for judicial review of agency action, setting relevant limits
to the use of these remedies, take place in the state as well as the
federal sphere. State administrative procedure legislation that con-
forms in some degree to the federal pattern also enlarges the inter-
play between federal and state decision, with decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States tending to become a pervasive influence.
The question whether the three prerequisites are jurisdictional,
open for consideration newly at any stage of a case in court, re-
ceives varying answers. Conventionally they are so regarded, espe-
cially when the presence of a genuine controversy is questioned; but,
as will appear, the contrary conception prevails when there are strong
reasons not to permit a review proceeding to be defeated and neither
a constitutional provision nor a statutory limitation restricts the court.
In this situation, the need of the interests on each side for judicial
consideration, the availability and adequacy of later alternative reme-
dies, and the proper relationship of judicial power to agency authority
are factors that are balanced against each other in determining whether
judicial relief should be available in the circumstances presented.
PART I: RIPENESS OF AGENCY ACTION FOR REVIEW
Elements of Ripeness
The most essential element of ripeness of agency action for review
is the presence in the action of a determination that definitively affects
specific interests on which it bears. This element is present when
direct enforcement is sought, and may be present even when further
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proceedings are necessary to carry out the determination legally, or
relief from it could be sought administratively.2 Hence, agency action
that significantly affects an interest does not lack finality merely be-
cause it is not self-enforcing or is subject to an administrative appeal,
although in the latter event exhaustion of the appeal may be required
before review may be had. Similarly, as will appear, an enforceable
general regulation may be reviewed even though it requires imple-
mentation by the agency or a court and is subject to change, if it
states conclusions that, in the absence of change, will determine agency
action in later proceedings and if these proceedings are not too con-
tingent upon further exercises of official discretion or upon further
acts of the persons who are subject to the regulation. In addition,
interlocutory agency action or an agency pronouncement that merely
contains advice to persons concerned or states an intention of the
agency, normally not reviewable because immediate effects are absent
and further agency consideration is expected, may become ripe for
review if significant immediate effects in fact arise. Statutes may,
however, preclude review altogether, limit it in time, or confine it to
particular kinds of court proceedings. On the whole, the ripeness
prerequisite has become a weaker barrier than formerly to judicial
review of less-than-ultimate agency determinations.
Relation of Ripeness to Kinds of Court Proceedings Involved
The issue of ripeness of agency action for review may arise in a
statutory proceeding to review the action, usually as an "order," or
in a suit under a court's general jurisdiction to entertain a challenge-
often in an injunction suit-to the effectuation of the action sought
to be reviewed. In the first kind of proceeding the issue of ripeness is
often stated as turning on whether the agency action, considering its
form, the stage of agency processes at which it occurs, and its effects,
is really an "order."' In the second kind of proceeding the question
2 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228 (1908) (challengers of a
rate order "were not bound to wait for proceedings brought to enforce the rate and
to punish them for departing from it" before securing judicial review). Cf. Friedman
v. United States, 310 F.2d 381 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
3 See the elaborate discussion in PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974), majority and minority opinions, where
the result turned largely on the Congressionally intended meaning of "order" in the particu-
lar statutory provision involved, § 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat 901
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970), with reference to a regulation that was not issued
expressly as an "order." In any case resting on a statute, the decision must, of course,
turn on the precise terms and interpretation of the particular statutory provision; but
the review provisions of the federal statutes have often been sufficiently similar to
each other to produce much cross-reference among decisions as to ripeness under them
and to develop a common body of interpretation.
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is whether the intervention of a court is warranted under the circum-
stances, given the terms, legal effects and practical consequences of
the agency action involved. In such an instance the issue is often
stated to be whether the controversy before the court, rather than just
the agency action, is ripe for judicial consideration; but a great deal
turns on the nature of that action.'
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act recognizes, first, the
reviewability of "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute," and
provides, second, for review in "any applicable form of legal action"
of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in a court. . . ."I Like the original and Revised Model Acts,6 state
administrative procedure legislation commonly provides a new mode
of review for adjudicative decisions or orders. This statutory process
is sometimes limited, as it is in the Revised Model Act, to "final"
decisions or orders. It may be made exclusive or be accompanied
by an express retention of preexisting modes of review.7 Under the
federal act and under state acts which do not supersede prior modes
of review, previous precedents with regard to the requirements of
ripeness continue to apply to the review proceedings that are re-
tained; but where the new mode of review is rendered exclusive, ripe-
ness turns chiefly on interpretation of the new legislation. Again
following the original or Revised Model Act,' state administrative
procedure legislation commonly provides for judicial review of gen-
eral regulations by means of declaratory judgment proceedings.
Ripeness of "Final" Agency Action in Federal Statutory
Review Proceedings
Holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States with regard
to ripeness of agency orders in statutory three-judge court review
proceedings took a new course, expansive of ripeness for review, in
Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States.' Review by means
4 See also Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Ad-
ministrative Law, 69 Mica. L. R v. 1445, 1447-52 (1971).
55 U.S.C. §§ 703, 704 (1970).
6MODEL STATE An3xismrVE PizocEDuRE Acr § 12, 9C U.L.A. 183 (1957); Ravisw
MODEL STATE ADmISTRATmVE PRocEDuRE AcT § 15, 9C U.L.A. 142 (Supp. 1967) [here-
inafter cited as RMSED MODEL Acr].7 Rmsws MODEL ACT, § 15. That Act expressly includes any "preliminary, proce-
dural, or intermediate agency action or ruling . . . if review of the final agency decision
would not provide an adequate remedy." The Administrative Review Act, IhL. REV. STAT.,
ch. 110, § 264 et. seq. (1971), provides an exclusive method of reviewing final "decisions,"
which "terminate ... the proceedings" leading to them, of agencies made subject to the Act.
8 See § 7 of both Acts.
9307 U.S. 125 (1939). See also FPC v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939)
(applying the same thought to review of orders by Courts of Appeals on the record of
agency proceedings) and Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 129 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1942).
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of such proceedings had been made applicable to "any order of the
[Federal Communications] Commission" with stated exceptions. The
order involved in Rochester Telephone merely stated that the corpo-
ration was a telephone carrier subject to the Communications Act and
was required to comply with certain general orders of the Commission
which directed that rate schedules and specified information be filed.
These orders, not the order directing the corporation to comply with
them, .were enforceable by statutory penalties. The Court held that
the order directing the corporation to comply was itself reviewable
in a statutory injunction proceeding before a three-judge court, even
though its only legal consequences would take the form of enforce-
ment of the previous general orders and would take place only if
these were not obeyed. The Court stated:
[I]t was not a mere abstract declaration regarding the status of
the Rochester under the Communications Act, nor was it a stage in
an incomplete process of administrative adjudication. The contested
order determining the status of the Rochester necessarily and
immediately carried direction of obedience to previously formulated
mandatory orders addressed generally to all carriers amenable to
the Commission's authority. Into this class of carriers the order
under dispute covered the Rochester, and by that fact, in conjunc-
tion with the other orders, made determination of the status of the.
Rochester a reviewable order of the Commission.' 0
The Court distinguished a seemingly contrary decision as to
reviewability in Shannahan v. United States," in which the Interstate
Commerce Commission had made a determination that subjected an
electric railroad to the Railway Labor Act. That determination, the
Court held, involved merely a declaration which required further
action by the National Mediation Board before it could have effect.
The Court in Rochester Telephone also distinguished United States
v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co.,"2 in which a valuation by the
Interstate Commerce Commission of the railroad's property, which
10 307 U.S. at 143-44. The opinion repudiates the contrary reasoning of Lehigh Valley
R.R. v. United States, 243 U.S. 412. Id. at 133 n.11. The Court also overruled other
aspects of the previous "negative order" doctrine, most fully enunciated in Procter &
Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282 (1912), whereby agency orders that denied
relief from certain kinds of requirements of pre-existing law were held not reviewable.
Such orders are not in themselves enforceable but call in effect for enforcement of the
previous law. The same is true of license refusals which are traditionally reviewable.
11303 U.S. 596 (1938). See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130,
n.8 (1939). In accord with Shannahan, under a different statute, is Carolina Aluminum Co.
v. FPC, 97 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1938).
12 273 U.S. 299 (1927).
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would be prima facie evidence of the value in later rate and other
regulatory proceedings, was held to be subject neither to statutory
review nor to review by suit under the general equity power of the
district courts, because it was "merely the formal record of conclusions
reached" and any error in it could be corrected in later proceedings
in which it might be used. A year after Rochester Telephone the
Court noted broadly that "we attribute little importance [in determin-
ing reviewability] to the fact that" a certification of a collective
bargaining agent for the employees in an employment unit, which
might later be implemented by an order to the employer to cease re-
fusing to bargain with the agent as the exclusive representative of the
employees involved, "does not itself command action."'-' Later the
Court applied the same principle to a determination of the Interstate
Commerce Commission that a motor carrier was a contract carrier
subject to the permit requirement of the Motor Carrier Act, non-
compliance with which would render the carrier's operation illegal. 4
Declaratory agency orders under the Administrative Procedure Act
are made binding by the statute and consequently are reviewable by
statutory process.15
Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States" involved agency
action which clearly required further proceedings in the agency before
it would have legal consequences. The Federal Communications Com-
mission, pursuant to statute, promulgated its Chain Broadcasting
Regulations in an "order." Orders of the Commission, other than
certain orders relating to radio station licenses, were statutorily re-
viewable in a three-judge district court injunction proceeding. The
question was whether this particular order was so reviewable. The
lower court dismissed the complaint with one judge dissenting.'7 Most
13 American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 408 (1940). The decision was
that the National Labor Relations Act precluded review under the statute of a certification
order of the Board, except as incidental to review of a later unfair labor practice order.
The Court declined to decide whether, under some circumstances, such an order might be
challenged in an independent suit invoking the general jurisdiction of the district courts
under the Judicial Code; but the purpose of Congress was to avoid interruption of Board
processes by premature judicial review. Cf. Boire v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 376 U.S.
473 (1964). See also Part II, infra, at notes 17, 78-98.
14Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 436 (1946), cting Cornell
Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634, 635 (1944), where the point was taken for
granted. The district court in Schnley, 50 F. Supp. 491 (D. Del. 1943), and 61 F. Supp.
981, 986 (D. Del. 1948), discussed the matter fully. To the same effect is G.J. Amshoff v.
United States, 228 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956).15 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 372, n.3 (1969); New York State
Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969); Northeast Airlines v.
CAB, 345 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1965).
16316 U.S. 407 (1942).
'National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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"orders" of the Commission are rendered in proceedings involving
named parties and dispose of the claims of those parties. The Chain
Broadcasting Regulations, by contrast, were in general terms, stating
that no license should be granted to a commercial radio station which
had a contract with a network containing certain provisions. Most
regulations of the Commission are enforceable by judicial proceedings
to impose statutory penalties and might therefore be reviewable as
"orders" in such proceedings ;"8 but those here involved were, by their
terms, not susceptible to this kind of enforcement; they would be
carried out by the withholding or, conceivably, the revocation of licenses
of broadcasters whose contracts with networks were in violation of
the regulations. The regulations were, however, specifically authorized
by the statute, which empowered the Commission "to make special
regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting."19
In a report on which the Chain Broadcasting Regulations were
based2" the Commission characterized them as the "announcement of
the principles we intend to apply in exercising our licensing power,"
but also as "the expression of the general policy we will follow in
exercising our licensing power." It assured license applicants of the
"right to a hearing on the question whether [they] in fact propose to
operate in the public interest," but clearly the regulations were never-
theless couched in "terms of command" and the order embodying
them, as the dissenting judge in the district court pointed out, had
"all the earmarks of a final order."21 Because of these aspects of the
Commission's action and the manner in which the regulations could
be expected to operate, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Stone, concluded that the order embodying them was review-
able under the statutory provision. The effect of the order was to
"determine [the] validity" of the specified contract provisions in ad-
vance of licensing proceedings. The cancellation or refusal of a license
because of failure to comply with the regulations would impose "a
penalty and sanction for noncompliance far more drastic than the
fines customarily inflicted for breach of reviewable administrative
1848 Stat. 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 502 (1970). Regulations enforceable by penal
sanctions, issued in an order, were reviewed in a three-judge court proceeding, without
question as to jurisdiction, in the Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927). Florida East
Coast Ry. v. United States, 410 U.S. 224 (1973), and United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972), are recent instances of three-judge court review, implicitly
sustained by the Supreme Court, of agency regulations involving liability to direct sanctions
for violations.
1948 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1970).
20 FCC, REPORT ON CnAiN BROADCASTING, ORDER No. 37, ch. VIT, J, (1941).
2 1 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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orders." Hence the regulations had "the force of law" before they
were applied as well as after. As an "exercise of the delegated legis-
lative power," they would be, "until amended, . . . controlling alike
upon the Commission and all others whose rights may be affected by
the Commission's execution of them."2
For Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting with the concurrence of
Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Douglas, the sanctions applicable
to the Chain Broadcasting Regulations were not comparable to the
penal sanctions applicable to other regulations, partly because the
Commission, in his view, could not dispense with "its statutory obli-
gation to examine each application for a license and determine whether
a grant or denial is required by the public interest," and had not
attempted to do so. The regulations themselves "entailed no immediate
legal consequences." They did not forbid licensees to enter into any
relations they might wish with networks, but only expressed a policy
with regard to those relations as they might bear on the public inter-
est involved in a particular license application or continuance. Hence,
according to the dissenting opinion, the order embodying the regula-
tion was not subject to review.28
Certain practical consequences of the regulations were considered
by the Court, together with their legal effect, in determining review-
ability. Although the regulations would not be applied in license pro-
ceedings until such proceedings arose--normally when current licenses
expired-the Columbia Broadcasting System asserted, without contra-
diction, that affiliated stations had already announced they would not
negotiate for the renewal of existing contracts with Columbia which
did not conform to the regulations, or continue these contracts in effect
beyond the expiration of their licenses, and that, as a consequence, the
business of Columbia was already being seriously harmed. These con-
sequences, the Court held, established the threat of sufficient injury
to the network to justify its invocation of the equity jurisdiction of a
three-judge court24 and, it seems fair to add, also contributed to the
22 Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 420-22 (1942).
21d. at 432-38.
24 Id. at 422-24. The standing of the network is also closely involved. As to immediate
reviewability of a threatened restriction in a license, operative in future circumstances,
because of its effect on the establishment and financing of the enterprise involved, see United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). In Music Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC; 217 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1954), an order of the Commission, which was subject to
change after a hearing if one were requested, was held reviewable because of its immediate
effect of preventing the music company from broadcasting during certain pre-dawn hours.
Judge Danaher dissented, characterizing the order as interlocutory. See also Isbrandtsen
Co. v. United States, 2U F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954)
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reviewability of the regulations without further agency action to im-
plement them.25
A similar conclusion was reached, on similar grounds, in United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Corporation,2 as to the legal effective-
ness and reviewability of a Federal Communications Commission regu-
lation which conditioned the future licensing of broadcasting stations
on an absence of ownership by applicants of more than stated numbers
of stations, thereby limiting the business opportunities of multi-station
broadcasting corporations.2 7  Judicial review in the Storer case -was
under the provisions of the Review Act of 1950 which, by that time,
had replaced the three-judge court process as to orders of various
agencies other than the Interstate Commerce Commission, including
the Federal Communications Commission.2 8
In Frozen Food Express v. United States 9 the Court held that
action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, consisting of a report
as to Commission authority under the governing statute over the
transportation of enumerated kinds of commodities and an order
terminating the inquiry which led to the report, was ripe for review
in a three-judge court proceeding. The Court noted that the carriers
who did not comply with the statute as correctly interpreted by the
Commission might be subject to penalties or to enforceable cease-and-
desist orders. Thus, the carriers were under immediate pressure to con-
(interim approval of a restrictive agreement among shipping lines held immediately review-
able at the instance of a competitor with them, because of adverse effects on its business).2 5 See further the discussion of this point in PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485
F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974), note 3 supra, in relation to
statutory court of appeals review of regulations considered as a possible "order."
26 351 U.S. 192 (1956). In the intervening case of FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,
347 U.S. 284 (1954), the Court affirmed a three-judge court's judgment enjoining the
enforcement of Commission regulations which the Supreme Court labeled "interpretative,"
id. at 289 n.7, and which the lower court said "would be considered by the Commission,"
in deciding upon license applications. American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110
F. Supp. 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The issues of ripeness and standing were not discussed,
but adverse effects of the regulations on the businesses of the plaintiffs had been alleged
and were not disputed. Both courts, notwithstanding their characterization of the regula-
tions, appeared, in reality, to regard them as virtually a final disposition of the matters
they covered, reviewable within the principle of the Columbia Broadcasting System case.
27 More recently, under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (1970), the
Federal Power Commission issued a new general rule in the form of an order, exempting
small producers of gas from existing price limits on new sales, but providing for substituted
future Commission controls over the prices resulting from these sales, which might result
in retroactive refund costs for purchasers for resale. The rule was assumed to be directly
reviewable by a court of appeals under the review povision of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r
(1970), at the instance of purchasers and other persons affected adversely. FPC v. Texaco,
Inc., 407 U.S. 380 (1974).
28 Review Act of 1950, ch. 1189, § 4, 64 Stat. 1130 (1950), as amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2344 (1970).
29351 U.S. 40 (1956).
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form their businesses to the conclusions in the report. A strong dissent
by Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that, as actually occurred. in a
companion case involving a cease-and-desist order against a carrier
which failed to comply with the Commission's interpretation,30 the
Commission in. deciding upon its order would not regard its prior
general conclusion as binding and would re-examine the issues. Hence
the prior order determined nothing and should not be regarded as
reviewable.
The principle of Frozen Food Express is capable of wide exten-
sion. In light of the existing strong tendency toward enlarging the
availability of judicial review of administrative action whenever a sig-
nificant interest is affected by the action, it seems likely that pro-
nouncements addressed to affected persons generally, which wear a
sufficient agency imprimatur and in fact produce identifiiable conse-
quences to interests that are legally cognizable, even though the pro-
nouncements contain no command, may well be considered to fall within
statutory provisions for review of agency orders.8 It would follow
that agency pronouncements in the form of regulations, which are
not directly enforceable but give notice of policies that will be applied,
and which have adverse consequences for affected interests, are subject
to such review when the governing statute permits32 and when the
agency and court procedures involved render the review feasible.' 3
Agency actions which, like that in Rochester Telephone Corp. v.
S0 East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49 (1956).
81 See Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative
Law, 69 MIcH. L. RaV. 1445, 1446-48 (1971). Se also Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478
F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973) ("order" stated as a newly
formulated "reminder" to broadcasters of their pre-existing duty held reviewable); Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), clarified on rehearing,
463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (so as to a "policy statement" covering procedures and
standards in license renewal). Compare Hearst Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C.
Cir. 1948) (policy statement in an informational publication held not reviewable under
the general jurisdiction).
32 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1116 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (procedural rules which governed the character of subsequent proceedings). A
published "regulation" establishing policy may in some contexts be looked upon as an
"order," whether so designated by the agency or not, made reviewable as such by a statute,
Public Service Comm'n v. FPC, 463 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1972), but the opposite may also
be true. Cf. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 969 (1974). Alleged illegality in a similar regulation can also be challenged "on
allegation of failure [t]o perform any act or duty not discretionary . . . ," made action-
able as such by statute. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972),
aff'd by an equally divided Court on cert. to ct. of appeals affirmance, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
S As to the prerequisite of agency records of hearings under many statutory provisions
for review, which can be satisfied after judicial remand when such a record is otherwise
absent or inadequate, see, in relation to agency pronouncements not backed in the first
instance by such a record, American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236 (D.C.
Cir. 1937); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
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United States4 establish decisively the basis for future legal rights and
liabilities of named or identified persons, such as a carrier and future
users of its service, are recognized more easily than general pro-
nouncements as final "orders" which are subject to federal statutory
review. In Port of Boston Marine Terminal Association v. Raderi-
aktiebolaget Transatlantic5 the Federal Maritime Commission ap-
proved a change in the fee structure contained in a filed tariff of
charges for the use of port terminal facilities. The Court held its action
to be an "order" subject to the Administrative Orders Review Act."6
The Court declared the "relevant considerations in determining finality"
to be "whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has
reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly
process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been
determined or legal consequence will flow from the agency action." 7
Ripeness of "Final" Agency Action in Suits
Under the General Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
The district court in the Columbia Broadcasting System case sug-
gested that the agency action before the court, which it regarded as
not an order reviewable in a statutory proceeding, might be subject
to challenge in a suit under a federal court's general jurisdiction, if
the requirements of justiciability were met." The Supreme Court in
Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co."9 had held that a determination
of the Interstate Commerce Commission was so reviewable even though
it was substantially identical to that in the Shannahan case40 where no
"order" was thought to have issued and statutory review was denied.
The requirement in Shannahan and later cases that there be an "order"
as a prerequisite to statutory review continues even though it lacks
substance since Frozen Food Express.41 Whether there is any signifi-
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Compare Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n,
99 F.2d 399, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796, 802-03 (10th
Cir. 1963), rev'd as to other points, 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC,
181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950). As to later review of
a "policy statement" not preceded by a hearing, where review is incident to agency action
applying the policy, see Pacific Lighting Serv. Co. v. FPC, 518 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1975).
34307 U.S. 125 (1939). See discussion in text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
35400 U.S. 62 (1970).
36 28 U.S.C. § 2341-51, 2353 (1970).
37 Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Raderiaktiebolaget, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970).8 8National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
39305 U.S. 117 (1938).4 0 See note 11 supra & text accompanying.
4 1 See text accompanying note 24 supra; compare Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), with Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966). In
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cant difference between the characteristics of agency action, other
than interlocutory action, necessary to make it an "order" or a "final
order" under a statute and those which might make it ripe for review
under the general. jurisdiction of the courts, depends in part on the
prerequisites to invocation of the latter. These involve aspects of
particular remedies the general jurisdiction embraces, which are common
for the most part to both federal and state remedies; and they derive
also from the separation of powers, the need to conserve judicial re-
sources while providing adequate remedies, and the importance of
according due scope to the discharge of agency responsibilities.
The general jurisdiction to entertain injunction and declaratory
judgment suits extends to possibly invalidating merely anticipated
agency action which is sufficiently threatened, as well as to forestalling
the effects of past action. With respect to injunction, the requisite
injury or threat of it to the planitiff's interest must be alleged.42
Injury or the threat of it at the hands of an agency, rather than
a specific agency action that allegedly causes the injury, is then the
crux of the matter and the issue of ripeness is focused in this
context upon the controversy rather than focusing mainly upon the
agency action. When the validity of a statute on its face is challenged
and other prerequisites to a proceeding in court are met, the mere
existence of the statute and of an agency or officers charged with
its application can create a ripened controversy,48 without any specific
prior agency action. When agency action has occurred, the question
arises whether that action is sufficiently definitive in nature and effect
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 485 (D Mnn. 1970), a three-judge
court held a published ICC interpretation of railway tariffs, substantially modifying their
effect, which had not been preceded by opportunity for hearing procedures normally
available when tariff changes were under consideration, to be an "order" that was statutorily
reviewable. See also Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1971), discussed at note 31 supra. By contrast, a mere interpretation, statement of fact,
or policy statement could be held not to be an order subject to statutory review, but to
be action which, because of its effects, was challengeable under the general jurisdiction.
See, e.g., FTC v. Nash-Finch Co., 288 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (review under Declaratory
Judgment Act hed available regardless of whether statutory review could be bad). Compare
Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (review in declaratory judg-
ment action not available); see- also Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647, 652
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (Bazelon, Ch. J. dissenting), suggesting the District of Columbia Code as
an independent source of jurisdiction to review.4 2 In any case, other prerequisites to a court action, including the involvement of a
sufficient plaintiffs' interest and the presence of issues suitable for judicial determination,
must of course be met.4 3 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 680-682 (1976); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v.
MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Public Util. Com'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534
(1958) (United States Government challenge to state statute providing regulation of Gov-
ernment transactions); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 421
(1949) (statutory provision operative 50 years later, having immediate effect on financing
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to create such a controversy relating to the statute, to that action,
or to both. If the relevant agency action has been preliminary, such
as a mere statement of intention to apply a certain policy or the
launching of an inquiry or acceptance of a complaint, without any
command or sanctions as yet, it may not suffice." The agency action
must carry implementation significantly forward and inflict or suffi-
ciently threaten ascertainable injury, before ripeness arises. In de-
termining when this point is reached, prior to some enforceable order
on which the court could focus attention, the court may consider
all that the agency has done and the consequences, both immediate
and future, having in mind whether a case or controversy in the
constitutional sense is presented and whether opportunity should be
preserved for further agency action, possibly leading to the availa-
of corporation); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 161 (1908).
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932), distinguished those aspects
of the statute that required discretionary agency application, as to which a ripened contro-
versy had not arisen, 286 U.S. at 367-68. See also Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of
Labor, 519 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir. 1975) (validity of provision of statute enforceable by
cumulative penalties is not an issue ripe for review in advance of actual threat of enforce-
ment); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1214-16 (8th Cir.
1972); Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1972); National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal dismissed voluntarily, 400
U.S. 801 (1970); City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 835-37 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd
385 U.S. 35 (1966); Senior Citizens League v. Dep't of Social Security, 38 Wash. 142, 228
P.2d 478 (1951) (statute allegedly curtailing public assistance rights previously bestowed
may be challenged without prior assertion and denial of claims before agency).
A classic discussion of circumstances in which a controversy over the constitutionality
of a statute may be ripe for judicial consideration in the absence of steps to enforce the
statute may be found in the several opinions in Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Compare Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971), and
Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971). In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), injunctive relief was held to be obtainable in a federal court against the
enforcement of a challenged state statute which was clear in its terms, even before its
effective date. See generally as to determining the constitutionality of proposed statutes or
ordinances by declaratory judgments, Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1361, 1365-1366 (1938). Even
when a ripened controversy exists (or is assumed to exist), relief by injunction may be
unavailable because of restrictions applicable to that remedy. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S.
387, 400-01 (1941). When a statute, although clear in its terms, comes into operation only
as respects persons, projects, or geographical areas that are to be officially designated, action
that places it in effect in relation to the plaintiffs is often necessary to challenge its
validity; but in the consideration of such a challenge the focus is then on the statute.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
Wallace v. Currin, 95 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1938), aff'd, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).44 See W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967); Alabama v.
United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963); First Nat'l Bank v. Albright, 208 U.S. 548 (1908);
Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943). In Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1972), the plaintiffs failed because in the view of the Supreme Court majority
the system of military surveillance of civilian political activity which they challenged was
not alleged or shown to have resulted in specific acts or consequences that were illegal
or suppressive of the First Amendment freedoms for which the plaintiffs sought protection.
See also Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972). In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
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bility of other judicial remedies.45 The court's balancing of the need
for immediate protection of the interest opposing the agency, of
preserving opportunity for further agency action, and of conserving
judicial resources will obviously play a greater role than the- more
conceptual aspects of ripeness. Nevertheless these aspects serve to
structure the decisions in a wide variety of factual and legal con-
texts. In a case coming to the Supreme Court from the state courts
the determination of ripeness" for consideration at the federal level
is made with attention to special federal concerns.4"
Appraisal of the consequences of agency action turns in part
on the nature of the interest which a plaintiff seeks to protect; hence
the issue'of standing may also be involved and may have a close
bea-ing. If the interest for which protection is sought is both publicly
U.S. 488 (1974), illegal and intimidating acts of local law enforcement officers were alleged
to lave been committed as part of an oppressive course of conduct by local law enforce-
ment authorities against members of the Negro race as a class, but were held not to hav-e
been sufficiently related in the allegations to any named plaintiff to support jurisdiction.
The issue was standing rather than ripeness. The Tatum and O'Shea decisions rejected the
view advanced in dissent, that the intimidating effect on all members of a class of systematic
official surveillance of the members, or the effects on all members of repeated illegal acts
against some, should suffice to establish ripeness of the official actions for review and
standing by all members of the class to bring an action challenging the conduct. Cf. Rincon
Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974), and contrast
Part I of the opinion of the Court in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), where con-
tinuing police misconduct against plaintiffs and members of their class was established.
4 5 See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 63, 80 (1974) (district court "not totally
without jurisdiction" to review dismissal of probationary federal employee, which was
still subject to possible administrative correction; but interim judicial stay of the dismissal
was without authority). Cf. West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 310-14, 316-17
(3d Cir. 1975); Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962) (threatened military discharge
after inadequate hearing, held not reviewable); City Bank Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934) (threatened tax assessment based on attorney gen-
eral's opinion held reviewable); Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 848 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (anticipated action on permit applications not yet made held not reviewable);
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 694-704 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (distinguishing Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1943)
(judicial review of published interpretation held appropriate); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC,
530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976) (elaborate weighing by court of effects of a new agency
rule on public and private interests effected); Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp.
452 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (controversy ripe because of enforcement but need for injunction not
shown); Lehmann v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 208 Ala. 185, 94 So. 94 (1922), aff'd
263 U.S. 394 (1923) (validity of charges against a professional practitioner cannot be
judicially determined until agency proceedings against him have run their course).
See also Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972) (military order enlarging
theater of hostilities which merely increases the likelihood that the active armed forces
will be augmented and ordered into combat zones does not affect inactive reservists suffi-
ciently to be reviewable at their instance; opinion couched in terms of standing); National
Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (two of three aspects
of challenged official directive as to Selective Service policy held not to have sufficient
adverse effect on registrants' interest to create a ripened controversy).
46 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1961). See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 429 (1952), with regard to the same aspect of determining standing.
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important and likely to wither under adversity, as tends to be true
of freedom of publication, speech, or association and of certain other
civil liberties, an agency statement which is intended to produce com-
pliance because of fear of consequences, or to lead to action against
the interest, may be a determination ripe for review, even though in
itself it lacks legal force." If, by contrast, the interests involved are
looked upon as less vulnerable, as corporate business interests at
times hqave been, even rather definite agency action limiting the
interest, such as a statement of intention to terminate it under defined
circumstances, thereby affecting its value, may not suffice to generate
a ripened controversy." When injunctive or declaratory relief against
state law enforcement action is sought in a United States district
court, the ripeness issue which may be present tends to be subordi-
nated to the related question of whether, considering the character
and stage of the state processes which are under way, the desired
form of relief in a federal court may properly be considered by the
court.
4 9
47See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); National Student Ass'n v.
Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969), discussed at note 45 supra, as to the third aspect
of the directive there involved; Thorns v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated on other grounds, 418 U.S. 908 (1974); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 991
(D. Kan. 1972). Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 596, 604 (1967) (entire
anti-subversion "statutory and regulatory complex," enforceable by termination of teacher
employment, renders teachers "aggrieved" and satisfies prerequisites to action in court).
48See, e.g., Eccles v. People's Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948), in which the bank sought
a declaration of invalidity of a condition the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System had attached to the bank's membership in the system, whereby the Board de-
clared its intention to terminate the membership if a named banking chain acquired an
interest in the bank. Intervening action by the Board, when a unit of the chain acquired
some shares in the bank, had established that the condition was not as absolute as it
seemed, but left room for a Board determination as to whether the interest acquired was
in such form as to endanger the independence of the bank. Two dissenting Justices pointed
out that the Board's action had an immediate effect on the market for the bank's stock,
sufficient to warrant a judicial determination of the issue presented. See also Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of goods upon probable cause prior
to institution of judicial enforcement proceedings against them was at a "preliminary stage'
of enforcement and was not reviewable action any more than other forms of initiation of
porceedings "where only property rights are concerned"); Continental Bank & Trust Co.
v. Martin, 303 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Cf. Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S.
535 (1954) (enforcement steps which threatened heavy loss to the challenging corporation
and impaired its financial standing sufficed to justify judicial determination of the statutory
authority of the agency but not the issue of constitutionality of the governing statute);
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (SEC
communications to stock exchange, contributing to exchange action adverse to plaintiffs,
were sufficiently definite action to be reviewable); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways, 321 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (tentative conclusion, allegedly without
authority, to be considered further in a show-cause proceeding, that airline certificate shouid
be terminated, held not reviewable); MacDonald v. Best, 186 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1960)
(effects on mining claim of threatened forfeiture based on prior agency legal opinion held
to confer jurisdiction to enjoin).
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The issuance of a clear but non-binding agency "guideline" as
to future agency action, applicable to circumstances that are fairly
certain to arise, may either create a sufficient controversy because
of some immediate impact 0 or fail to do so because of the absence
of assurance that the guideline will actually be followed.51 Agency
conduct threatening future agency action that would not be subject
to judicial review may give rise to a ripened controversy if other
conditions of justiciability are met, even though if judicial review
after additional agency action were available, the threat alone would
not suffice.5
Regulations which are issued under a power to make legally
binding rules may, like statutes, either have effects which render
them subject to immediate challenge by persons concerned,5" or be
4 9 See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974),
discussed at note 44 supra; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (police threats of
arrest for handbill distribution); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (official
actions included bad-faith harassment of plaintiffs by means of threats and illegal search
and seizure); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), where the Court,
in an analogous injunction suit against pending court martial proceedings, distinguished
between judicial jurisdiction to entertain the action and "equitable jurisdiction" for the
court to "exercise its remedial powers."
GOSee, e.g., Ramer v. Saxbe, 522 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bureau of Prisons written
policies, not made publicly available but distributed to local penal administrators, held
reviewable as regulations); State ex rel Time Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, 200 N.W.
65 (1924).
51 Standard Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919) (guidelines supplied by state
official to local officers who were not legally bound to follow them); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (non-binding statement of policy); National
Ethical Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 503 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1974) (general characterization
of drugs requiring agency clearance, still to be applied in specific instances); Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. FMC, 402 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (agency "report" which it probably
would follow in future contingencies); Duke v. State ex rel. Shaw, 247 N.C. 236, 100
S.E.2d 506 (1957) (interpretative tax regulation). Property tax assessments which have
become final, unlike the foregoing guidelines and the valuation in United States v. Los
Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927), are not mere guides but determine the
actions of other officials in collecting taxes, and would no doubt be ripe for review by
statutory processes if any were provided. Language in Ex parte Williams, 277 U.S. 267
(1928), which seems to indicate broadly that assessments, because they "are merely find-
ings of fact," are not "orders" which can be reviewed, must be read in context. Tax col-
lections based on such assessments may under some circumstances be enjoined, Great
Northern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135 (1936); Annot., 80 L. Ed. 546 (1936); but for
traditional and practical reasons judicial review under the general jurisdiction is largely
precluded.52 See Commercial State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D.D.C. 1959), af'd
per curiam, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
58 See cases cited in note 56 infra and California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972);
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387
U.S. 167 (1967); Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953);
States Marine Int'l, Inc. v. Peterson, 518 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Florida v. Wein-
berger, 492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1974); National Ind. Coal Operators Ass'n v. Morton, 494
F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ripeness of procedural regulations assumed without discussion);
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1953); American Medical Ass'n v.
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so contingent on future events as to preclude immediate judicial
review." It has been argued unsuccessfully that a ripened controversy
urnder the general jurisdiction does not arise before attempted en-
forcement, even of a regulation which is definite in its terms and
has an immediate economic impact, because administrative judgment
is inescapably involved in determining whether to commence enforce-
ment proceedings in particular instances, and should not be inter-
fered with. 5 The argument was made in the context of statutory
provisions which gave some support to the view that Congress in-
tended to preclude review of the regulation prior to enforcement
action. Without such a context, the argument could not prevail over
the. frequent practice of permitting pre-enforcement review of clear
regulations under the general jurisdiction, despite contingencies that
inescapably surround their effectuation.58
Binding orders with respect to specific named persons are often
ripe for review under the general jurisdiction prior to enforcement,
if such a review is not foreclosed by statute;"7 and agency action
Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. IMI. 1975) (regulation not yet in effect hed review-
able); Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971); Pharmaceutical Mfr. Ass'n v. Richardson, 318 F. Supp. 301 (D.
Del. 1970); Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521, 526 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Sigma Chi
Fraternity v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 258 F. Supp. 515, 521-22 (D. Colo.
1966); Democratic State Central Comm. v. Andolsek, 249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1966).;
Pharmaceutical Mfr. Ass'n v. Finch, 318 F. Supp. 301 (D. Del. 1970) (procedural regulation
imposing burden); Salazar v. Hardin, 314 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Colo. 1970); In re Rules and
Regulations of Division of Social Administration, 118 Ohio App. 407, 195 N.E.2d 112
"(1963); Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Peterson, 244 Ore. 116, 415 P.2d 21 (1966).
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) the Board's actions implementing
a statute gave greater definiteness to it than it would otherwise have had and led Air.
Justice Clark, dissenting, to contend that the decision should have dealt with the legislation
as it was being applied by changed regulations, rather than with its full potential force.
54Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Stearns v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75
(1915) (regulations establishing maximum rank and conditions of service of national guard
officers in future emergencies); Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1966) (regu-
lation restricting professional freedom of staff physicians in possible future cases). Cf. the
suggestion of Judge Thornberry, concurring, in Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n. of Ind. Ins. Agents,
Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), with relation to standing, that action by an agency
pursuant to a general ruling may be challenged by individuals whom the action harms
collaterally, whereas the ruling itself may not be, inasmuch as it does not give rise to a
sufficiently immediate controversy; Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (proposed regulation, announced at start of rulemaking proceedings, is not review-
able action).
5 5 Justice Fortas, concurring and dissenting in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn, and
companion cases, 387 U.S. 167 (1967). See also Helco Prod. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681
(D.C. Cir. 1938) which, however, involved discretion in the enforcement of a statute, not
of regulations.5 GRamspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953); Colorado v.
Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925); Houston v. St. Louis Ind. Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919);
Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-23
(1912); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975). See also cases cited in note 53 supra.57 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228 (1908); Berk v. Laird, 429
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which is merely permissive is similarly reviewable if it determines
"legal rights and relationships" that are not too subject to contin-
gencies.5 Determinations of the status of designated persons or busi-
nesses, which give rise to changed rights or duties on their part, are
also reviewable, at their instance, even if further agency action is
required for enforcement of the obligations.59 A ruling by an agency
which is intended to state legal rights or to guide future agency
action may be reviewable even though it does not have legal force."
Ripeness as Affected by Contingencies
When agency actions or their effects are contingent on future
developments; the nature of the contingencies becomes a factor bear-
F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970) (order dispatching serviceman to combat zone); Lodge. 1858,
Amer. Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (orders separating
certain government employees from their positions and reducing others in grade); Escalera
v. N.Y. City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 865 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
853 (1972) (eviction and rent payment orders against public housing tenants); Getty Oil
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972). In Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp.
v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947), and Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, 323 U.S. 316 (1945),
orders that debtors of the plaintiffs pay certain moneys to the Government instead of to
the creditors were stated to be reviewable in actions against the debtors for the money-
in the Aircraft & Diesel case without exhaustion of a statutory remedy in the Tax Court
with respect to the orders there involved. Because, consequently, the proper remedy was
at law, injunction suits against the payments could not be maintained. See also General
Motors Corp. v. Volpe, 321 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Del. 1970), where review in an injunction
and declaratory judgment action was denied because, in the circumstances, defense in an
enforcement action was considered to provide a sufficient alternative remedy.
5 8 See First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1974) ("preliminary" ap-
proval of new national bank held final in effect); Citizens Committee for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970) (federal
agency consent to a state highway project). See also text accompanying note 51 infra and
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 424 F.2d 1349, 1354 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (order rejecting a particular objection to a corporate acquisi-
tion, even though additional implementations of the acquisition were still required, is
reviewable-but by statutory process alone under the particular statute involved).
59 LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949);
Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v.
National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (Administrative Procedure Act
contributes to immediate reviewability of a negative determination of status and of agency
jurisdiction, which results in withholding statutory benefits, even though agency action
concerning the benefits, if undertaken, would not have been reviewable). Compare American
Air Export & Import Co. v. O'Neill, 221 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1954); (Shields distinguished
because in that case, but not in this, there were criminal penalties for failure to heed the
agency's pronouncement). In Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609
(1973), involving statutory judicial review of a final withdrawal of approval of a new
drug, the Court notes that the agency's threshold determination that the drug was indeed
a new one subject to this withdrawal power could itself have been "a declaratory order
that is eviewable" in a district court, although not directly in a court of appeals in a
proceeding under the statute. Id. at 627. See also the holdings as to federal statutory review
since the Rochester Telephone decision, text accompanying notes 9-14, supra.60 Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250 (1925); Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n
v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971); B.C. Morton Int'l Corp. v. FDIC, 305 F.2d 692
(Ist Cir. 1962), and Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 135 (1963). See also note 41 supra.
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ing on the issue of ripeness, as the foregoing cases indicate. The
contingent events may consist of additional steps by officials, which
may be either discretionary or nondiscretionary, or of acts of private
persons. As to additional official steps, a majority of the Supreme
Court held in Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship
Corp.6 that an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board which was sub-
ject to Presidential action before it could go into effect was "no final
administrative determination" which a court could review, and did
not become such after the President acted, even as to provisions which
he left undisturbed. His action, however, was not subject to Board
control and therefore not predictable by the Board, as were the antici-
pated actions in the Frozen Food Express" case and others cited
above, or the results of the "guidelines" in Standard Scale Co. v.
Farrell' and Sea-Land Service, Inc." In State v. FPC," one feature
of the agency action involved, which was held not ripe for review,
was definite in terms, but its effective date had been postponed until
its probable consequences could be better ascertained, with resulting
doubt whether it would go into effect.88 The situation is similar when,
in the absence of agency action, a statute which is not invalid on its
face is challenged because of the danger of unconstitutionality of its
application; the content, scope, or incidence of future enforcement
action may be too speculative to warrant judicial consideration.'
61 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1947). Cf. Abrams v. Van Schaick, 293 U.S. 188 (1934), reciting
the contingencies that surrounded the anticipated action of a state superintendent of insur-
ance, which was subject to court approval but which the plaintiffs had sought unsuccess-
fully to enjoin in a state court in advance. These contingencies led to the conclusion that
a federal constitutional question underlying the case was not at that stage properly before
the Court on appeal.
62351 U.S. 40 (1956). Procedural regulations were similarly held subject to challenge
in advance of their application in Harlem Valley Transportation Ass'n v. Stafford, 500
F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973);
and Leyden v. FAA, 315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) on the ground that much is
gained by prompt review of the legality of a stated agency procedural policy, even though
the agency might desist from applying the policy in specific instances.
63249 U.S. 571 (1919). See Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Lack of finality also explains the decision in
Standard Scale.. .. There the Court was faced by an advisory 'specification' of char-
acteristics desirable in ordinary measuring scales. The specification could be enforced only
by independent local officers' withholding their approval of the equipment. Justiciability
was denied." Id. at 155.
64402 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
65 503 F.2d 844, 870-71 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co.,
519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975) (agency action, suspended by court order to await environ-
mental impact statement, was thereby rendered too contingent to be subject to judicial
review of other aspects).66 Id. at 870-71.
67Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 459-62, 466, 468-70
(1945); Dash v. Mitchell, 356 F. Supp. 1292, 1299-1301 (D.D.C. 1972); Amalgamated
Meatcutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 760-61 (D.D.C. 1971); Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
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On the private side, action by the recipient of an agency authoriza-
tion, taking advantage of it, usually is required before most of the
consequences of the authorization can arise. Yet the possibility that
the recipient may not act on the authorization may be insufficient to
prevent the authorizing order from being immediately reviewable at
the instance of third persons who are otherwise entitled to seek re-
view. There are inconsistent decisions on this point.6"
In the Columbia Broadcasting System case the contingency in
which the regulation would operate was that an application be made
for the issuance or renewal of a radio station license under arrange-
ments in conflict with the regulation. The likelihood of its occurrence
was so great as almost to eliminate the contingency. In Storer, con-
duct of the Storer Corporation or of other broadcasters who might
purchase its stock in the open market could have brought the con-
tinued licensing of Storer into conflict with the regulation. Here the
contingencies were less certain to arise than in Columbia Broadcast-
ing, but still quite probable and a license to Storer for an additional
station was in fact refused in a companion proceeding because of
the regulation. 9 In Frozen Food Express the contingencies were not
only whether the occasion for enforcement would arise but also
whether the conclusions stated in the "order" under review would
then be followed. In Texaco Inc. v. FPC the court of appeals,7 at the
instance of the applicant, reviewed two license refusals based on a
challenged regulation, holding them invalid for procedural reasons.
At the same time the court declined to review directly, in separate
v. Fowler, 261 F. Supp. 508, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (agency proceedings under way but
no determinations yet made).68 See, e.g., Chicago junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1924) (review accorded);
Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1143, 1147, 114
N.W.2d 622, 624 (1962) (nonstatutory review accorded). See also Newspaper Guild v.
Saxbe, 381 F. Supp. 48 (D.D.C. 1974) (interpretative regulation dispensing with need for
agency clearance of defined class of private transactions held by implication to be review-
able as to legality). By contrast, a permissive order allowing carriers subject to the Inter-
state Commerce Act to increase their rates across the board has so far been considered
nonreviewable at the instance of shippers who might still complain of any resulting rates
to which they might be subjected. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. United States, 316 F.
Supp. 337 (D.D.C. 1969), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 73 (1970). Cf. Gold-
man, Standing to Challenge Orders of the L.C.C., 9 GEo. WAsE. L. Rv. 648 (1941). Com-
pare Goodman v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 467 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (permissive rate
increase order, requiring later specification of rate schedule, held reviewable). See also
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 424 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied
400 U.S. 822 (1970), in which many contingencies still surrounded the corporate acquisition
from which the agency bad removed a particular barrier.69United States v. Storer Broadcasting Corp., 351 U.S. 192, 197 (1956). See also
California Oregon Power Co. v. FPC, 239 F.2d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1956).70317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
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proceedings, either the merits of the regulation or those of a condition
the Federal Power Commission had attached to certain authorizations
it had issued for the sale of natural gas by producers to pipeline
companies, requiring the regulation to be observed, because the regu-
lation ruled out certain grounds for rate increases that had not yet
been sought and were, therefore, still in the realm of mere possi-
bility.7' The contingency that rate increases on the forbidden grounds
would be desired seems to have been as likely to arise as the con-
tingencies in Storer, and the likelihood that consequences adverse to
the objectors would result was seemingly as great. Consistency in the
decisions on this aspect of ripeness has obviously not been achieved.
As previously noted, the matter turns on practical considerations as
viewed by the courts.
Ripeness of Temporary Agency Action
Orders of temporary duration dealing with substantive rights,
whether or not they terminate a proceeding, are immediately review-
able, either as "orders" under statutory provisions or under the
general jurisdiction, if they have consequences that are not remediable
later and that should be prevented if the orders are invalid. Inter-
locutory orders determining procedures or other aspects of the con-
71317 F.2d at 803-04. Cf. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
See also Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861
(1962). In Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404, 407 (10th Cir. 1959),
cited by the Court of Appeals in Texaco, the opinion quotes from Rochester Telephone
Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), to the effect that a challenged order is not
reviewable when it affects the rights of the challenger adversely "only . . . on the con-
tingency of future administrative action." The contingency in the Sunray Mid-Continent
case was the Commission's possible exercise of a power which it reserved in its grant of
certification for gas sales, to deny permission for the discontinuance of service upon the
request of the seller. The likelihood of a request for such permission was substantially less
than the probability that the contingencies involved in the other gas cases would arise;
and, in addition, a request, if it were made, might be granted as well as refused. In all
the foregoing gas cases the business risks of the challengers, affecting their financing, were
increased to at least some degree by the contingencies; but this factor is not dealt with
in the opinions. In Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FPC, 351 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1965), 370 F.2d
181, 191-94 (10th Cir. 1966), by contrast, the court emphasized the present business
risks resulting from the contingency of future agency action as a reason for immediate
reviewability of the orders involved. These orders asserted the agency's authority to re-
quire future refunds of money previously collected in the sale of gas by certificate holders,
but necessitated further action by it before the refund obligations could become definite.
Also see the case on review by the Supreme Court, FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S.
9, 42-43 (1968); Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 378 F.2d 510, 530 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 917-19, No.'s 504, 520, 526, 628 (1968); and the excellent discussion by
Judge Washington, in California Oregon Power Co. v. FPC, 239 F.2d 426, 432-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1956). In Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
occasion for future license renewal coming under the policy statement for which review
was sought was certain to arise; but it was only probable that the statement would then
be followed.
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duct of proceedings, -which are considered below, are subject to the
same basic principle; but the review which is incident to later review
of final agency action is generally considered to suffice as to them,
unless the loss from delay appears excessive.72 On the substantive
side, the suspension, peniding further proceedings, of an existing
authorization or license essential to a business or other important
interest is likely to be ripe for review.. Immediate review may be
prevented, however, by such considerations as the importance of allow-
ing agency protection to the public interest to run its course.7" The
interim approval of an application or proposal requiring advance ap-
proval, or decision not to suspend a previous authorization pending
further action, is likely to be similarly ripe for review at the instaice
of persons,. if any, who have standing to challenge it.74 Suspension
7 Covering both substantive and procedural interlocutory orders, § 15 of the Revised
Model Administrative Procedure Act, which has been followed in a substantial number of
states, provides that "[a] preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling
is-immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an
adequate remedy." The Federal Act, recognizing that "[a] preliminary, procedural, or
intermediate agency action or ruling" may sometimes be "directly reviewable," provides
that such an order which is not so reviewable "is subject to review on the review of the
final agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
73 Compare Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.
1970) (ripeness negated by particular statutory purposes and provisions), with Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 590-92 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972); R.. Holman & Co. v. SEC,
299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962) (review available in
declaratory judgment action); American Home Products Corp. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp.
448 (D. Del. 1969) (same in suit for injunctive relief) (for decision at later stage see
328 F. Supp. 612 (1971)); Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969)
(same in suit for injunction and declaratory judgment); Airline Ground Serv. Inc. v.
Checker Cab Co., 151 Neb. 837, 39 N.W.2d 809 (1949) (order held to be final in reality,
even though only temporary in form); Russo v. Walsh, 18 N.J. 205, 113 A.2d 516 (1955)
(suspension of public officer pending possible removal held immediately reviewable as to
existence of power, because of public importance of issue; larger question of ripeness not
considered); Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 212 Wis. 184, 248 N.W. 458
(1933) (agency action sustained on the merits). Cf. Relco, Inc. v. Consumer Products Safety
Comm'n, 391 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (public warning as to danger from product,
carrying "finality in its most certain and practical sense," but subject to later correction
after hearing, held preliminary and not reviewable except as to subdelegation of its issuance).
See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949)
(issue of agency jurisdiction decided without question as to ripeness of interim order).
74 Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelsbaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; United
Telegraph Workers v. FCC, 436 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (order sanctioning experimental
service); National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Pennsylvania
Gas & Water Co. v. FPC, 427 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1970); City of Los Angeles v. FMC, 388
F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 379 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Tsbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 990 (1954); Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 211 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(refusal to suspend license for test broadcasting, pending hearing on objections); American
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Merchants Delivery Co. v. United
States, 265 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (temporary certificate to motor carrier reviewable
for abuse of discretion); Smith v. Delaware Coach Co., 31 Del. Ch. 256, 70 A.2d 257 (1949)
(temporary rate increase); American Vitrified Prod. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 131 Ind.
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of payments by the government under a statute, on the other hand,
is not reviewable when adjustment can be made after further con-
sideration ;7  but if prompt payment is part of the statutory purpose,
its postponement or suspension becomes reviewable. 7 An order, not
immunized from review because wholly discretionary, limiting rates
that can be charged by a utility pending agency decision, or an order
conditioning a temporary authorization in some other way that im-
poses irremediable disadvantage on the person authorized, is ripe for
review.7 7 Similarly, denial of a temporary authorization to engage
App. 378, 176 N.E.2d 145 (1961); City of Pittsburgh v, Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
178 Pa. Super. 368, 115 A.2d 858 (1955) (same). Cf. Lehmann v. State Bd. of Pub. Acc'tc'y,
208 Ala. 185, 94 So. 94 (1922), affld 263 U.S. 394 (1923).
When, however, advance approval for private conduct is not a prerequisite, but an
agency has power summarily to impose a suspension pending investigation, a decision as to
suspension is likely under Federal statutes to be wholly discretionary and hence immune
from review without reference to any issue of ripeness. Port of N.Y. Auth. v. United States,
451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971); Municipal Light Bds. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Associated Press v. FCC, 448 F.2d 1095, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Radrizzi v. ICC, 441 F.2d
1236 (8th Cir. 1971); Minnesota v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 107 (D. Minn. 1965);
Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1959), vacated in part as
moot, 364 U.S. 280 (1960). Cf. Arrow Transp. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 658, 670 (1963).
Termination of an investigation and of a suspension that led to it may, by contrast, be in
effect a determination on the merits, reviewable as such. City of Chicago v. United States,
396 U.S. 162 (1969). The effects of a nonsuspension in itself, pending a final determination,
may at times be sufficiently irreparable to justify judicial review. Michigan Power Co. v.
FPC, 494 F.2d 1140, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142,
148 (5th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1975), in which the agency's designation of an initial list of water pollutants that might
be subjected to effluent standards was held by a majority of the court to be statutorily
final and therefore subject to judicial review of challenged omissions from the list.75 Aquavella v. Finch, 306 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf. Adams v. Nagle, 303
U.S. 532, 544 (1938) (collection of assessment against shareholders of national bank is not
subject to challenge in advance of payment).7 6 California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971) (unemploy-
ment compensation payments).
77 Prendergast v. N.Y. Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
FPC, 227 F.2d 470, 475 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005 (1956); Atlantic
Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953); Sohio Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 298
F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1961); Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1961); and Sunray
Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959) (conditions limiting rates,
attached to temporary certificates of convenience and necessity). Cf. Lewiston, Greene, &
Monmouth Tel. Co. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 299 A.2d 895 (Me. 1973) (interim
rate division order held reviewable under statutes as to constituional issues). Compare
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 149, 157 (5th Cir. 1961), and Humble Oil Co. v. FPC, 236
F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1956), where the court based its conclusion, that a condition attached
to a temporary certificate was nonreviewable, partially on the ground that the statutory
review proceeding, which had been invoked, required an agency record, absent in these cases
because the temporary certificate was issued without a hearing. As in the other cases under
the Natural Gas Act cited above, the issue presented on review was essentially one of law,
involving the Commission's power to act. In American Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. SEC, 93
F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937), the court of appeals held the agency was under a duty to
provide a record, even without a statutory requirement for it, in aid of review of an order
which the court held was reviewable on the record by the court. The court took the same
position, casting doubt on United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In
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in business, twhich withholds the use of a large investment already
made, may be reviewable.7 8
Ripeness of Interlocutory Procedural Orders
for Statutory Review Proceedings
Interlocutory procedural orders are normally not embraced by
statutory provisions for the review of "orders" or, more specifically,
"final orders." Unless some other process for immediate review is
available, judicial consideration of these orders must await an order
terminating the proceedings. The interlocutory orders can then be
scrutinized, insofar as they affect the validity of the ultimate result.79
The Supreme Court has said that statutory provision for the review
of orders relates "to orders of a definitive character dealing with the
merits of a proceeding . . . and resulting from a hearing upon evi-
dence and supported by findings appropriate to the case."'so Later the
Court, citing this prior utterance, noted that even a provision for the
review of "any order, affirmative or negative," is subject to "self-
denying constructions which do not subject to judicial control orders
which, from their nature, from the context of the Act, or from the
relation of judicial power to the subject-matter, are inappropriate
for review." 1 Earlier the Court had held that an order setting a case
for hearing, even though the agency's statutory authority to proceed
was challenged, was not immediately reviewable by a statutory three-
judge court.8  Subject to exceptions discussed below,' when review
Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FPC, 351 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1965), 370 F.2d 181, 191-94 (10th Cir.
1966), the court emphasized the business risks which resulted from the agency action as an
important reason for immediate reviewability of the orders there involved. These orders
asserted the agency's authority to require future refunds of money previously collected in
the sale of gas, but required further action by it before the refund obligations could become
definite. See also the same case in the Supreme Court, FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391
U.S. 9, 42-43 (1968).78 Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1953).
79 See Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Citizens for a Safe Environ-
ment v. AEC, 489 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1974), where only "final orders" were reviewable,
distinguishing on this ground Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. dented, 409 U.S. 849 (1972), where "orders" were reviewable; City of
Trenton v. FCC, 441 F.2d 1329, 1333 (3d Cir. 1971) (general order halting temporarily a
class of proceedings before the Commission); Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC,
433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Cf. Thompson Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.2d 637 (6th
Cir. 1943).
8OFPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 384 (1938).81 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 106 (1948).
82United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 244 U.S. 82 (1917). See also N.Y. Shipping
Ass'n, Inc. v. FMC, 495 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir. 1974) (temporary order held equivalent of
refusal to dismiss, without prejudice to merits, hence not immediately reviewable); Canadian
River Gas Co. v. FPC, 110 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1940); Territo v. United States, 170 F.
Supp. 855 (D.NJ. 1958). Compare Associated Press v. FCC, 448 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1971), in which the court reviewed on the merits and sustained two orders accepting a
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is sought pursuant to statute, noninterference with the orderly progress
of agency proceedings is in general more important than immediate
redress for alleged errors or wrongs that can largely be remedied later
by the agency or on review of a final order."
Decisions applying the foregoing principle have withheld im-
mediate review of rulings which related to pleadings or evidence,"
rejected an application without prejudice,"6 declined to accept settle-
ments,8 7 determined the burden of proof or the order in which evi-
dence should be adduced,88 refused the issuance of subpoenas to
private parties, 9 or denied access to a hearing examiner's intermediate
report.9
°
Because of the Supreme Court's disposition of one of the points
involved in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 1 rulings on evidence
by federal agencies presented special problems in subsequent years.
The Court branded as an abuse of discretion the action of a hearing
examiner and of the National Labor Relations Board in rejecting
the testimony of two witnesses for the company but, affirming the
lower court, refused to set aside the Board's order on this ground,
because "[p]etitioners did not avail themselves" of the "appropriate
procedure", which was "to apply to the Court of Appeals for leave
to adduce the additional evidence". 92 The case involved two proceed-
ings, one brought by the Board to enforce a cease-and-desist order
common carrier tariff for filing, suspension, and investigation, allegedly without statutory
authority to do so, but at the same time rejected as not ripe for review certain alleged
reflections of agency bias during interim proceedings.
83See text accompanying notes 102-105 infra.
84 Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Iowa
City-Montezuma Shippers Ass'n v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (S.D. Iowa 1972)
(review of denial of claimed rights to discovery and cross-examination).
85 See e.g., Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 329 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 941 (1962);
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 822 (1962).86 See, e.g., Fort Harrison Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, 297 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Although the order terminates the proceeding, a new one can be begun. Hence, the situ-
ation is analogous to deferment of an agency's consideration of an application that remains
pending.
87 See, e.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 285 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1960).
88 See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1961);
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 206 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1953).
89See, e.g., Laundry Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1952);
cf. Sayre Land Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Commn'n, 167 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 74 A.2d 713
,1950) (order granting discovery).
I0 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. FPC, 130 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
91305 U.S. 197 (1938).
921d. at 226 (footnote omitted).
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and one by the respondent to review the order as "final", both of which
were subject to a statutory provision which specified that
[ilf either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce
additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the
court that . .. there were reasonable grounds for the failure to
adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, . . . the
court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the
Board, . . .and to be made part of the record. 3
The court of appeals had held that there was a failure to follow
the statute because "the petitioners have not applied to this court
for the taking of additional evidence."" In that court the Board's
answer to the petition for review of the final order had contended
with respect to the exclusion of the testimony thaf "the statute af-
fords petitioners now, before final hearing, the remedy therefor by
application to this Court for leave to adduce additional evidence.... .,"
The Supreme Court decision, therefore, despite the ambiguity of its
wording, seems to have been intended to mean that leave to adduce
additional evidence must be sought by specific application to the court
in proceedings to enforce or review a final order-not by way of
immediate challenge in court to an interlocutory order excluding the
evidence. The statutory provision in context has this meaning.
The matter again came before the Supreme Court in Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,96 under a similar pro-
vision of the review section of the Internal Security Act. The Court
refused to decide whether a challenge to the exclusion of evidence
could still be made on review of a final order under such a statute,
because the issue had not been presented-although it might have
be n-when the same case was previously before the Court. Chief
Justice Warren, dissenting, contended that the issue should have been
passed upon and decided favorably to the petitioner's right to offer
the challenge9" because a remand to correct the exclusion, which in
his view was erroneous, would have avoided the necessity of deciding
93 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
94 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 95 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1938).
9 5 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 226; Record, Vol. 7, part 2, at
1698-99. Also see the Solicitor General's Brief in the Supreme Court for the Board, at 53.
The brief for Consolidated Edison, at 73, objected to the lower court's holding that "upon
the hearing of their petition for review" the petitioners should have sought leave to
adduce the additional testimony.
96367 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1961).
97Id. at 219. The excluded "evidence" consisted of documents containing previous
statements of a witness, which were in the possession of the Government and which the
petitioner wished to use for impeachment purposes. Id. at 117.
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the constitutional questions in the case which the majority undertook
to decide. He criticized the Consolidated Edison holding because he
thought it "established a cumbersome procedure whereby resort to
the Court of Appeals was required every time the Board excluded
evidence which the offering party thought should have been ad-
mitted." '
Courts of appeals treated the issue raised by Consolidated Edison
in conflicting ways99 until Judge Burger, as he then was, for a ma-
jority of the court of appeals in Texaco, Inc. v. FPC,'" elaborately
re-examined the issue and construed the Consolidated Edison holding
in accordance with its probably intended meaning. This requires,
under the kind of statute involved, that an application for leave to
introduce evidence which was rejected or refused by an agency be
made to the court of appeals on review of an eventual final order, so
as to secure consideration of this issue, but not that the rejection or
refusal be taken immediately to court. The decision in the case re-
jected an immediate resort to court under the Natural Gas Act as
premature. At length, then, the Consolidated Edison holding appears
to have received an adequately supported, workable intrepretation.10'
Despite the normal nonreviewability of interlocutory procedural
98 Id. at 122.
99 Statements which echoed the Consolidated Edison opinion without imparting greater
clarity to it appeared in NLRB v. National Laundry Co., 138 F.2d 589, 590 (D.C. Cir.
1943), and Swift & Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 87, 91 (10th Cir. 1939), both involving final
orders. The view that under the Federal Trade Commission Act an immediate application
should be made to a Court of Appeals for leave to produce wrongly rejected evidence
appears to have been taken in California Lumbermen's Council v. FTC, 115 F.2d 178, 183
(9th Cir. 1940), on review of a final order, and was more dearly expressed as to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 145 F.2d 214,
215 (4th Cir. 1944), and Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1939). Such
was also the holding of the court of appeals in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board which later came before the Supreme Court, 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
af'd on rehearing, 277 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
In Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 822 (1962),
the court, without discussing the problem of interpretation surrounding the Consolidated
Edison holding, rejected as premature an immediate challenge to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's rejection of proffered testimony. The view that improper exclusion of evidence may,
under the kind of statute here involved, be corrected on review of final orders was acted
upon in NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Co., 258 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1958), and Mississippi
Valley Structural Steel Co. v. NLRB, 145 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1944). In the latter case
the court considered the petition for review to include an implied request for leave to adduce
the additional evidence.
100 329 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 941 (1963). An appendix to the
opinion enumerates federal statutes containing substantially similar provisions. The Com-
mission's refusal in the case was later reviewed and upheld in Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FPC,
370 F.2d 181, 186-87 (10th Cir. 1966).
10 1 See Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); R.H.
Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778, 781-82 (D.D.C. 1966).
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orders, some orders of this nature, which to a large extent dispose
of interests with practical finality, may be immediately reviewable by
statutory processes. Hence, for example, an agency ruling or order
that would result in the disclosure of trade secrets or other confiden-
tial information demanded by the agency may be reviewed;"'2 and
even the withholding or delay of an agency hearing or decision with
resulting serious injury to an interest protected by statute may become
an "order" subject to statutory review." s Denials of intervention in
proceedings or consolidation of proceedings present special problems
which are discussed below.'" In addition, the public importance of
particular procedural issues determined by interlocutory orders or
directives may be so great as to bring these actions without delay
under statutory provisions for review of "orders" which for this pur-
pose possess sufficient finality or ripeness to render them immediately
reviewable. 05
102 See, e.g., American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
103 See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) distinguished in Citizens for a Safe Environment v. AEC, 489
F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1974) (postponement of consideration of allowance of attor-
neys' fees which were allegedly authorized by law and were needed immediately); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where, however, the
impact of the order was not merely procedural, but suspended the sale of a product; Black
United Front v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 436 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (refusal to receive petition for rehearing, with consequent loss of petitioners' statutory
right to suspension of prior order). In Utah Agencies v. CAB, 504 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1974), the court sustained the denial of a motion for an expedited hearing in an important
proceeding, without discussing the question of whether the matter was ripe for statutory
review. See also Harvey Radio Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 289 F.2d 458 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
The statement in International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. National Medi-
ation Board, 425 F.2d 527, 535 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that the "claim of unlawful or un-
reasonable delay establishes court jurisdiction even though there has been no final agency
order," citing Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963), and Harvey Radio Labo-
ratories v. United States, 289 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1961), is highly questionable. It seems to
rest in reality on the provision of § 706(1) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970), that a
reviewing court shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."
This provision prescribes the scope of review when review takes place, not a basis of juris-
diction in the first instance.104 See text accompanying notes 139-56 infra.
1 0 5 See Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) (review accorded, without discussion of ripeness point, to failure
to follow critical procedural steps required by Environmental Policy Act); Citizens Gas &
Coke Util. v. Sloan, 136 Ind. App. 297, 196 N.E.2d 290 (1964) (assertion of jurisdiction by
state commission over municipally-owned utility).
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 851 (10th Cir. 1973), the procedural
order which was challenged, although interlocutory as applied to pending proceedings, was
viewed by the court as in effect a general regulation fixing procedures, ripe as such for
review by the statutory process. See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), distinguishing in n.28 of the opinion Thermal Ecology Must Be
Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The Atomic Energy Act provided explicitly that orders containing regulations should be
reviewable by the statutory review process and by that process alone. See Izaak Walton
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General-Jurisdiction Review of
Interlocutory Procedural Actions
When immediate judicial review of an interlocutory procedural
ruling of an agency is sought under the general jurisdiction of the
courts, the question of ripeness turns initially on whether the ruling
generates a case or controversy, and on whether other prerequisites
of ripeness, sometimes including requirements which attach specially
to the kind of action brought, are present in the case. In relation to
the frequently invoked injunction suit, these additional specific re-
quirements are principally whether an actual or immediately threat-
ened injury is sufficiently made to appear and whether an adequate
alternative remedy could be had."0 6 If a remedy after additional agency
action is provided by statute but is available only later, the question
arises whether the statute impliedly excludes immediate review of
interlocutory action by means of the general jurisdiction.' In addi-
tion the courts' possession of a residuary discretion to withhold de-
claratory, mandamus, or injunctive relief for policy reasons, even
when authority to entertain the proceeding is present, gives rise to
questions surrounding the exercise of that discretion which are diffi-
cult to separate from the issue of whether the review proceeding
should be entertained in the first instance.10 8
League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 290-91 (D.D.C. 1971). In Harlem Valley Trans.
Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974), the court, construing the Greene County
decision, above, as upholding immediate statutory review of AEC regulations prescribing
interlocutory procedures, sustained the immediate reviewability of similar ICC regulations
under the district court's mandamus jurisdiction, but held that these regulations were not
the kind of "order" covered by the three-judge-court process for "restraining the enforce-
ment, operation, or execution," of orders of the Commission, prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2325
(1970).
106 Cf. A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); R.H. Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp.
778 (D.D.C. 1966).
107 See A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For a further discussion of this
aspect of the method and timing of judicial review, see text accompanying notes 134-38
inf ra. With reference to review of agency action not otherwise made reviewable by statute,
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides only for review of "final agency action,"
and for review at the same time of "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). The direct reviewability
of some interlocutory action, which is contemplated, depends on law outside the Act. The
APA, however, does bestow procedural rights which can be enforced in an allowable review
proceeding. See Deering Miliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961), involving
the right to have the agency, "within a reasonable time, .... proceed to conclude a matter
presented to it," as bestowed by 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970).
108I Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), the Court held (1) that there
was subject matter jurisdiction in the District Court to entertain an injunction suit to halt
a court-martial proceeding because a substantial question as to the jurisdiction of the court-
martial itself had been raised, but that the District Court erroneously employed its resulting
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The recognized applicable principle is that the general juris-
diction of the courts is not available for immediate judicial review
of the interlocutory procedural orders or rulings of agencies. Excep-
tions arise most often when: (1) violations of due process are suffi-
ciently alleged and may fundamentally affect the agency proceeding
as a whole; (2) other alleged excess of authority or violations of
duty by an agency raise the issue of agency jurisdiction or power to
commence or go on with its proceeding; (3) or challenged agency
action or inaction involves an issue which is important to the public
and calls for immediate resolution or is not resolvable otherwise.
The general principle that judicial review of interlocutory pro-
cedural action is not immediately available has been followed easily
when inconvenience or litigation costs to participants in additional
agency proceedings are the principal hardships alleged,10 9 or even
when procedural handicaps that are not irreparable may be imposed.
The principle has been applied to: an asserted want of agency auth-
ority in relation to merely some of the issues involved in a proceed-
ing;11° an agency's omission of allegedly mandatory pre-complaint
processes ;111 an agency's denial of discovery 1 2 or of subpoenas or their
"equitable jurisdiction" to "exercise its remedial powers." Id. at 754. It should, rather, have
given the court-martial the opportunity- to decide in the first instance the particular kind
of question which had been raised concerning its own jurisdiction.
109 See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Purcell, 125 F. Supp. 74 (W.D. Mich. 1954); Pax
Co. of Utah v. United States, 454 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1972); M. G. Davis Co. v. Cohen, 369
F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1966). Perhaps the leading pronouncement on this point in relation to the
timing of judicial review of agency action is that of Mr. Justice Brandeis in- Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938). The point is often reiterated, as it
was in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756 (1975).
110 Power Authority v. Dep't of Environmental Conservation, 379 F. Supp. 243
(N.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974) (order
limiting issues held not ripe for immediate statutory review).
11 Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1974), in which the opinion speaks
in terms of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
112Nader v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Maremont Corp. v. FTC, 431 F.2d
124 (7th Cir. 1970); Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960); Barnes v. Chatterton, 515 F.2d 916, 921 (3d Cir.
1975); Intertype Co. v. Penello, 269 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Va. 1967); Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. FPC, 224
F. Supp. 166 (N.D. Ind. 1963). The contrary has been held with respect to a statutorily-
based action under the Freedom of Information Act to compel discovery of information
by an agency to a party before it. See Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co.,
415 U.S. 1 (1974). The remedy, however, does not extend to an injunction against con-
tinuance of a negotiatory main proceeding pending a requisite disclosure; for the opposing
view see the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and
Powell. Id. at 26. See also United Tel. Co. v. FCC, 375 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Pa. 1974);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (action to secure information
for use in rule-making proceeding); Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir.
1971), in which the district court in a Freedom of Information Act proceeding to compel
disclosures to Sterling as a respondent before the Commission was held to be empowered
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equivalent by an agency;113 an agency demand for information, with-
out attempted enforcement;114 refusal by an agency to join allegedly
indispensable parties respondent, at least when a valid final order
may still result ;11 alleged violations of rules of practice by an agency's
interim steps in a proceeding;11 the exclusion of proffered evidence;117
and even the denial of procedural rights claimed by virtue of constitu-
tional provisions,"' have been denied review prior to final agency
action.
The first exception enumerated above, involving alleged violations
of due process which appear on the record before the court, funda-
mentally affecting the agency proceeding as a whole, includes such
situations as alleged bias or conflicts of interest on the part of an
official actively participating in the proceedings, which threaten un-
fairness at many points." 9 Also within the exception are decisions
reviewing on constitutional grounds interlocutory agency actions which
do not involve a threat of pervasive unfairness but still detract seriously
to decide issues under that Act but not questions as to whether the challenged withholding
of information violated fair-hearing requirements. Exhaustion of agency processes for con-
sideration of disclosure requests is also an applicable prerequisite. Cf. Diapulse Corp. of
America v. Food & Drug Admin., 500 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1974).
113 Bristol Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1972) (subpoena sought during
informal pre-complaint negotiation); Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 307 F. Supp. 1401, 1404
(W.D. Pa. 1970); R.H. Macy & Co. v. TInley, 249 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1966). Compare
Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp. v. FTC, 233 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), distinguished in
R.H. Macy, 249 F. Supp. at 783.
114 Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966). Statutory proceedings to en-
force agency subpoenas, similar in this respect to proceedings under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), when used to compel discovery
by an agency, provide a means to secure immediate judicial review of interlocutory agency
demands which take the subpoena form; but the scope of review is extremely limited.
Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); NLRB v. Daniel Constr.
Co., 418 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970). Compare A.O. Smith
Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3rd Cir. 1976), where the court looked upon the agency's
order as one imposing a rule of regular reporting of information, rather than as a demand
for information as a prerequisite for further agency proceedings, and held it to be subject
to immediate review in an injunction suit.
115 Seven-Up Co. v. FTC, 478 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1973); Coca Cola Co. v. FTC, 475
F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973); Pepsi Co., Inc. v. FTC, 472
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
116 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 210 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1962) (decision largely
based on exclusiveness of statutory review of final order, but basic principle seems
broader).
117 Cf. Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354, 357-58 (2d Cir. 1968).
118Delzer Constr. Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1973); J.C. Penney
Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 439 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869 (1971); Jackson v. Colorado, 294 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (D. Colo. 1968) ("[a]bsent
a serious constitutional threat") (emphasis added).
119 See Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962), narrowly interpreted
in Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The case is distinguished in,
among other cases, Maremont Corp. v. FTC, 431 F.2d 124, 128 (7th Cir. 1970) (facts as
to alleged prejudice required elaboration); San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d
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from the entire proceeding, as does a want of due initial notice,'
agency resort to rdlemaking instead of adjudication,' 2 ' adherence to
private rather than public proceedings, 122 or failure to accord statu-
tory procedural rights embodying constitutional due process," pos-
sibly including the right to use a legally qualified hearing examiner.'2
In these instances, however, a court on later review of final agency
action could actually counteract the alleged fault by remand or decree
requiring correction. Hence, the ultimate injury would be only the
expense and other handicaps of the additional procedures involved.
Important decisions have therefore denied immediate general-juris-
diction review in similar situations." Arguably such review should
be accorded if, in addition, serious injury to a business or reputation
would result from delay until after final agency action.126
162 (9th Cir. 1967) (same); SEC v. RA. Holman Co., 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963) (same). See also National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell,
225 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denid, 351 U.S. 927 (1956); Lehigh Portland Cement
Co. v. FTC, 291 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd 416 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1969);
Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 280 F. 45 (8th Cir. 1922) (attempted original action in
the court of appeals). In FTC v. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965), the court chose, 336 F.2d at 691, to review for alleged
prejudicial purpose the Commission's order remanding the proceeding to a hearing exam-
iner, with the conclusion that prejudice was not shown, rather than to decide whether
the district court had jurisdiction to review. See also United States v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
462 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972), where, in a proceeding to enforce an agency order to supply
information, the court held that the respondent could not seek review as to alleged agency
bias resulting from a parallel investigation. See further, as to review of alleged bias in a
statutory proceeding seeking review of an interim agency order, Associated Press v. FCC,
448 F.2d 1095, 1106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
120 See, e.g., Kalman v. Walsh, 355 Ill. 341, 189 N.E. 315 (1934).
2 1 See, e.g., Anaconda Company v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1305 (10th Cir. 1973)
(constitutional issue as to validity of proceeding decided, although statutory issues not
ripe for review).
122 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
123See, e.g., Leyden v. FAA, 315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Holmes v. N.Y. -
City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). In Holmes the procedural rights which
were withheld derived most immediately from a regulation that purported to accord them;
but their denial, incident to the informal handling of applications for admission to public
housing facilities, pervaded the entire administration in a manner violative of due process.12 4 See, e.g., Yanish v. Barber, 181 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1950), impliediy affirming
Yanish v. Wixon, 81 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Cal. 1948), as to ripeness, but reversing as to
the merits; Davis v. Secretary of HEW, 386 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1967) (the government
did not appeal on the ripeness issue and decision is on the merits, "assuming [ripeness]
without deciding" that issue). Riss & Co. v. ICC, 179 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1950), is to the
contrary. In United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33 (1952), the exhaustion
principle barred a challenge in court because the issue of hearing officer qualifications had
not been raised before the agency.
125,See, e.g., Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962) (denial of claimed due process rights
in an Army discharge proceeding); Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1966),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966); Vitelli v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. CaL 1965),
and cases cited note 118 supra.
126JIn Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962), Justices Douglas and Black dissented force-
fully on the ground of irreparable damage to the reputation of the military officer involved
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Similarily under the second exception, when the statutory (even
though not the constitutional) foundation for an agency proceeding
or its conformity as a whole to statutory requirements may be re-
solved on the record at the stage of interlocutory action, as distin-
guished from the legality of a single aspect such as is involved in a
ruling on evidence or on the scope of issues to be considered, the
evidence or on the scope of issues to be considered, the contention
that further steps in the proceeding can be enjoined, or procedural rights
be judicially declared, is sometimes made successfully.127 On this basis
the alleged inadequacy of an initial notice or basis of complaint under
the governing statute, 2 ' or an alleged failure to take essential inter-
mediate steps,' 29 has been held immediately reviewable. However,
if due process were not assured in advance. In Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139, 141
(D.C. Cir. 1963), the court sustained judicial jurisdiction to decide the issue of statutory
authority of the agency to continue a proceeding damaging to the reputation of a busi-
ness, emphasizing at the same time the highly limited availability of injunctions in such
cases. Review as to a similar issue took place in a statutory proceeding by the Commission
to enforce a subpoena, in Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). See ako E. Griffiths Hughes,
Inc., v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (injunction suit against the Commission);
Knoll Associates v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (review of agency's use of
allegedly tainted evidence).
12 7 See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (issue of continuing failure to
accord interim procedural safeguards required by regulations having statutory force;
plaintiff loses on this issue, however); Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d
328 (2d Cir. 1974) (review of failure to fulfill statutory prerequisite of environmental
impact statement); Farmer v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C.
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954) (review of jurisdiction of NLRB to initiate an
inquiry with constitutionally questionable consequences); City of Rye v. Schuler, 355 F.
Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (review of omission of prerequisite early steps in highway loca-
tion proceedings). In International Waste Controls, Inc. v. SEC, 362 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), the issue of agency authority to proceed, which was held not ripe for review,
turned on questions of fact that were not resolvable from the record.
128Cf. Pharmaceutical Mfr's. Ass'n v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 271, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(review of asserted deficiency in original statutory notice); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. White-
house, 212 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1964), and Townsend v. National R.R. Adjustment Bd., 117
F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1954) (challenges to agency refusal to notify and permit participa-
tion by third persons in proceedings, where statute allegedly made notice and opportunity
to participate a prerequisite to agency jurisdiction.
In Elmo Division of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965), review
was had of alleged legal error in using complaint process in place of reopening an earlier
proceeding. Nevertheless, the decision in Elmo Division seems wrong because plaintiffs
only threatened loss was the costs of a possibly erroneous proceeding. So, for the same
reason, does the holding as to immediate reviewability of a single Commissioner's alleged
error of law in voting to issue the complaint in Jewel Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th
Cir. 1970). As to the insufficiency of troublesome procedures, allegedly erroneously imposed,
as a basis for overcoming the ripeness principle, see M.G. Davis Co. v. Cohen, 369 F.2d
360 (2d Cir. 1966).
129 See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974); Boston v. Stevens, 395 F. Supp.
1000 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (unconscionable agency delay, imposing serious hardship on the
plaintiff, held immediately reviewable); City of Rye v. Schuler, 355 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
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challenges raising issues of this nature have more often been rejected.130
Reliable criteria for decision as to ripeness in this type of situation have
not arisen. Answers turn on judicial evaluation of a host of factors
relating to the public and private interests at stake in particular cases,
including the need to conserve judicial resources, the relevance of
agency expertise to the issues raised, and the immediacy and seriousness
of threatened injury to the challenger.
More explicitly qualitative than the exceptions involving the
constitutional or statutory authority of agencies to proceed, is the
exception based on the possible need to resolve promptly an issue
important to the public, or to determine such an issue when it cannot
be settled otherwise. Seemingly because of this exception, agency
slowness to initiate steps, allegedly required by statute, to protect a
strong public interest which suffers in the meanwhile has been held
subject to immediate review.' 81 In Order of Railway Conductors v.
Swan?3 2 the Supreme Court held a total refusal to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a statutorily resolvable issue, resulting from a deadlock
between two branches of the same agency, to be immediately review-
able in a declaratory judgment action.133
As noted above, 84 statutory review of "orders" or "final orders",
available under many federal statutes, extends to immediate review
Is3 See, e.g., FPC v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 330 U.S. 802 (1947), rev'd per
curiam 156 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (statutory jurisdiction of the agency); American
Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); Dow Chem. Co. v. Ruckels-
haus, 477 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1973) (alleged statutory prerequisite of statement of reasons
for commencement of proceedings); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. FTC, 380 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967)
(jurisdiction of agency to conduct the proceedings); Lever Bros. Co. v. FTC, 325 F. Supp.
371 (D. Me. 1971) (authority of agency to proceed by rulemaking as to subject matter);
McDevitt v. Gunn, 182 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (statutory jurisdiction of the agency);
Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 hr=. 1, 60 N.W.2d 18 (1953) (alleged want of agency authority
because of composition of required advisory board). The issue of whether the agency pro-
ceeding was barred by res judicata might be reviewable upon a challenge to interlocutory
action in a later proceeding, if the absence of new facts were clear; but the issue has arisen
when the existence of additional facts remained in dispute; hence the issue was not ripe.
See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Weinberger, 384 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and cases cited
therein.
231 See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'g, 356 F. Supp.
92 (1973) (review of failure to institute enforcement proceedings against ascertained racial
discrimination violative of statute). Cf. also Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500
F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974), and City of Rye v. Schuler, 355 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
132329 U.S. 520 (1947).
133 n United States v. Christensen, 207 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1953), by contrast, the
Veterans Administration's refusal to proceed with adjudicating a war risk insurance claim
was not final but only pending a report from the Navy; hence, judicial intervention could
not be had. See akso Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, etc. v. National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d
527, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Board's interim refusal to offer arbitration held reviewable
because of importance of scrutinizing agency inactivity which prolonged a statutory sus-
pension of fundamentally important rights to strike and engage in peaceful picketing).
'
3 4 See text accompanying notes 102-105 supra.
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of certain interlocutory procedural actions. When it does, general-
jurisdiction review is, by inference, correspondingly precluded."'
When statutory review of interlocutory actions is not available im-
mediately and either becomes useless thereafter or is available only
less effectively as an incident to later review of final actions, the
question arises whether the statute nevertheless precludes immediate
review which the general jurisdiction would otherwise afford. Under
the National Labor Relations Act there is such a statutory preclusion
as respects Board actions in representation proceedings, with severely
limited exceptions.186 The terms of the statute and its legislative his-
tory establish that review can take place, if at all, only after ensuing
unfair labor practice proceedings have resulted in orders which are
statutorily reviewable in the courts of appeals, with accompanying
review of preliminary matters that remain consequential. These mat-
ters include interlocutory procedural orders in unfair labor practice
proceedings which are also affected by a specific legislative policy of
postponement of review, 137 as well as orders in such related repre-
sentation proceedings as may have preceded. These two policies, re-
lating specifically to the Board, augment but do not alter the policy
applicable to general-jurisdiction review of interlocutory procedural
orders of agencies generally. 
13
135 Cf. Floersheim v. Engman, 494 F.2d 949, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (preclusion of district
court declaratory judgment and injunction proceeding by narrow ancillary authority of
court of appeals under statutory review power, to entertain objections to agency rejection
of plaintiff's compliance with prior cease-and-desist order which court of appeals had sus-
tained). Compare Robertson v. FTC, 415 F.2d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1969) (district court action
not precluded in case to which statutory review does not apply); North American Van
Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 386 F. Supp. 665, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (statutory three-judge court
review excludes single-judge jurisdiction in mandamus, in relation to orders reopening pro-
ceedings).
1 8 8 This preclusion relates most often to orders which terminate the representation
proceedings by designating a collective bargaining unit and identifying a representative of
the employees there. The dominant question is whether additional Board proceedings pur-
suant to an unfair labor practice complaint, which often can be invoked in the same on-
going labor relations situation, must be exhausted before judicial review can be had; but
as to interlocutory orders there is the additional question of ripeness.
137 A comparison of the applications of these two facets of Congressional policy to
interlocutory procedural steps in labor relations proceedings is made in Bokat v. Tidewater
Equip. Co., 363 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1966), and Chicago Automobile Trade Ass'n v. Madden,
328 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1969). See akso Deering Milliken,
Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961), where a close relation between the two is
assumed.
138 The fountain-head case concerning the unavailability of immediate general-juris-
diction review of Board action initiating allegedly unauthorized proceedings, Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), regularly cited in relation to all areas of
administration, relies both (1) on the National Labor Relations Act's specific provision that
the authority of the Board and of a court of appeals exercising statutory reviewing power
"shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or pre-
vention that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise," 29
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Review of Action Refusing Intervention
or Consolidation
Special problems of ripeness are presented when immediate re-
view is sought of orders denying intervention by would-be parties
to agency proceedings or refusing consolidation of proceedings that
are under way. Many aspects of the pending proceedings may turn
on the interlocutory actions, yet constitutional questions or issues of
agency jurisdiction are rarely involved' and the procedural rights
at stake are seldom of outstanding public importance. However, ade-
quate later relief, incident to review of any resulting final orders,140
is often difficult. Hence immediate review in statutory review pro-
ceedings or under the general jurisdiction is likely to be accorded
when it is sought with respect to denials of intervention,141 and it is
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), 303 U.S. at 48, and (2) on the sufficiency of the statutory process
to provide "adequate opportunity to secure judicial protection against possible illegal
action on the part of the Board." 303 U.S. at 48. The exclusionary terms of the quoted
statutory provision apply only in NLRB cases, whereas the principle of exclusiveness
of an adequate statutory means of redress against unauthorized agency action applies to
any such statutory process. This two-fold aspect of Bethlehem Shipbuilding and the
specialized Labor Board aspect of the decisions as to ripeness in Board representation
cases is, nevertheless, sometimes not mentioned in decisions as to the ripeness for review
of orders of other agencies. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Co. v. Weinberger, 509 F.2d 1236,
1239 (2d Cir. 1975). Compare Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968), in which
the Court held that statutory review of deportation orders and of interlocutory orders
preceding them did not extend to later interlocutory orders denying stays pending
discretionary relief from deportation, but stated also that general-jurisdiction review
could be had, even though the legislative policy of rendering the statutory remedy exclusive
had previously, in Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963), and Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18
(1964), been held to be specific and strong. See also Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F.
Supp. 585 (D.N.J. 1975).
189But see Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Whitehouse, 212 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1964), and Townsend
v. National R.R. Adjustment Bd., 117 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1954) (jurisdiction of agency
depended by statute on notice to third persons and opportunity for them to participate).
14OAs to this remedy in relation to denials of intervention, see FCC v. WJR, 337
U.S. 265, 284-85 (1949); FCC v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239
(1943); Juarez Gas Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Lynchberg Gas Co. v.
FPC, 284 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1960).14 1 See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB, 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Spanish Intl
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1967); WFTL Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
376 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (review for failure to exercise agency discretion where inter-
vention not a matter of right); City of Houston v. CAB, 317 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Interstate
Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Seaboard & Western
Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1949), superseding a contrary indication in
Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 624 (1935).
Cf. Frank v. State Sanitary Water Bd., 33 111. App. 1, 178 N.E.2d 415 (1961).
In Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rejection by the Commission of
applications which could later be refiled but which could be foreclosed if not considered
in conjunction with other pending applications was held reviewable in statutory proceed-
ings. See also Cook, Inc. v. United States, 394 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1968). The statements in
some cases such as Alston Coal Co. v. FPC, L37 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1943), that an order
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even more urgently required in relation to denials of consolidation, if
a later remedy might require large scale repitition of agency proceedings.
If only a "party" to an agency proceeding is entitled by statute
to seek review of a final order, a denial of intervention which the
would-be intervenor desired to challenge might be rendered immune
from his attack at the ultimate review stage because he would not
then be a party. This consideration provides a practical reason for
holding the order denying intervention to be subject to immediate
review. 42 In Public Service Commission v. Federal Power Comis-
sion,148 the court, clarifying an earlier holding,144 determined that the
would-be intervenor should be considered a "party" for the purpose
of securing immediate review of an interlocutory order denying inter-
vention, which should then be regarded as ripe for review, but that
this status would not continue so as to confer standing at the later
final-order stage. If review of a final order terminating a proceeding is
available by statute to a person "adversely affected or aggrieved," the
person previously denied intervention, if he alleges sufficient interest,
will qualify. 45 Even so, relief with respect to intervention, after an
order on the merits has issued, is often unsatisfactory as already sug-
gested. If the court then holds that intervention should have been
granted, the proceeding must go back to the agency for a wasteful
reopening, even to the extent of providing a complete rehearing. 4"
If the consequent proceedings are supplementary rather than a com-
plete repetition of what went before, they are not likely to secure to
denying intervention which is a matter of right is reviewable whereas one denying inter-
vention that lies in agency discretion is not, seem unsound because the agency's exercise
of discretion is subject to review for abuse, except in particular instances where all review
is precluded.
14 2 See Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 284 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960); National Coal
Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1954); cf. Easton Util. Comm'n v. AEC,
424 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1970); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 265 F.2d 364
(D.C. Cir. 1959). See also Tenn. Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
143 284 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
144 Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 265 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See also
Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 265 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
145 See, e.g., Interstate Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1960).14 6Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
The remand may, of course, provide for supplementary, rather than completely reopened,
proceedings. Cf. Juarez Gas Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1967), which led to the
proceedings in Southern Union Gas Co., 38 FPC 493 (1967). In Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Brenner, 383 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968), contrary
to reasoning that a remand after a challenge to a final order provides an unsatisfactory
remedy, the court held the availability of such a remedy precludes immediate district court
review of action by a Patent Office examiner denying participation to one of three parties
to an interference proceeding with respect to issues involving the relative merits of the
applications of the other two parties.
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the intervenor the same rights of confrontation, cross-examination,
and timely argument as would have been secured initially. Hence a
denial of intervention should be reviewable immediately if fully effec-
tive participation in the agency proceedings, including opportunity
to shape the record for ultimate judicial review, is to be afforded in
proper cases.'l A mandatory stay of the agency proceedings will rarely
be issued on review of an interlocutory order; but the review need
not consume much time and, as has been suggested,1 48 the agency may
in some instances find it expedient to defer its hearing for the sake
of orderliness and economy if leave to intervene should be required.
The importance to the parties and perhaps to others of an issue sought
to be raised by one denied intervention militates in favor of immediate
review of the denial. 1
49
The opposite situation of immediate challenge in court to an
agency-prescribed enlargement of proceedings rarely arises, because,
in general, the only ground of objection would be the insufficient one
of added complexity and expense of the proceeding. In Klein v. Corn-
inissioner of Patents,50 however, a patentee sought and was held not
entitled to immediate review of the subjection of his patent to an inter-
ference proceeding precipitated by a new, possibly conflicting patent
application. The court concluded that the further factor of a cloud
on the existing patent, resulting from the proceeding, was not a
sufficient reason for review of the commissioner's denial of a motion
to dissolve the interference.
Immediate review of interlocutory agency orders refusing or
limiting the consolidation of separate proceedings is sometimes sought
when the consolidation would be a means of providing effectively
the hearing rights secured by the socalled Ashbacker doctrine.''
147 Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264, 1267-69 (D.C. Cir. 1975); National Welfare
Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See American Com-
munications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Com1-ama oN LizCsEss
AND AuTHoRIzArIONs, REPORT ON LIcENsIw or Dobrsc AiR TRANSrRTATIN BY Tvr
C-.AB., in SLmcrE REPORTS OP = ADimSTRATIV CONFERENCE Or THE UNITED STATES,
S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 397, 399 (1962).
148 Interstate Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
14 9 See Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264, 1267-69 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
150474 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1973).
151 Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). The Ashbacker case involved
a challenge by one of two applicants for the use of a single radio frequency to the issuance
of a permit to the other without a hearing. The applications were mutually exclusive be-
cause both could not be granted without producing intolerable electrical interference. By
statute, each applicant was entitled to a hearing upon his application before its denial;
yet the challenger here had not been accorded such a hearing before the grant of the rival
application, which he contended was tantamount to a denial of his. The Court agreed, hold-
ing that neither applicant could be given a permit "without a hearing to both."
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Typically, however, Ashbacker rights have been claimed in cases,
especially in the aviation industry, where the impairment was by
no means as clear as that in Ashbacker. In that case, the grant of one
radio broadcasting license was made in the absence of a hearing on
a competing application for the use of the same radio frequency.
Threatened electrical interference made the grant of both applications
a physical impossibility; hence a hearing on the second application
became relatively useless. In the later cases the conflict among rival
applicants for, say, certificates to provide transportaton service be-
tween the same points did not involve the same mutual exclusiveness,
since several applications could be granted without producing more
than economic competition among the certificate holders. Nevertheless,
the need for additional service would be diminished by each award that
might result, which, accordingly, would lessen the likelihood that the
hearing to a remaining applicant would have a favorable outcome.
In a consolidated hearing before any award, on the other hand, each
applicant would be on the same footing as the others. Arguably,
therefore, a denial of consolidation in such a situation threatens
injury which is not remediable later if, in consequence, a single applica-
tion is granted before others are acted on. Immediate judicial review
of the denial should, therefore, arguably be available. However, the diffi-
culty connected with granting it is that the rival applications often have
dissimilar aspects, such as different routes between the terminal points
proposed or different proposals for continued service beyond those
points, which need to be considered in the hearings but the considera-
tion of which in a consolidated hearing would greatly complicate the
proceedings. In addition, partial consolidations of proceedings may be
possible, whereby evidence as to the conflicting portions of the several
applications would be received, leaving the evidence as to other portions
for separate presentation. Thus, the question for a court in which
review of a denial or partial grant of consolidation is sought becomes
whether it or the agency should appraise the consequences of a con-
solidation and any parallel proceedings and determine whether effec-
tive hearing rights would be preserved under the various alternatives.
The court's undertaking this task often involves a deep invasion of
the agency's management of its own processess, whereas the court's
abstention may leave one or more parties with the shadow but not the
substance of a hearing over rights already lost.
In determining its course, the court, following the agency and on
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the basis of the record it has provided, must deal with the nature of
the substantive and the procedural issues presented-the extent, for
example, to which the applications, realistically viewed, are mutually
exclusive 52-- and with the bearing of the available evidence on each
portion of the case. In performing its task the court must ordinarily
defer to agency judgment but still accord review to action which
amounts to a denial of a meaningful hearing.'s As in Ashbacker,
the grant of one of several mutually exclusive applications which pre-
cludes an effective hearing on the other applications can be set aside;'"
but the mere refusal of a consolidation at a particular time, leaving
future action open, is within agency discretion.' 55 In either case the
court effectively reviews what the agency has done" even when it
declines "jurisdiction."
Review of Formally Final Action Deciding Certain
Issues but Deferring Others
Agency action may terminate a proceeding by enabling specified
conduct to take place, but reserve particular relevant issues for possi-
ble determination later in other proceedings if need be. These issues
might have been determined initially, but are wholly or partially put
aside, to be determined in an altered context if the occasion arises.
The agency action is neither interlocutory, because the proceedings
are terminated, nor temporary, because no time-limit is put upon its
152 Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Seaboard & Western Air-
lines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (mutual exclusiveness not present).
158 National Airlines v. CAB, 392 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Frontier Airlines v. CAB,
349 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1965); Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 243 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
15 4 Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 969
(1960); Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Compare Western Air
Lines v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545, 552 (9th Cir. 1950) (no Ashbacker issue until agency action
effectively denies a right); Pauley v. FCC, 181 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (same).
155 National Airlines v. CAB, 249 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
156See United Air Lines v. CAB, 228 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1955), in which the court
concluded that the order partially denying a consolidation of proceedings was "interlocutory
and not appealable," but did so only after it had "most carefully weighed and . . .
extensively explored all claims in the thought that a comparative hearing . . . might be
required under the Ashbacker rule." Compare Pan-American-Grace Airways v. CAB, 342
F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965) (court lacked jurisdiction
because the issues presented by the allegedly competing applications were not sufficiently
in conflict to give rise to a right under the Ashbacker doctrine); Midwestern Gas Trans-
mission Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1958), vacated as moot, 358 U.S. 280 (1959)
(orders partially denying comparative hearing set aside because they withheld an Ashbacker
right).
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effectiveness; yet some of the same reasons for allowing or not allow-
ing immediate judicial review to take place may be applicable. Further
agency action may alter the problem presented, and the injury inflicted
on the interests of would-be challengers may be mainly contingent on
further developments; yet the action is formally final in the same
way as a regulation which ends a rulemaking proceeding but requires
enforcement. In each case the interim consequences may be consider-
able.
The problem involved was elaborately considered by the Supreme
Court recently in Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)."' Environ-
mental groups sought to challenge an Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion order which terminated a general freight-rate proceeding by per-
mitting across-the-board increases to be filed, after the Commission
had given attention to the consequences for the recycling of waste
products and drain on new raw materials. The resulting rates on
specific commodities were not affirmatively approved as reasonable,
however, and could still be tested in new Commission proceedings
directed to them. Also, the environmental effects of the entire rate
structure were still under investigation in a parallel proceeding which
might result in future changes. The Court held that the order was
final in a sense which rendered it ripe for review as to the adequacy
and procedural correctness of the consideration of environmental fac-
tors by the Commission, pursuant to the Environmental Policy Act.
This issue related to the general determination that had been made;
the fact that later determinations might alter the ultimate substantive
outcome was irrelevant. The Court did not decide whether the same
would be true with regard to the reasonableness under the Interstate
Commerce Act of the body of rates conditionally permitted by the
order. Such a decision might go either way in the light of earlier
cases, including affirmance of two lower-court decisions by an evenly-
divided Supreme Court in 1970. As strongly urged by Judge Wright,
dissenting, in Alabama Power Co. v. United States,5 " such an order
is effectively final as to many aspects of the rate situation and should
be open to prompt review under the Interstate Commerce Act, with
respect to the determinations actually made. The further, pin-pointed
157422 U.S. 289 (1975).
158316 F. Supp. 337 (D.D.C. 1969), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 78
(1970). See also Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 317 (1975).
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determination of consequent specific rates must, however, await the
exhaustion of available new proceedings in the Commission, to chal-
lenge those rates that give rise to objection.' 59
SUMMARY
Ripeness, then, is that quality of agency action which consists of
sufficient legal force or produces sufficient practical consequences to
justify a judicial judgment upon the action at the stage of the relevant
governmental process which has been reached. Entering into the
ascertainment of whether ripeness is present are (1) whether a case
or controversy has arisen, (2) the statutory or traditional require-
ments for the availability of the particular judicial remedies that are
sought, (3) the presence or threat of sufficient injury by the action in
question to interests that, at some stage, are entitled to judicial con-
sideration and (4) the existence and adequacy of later alternative
ways to correct the action in question if it is erroneous in the respects
alleged. Some of these same factors are involved in determinations of
whether judicial relief is to be withheld because an administrative
remedy should be or should have been invoked and whether standing
to resort to court is present on the part of a challenger to agency
action. To these related issues we now turn.
PART I: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Nature and Scope of the Exhaustion Doctrine
Exhaustion is the prerequisite to judicial review of administrative
agency action which requires that, subject to certain qualifications and
exceptions, the available corrective steps at the administrative level,
whether preventive or remedial, have been pursued. The exhaustion
doctrine typically bars review even when other prerequisites for review
have been satisfied, i.e., an otherwise judicially determinable controversy
is presented; the agency has taken definitive, if not ultimate, action;'
159See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 310-316 (1975), and
lower-court cases cited, especially Electronic Indus. Ass'n v. United States, 310 F. Supp.
1286 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 401 U.S. 967 (1971).
'Sometimes the courts speak of exhaustion of administrative remedies when the agency
action from which relief is sought consists only of initial steps, such as the Ming of a
complaint or launching of an investigation, which lead normally to further proceedings.
See, e.g., Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1974); Mies Laboratories, Inc. v.
19761
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and the person seeking review has standing. The main reasons for
requiring the invocation of available agency processes prior to court
action are that otherwise the "efficiency" of having the statutorily pre-
scribed procedures utilized without interruption or curtailment is lost;
the legislative purpose of securing the most considered agency determi-
nation of the matters involved is thwarted; and the statutory scheme
providing for such determination is weakened.2
The "remedies" to which the exhaustion prerequisite relates are
of two principal kinds: (1) opportunities during agency proceedings
to urge particular matters, such as the admission of desired items of
evidence or the consideration of specified legal issues which may be in-
volved in later challenges to final agency action, and (2) additional
agency proceedings whereby otherwise final agency action may be re-
viewed by supervisory or appellate authorities or by way of reconsider-
ation. Omission or failure to complete the former may preclude review
with respect to the particular issues that were not raised; failure to
resort to over-all administrative appeals or reconsideration may prevent
judicial review of entire proceedings. Since challenges to the outcome of
entire proceedings always rest on particular grounds, however, the
practical effect of applying the doctrine of exhaustion in both situations
is to bar judicial consideration of specific issues that remain disputed.
The justification for applying the doctrine or for departing from it may,
however, differ in the two situations.
Often quoted as expressive of reasons for exhaustion of the first
kind of remedy is the statement in United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck
Lines that
orderly procedure and good administration require that objections
to the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while it has
opportunity for correction in order to raise issues reviewable by the
courts .... Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of
administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts
FTC, 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. dended, 322 U.S. 752 (1944); Leyden v. FAA,
315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); United Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 127 Cal. App. 2d 155,
273 P.2d 579 (1954). Whether such proceedings can be forestalled by immediate resort to
court involves problems of ripeness of agency action for review, rather than of exhaustion
of administrative remedies (so long as these remain separate prerequisites, as to which see
INTRODU cTION supra; but the applicable considerations are the same under both headings
and are usually stated in terms of the exhaustion requirement.
2 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1969). See also Brawner Bldg. v.
Sheyhn, 442 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reasons for requiring exhaustion of zoning proce-
dures prior to judicial review).
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should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administra-
tive body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at
the time appropriate under its practice.3
The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies became
part of American administrative law largely as an application of com-
mon sense relating to the use of prescribed procedures of the second
kind in preference to judicial remedies, in disposing of challenges to
tax administration4 and challenges to the exclusion and deportation of
aliens.' From these matters it spread to other administrative fields,
notably public utility regulation.6 The requirement arose simultaneously
in the state and federal' domains and in the sphere of federal judicial
8344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952). See Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Rinaldi, 329
US. 143, 155 (1946). The same policy is implicit in the denial of relief in Goldsmith v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 207 U.S. 117, 123 (1926). See also NLRB v. Newton-New Haven
Co., 506 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1974); Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J.
1975); Beaufort Transfer Co. v. United States, 379 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
4 Pittsburgh & C. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 172 U.S. 32 (1898); Dalton Adding
Mach. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 699 (1915); First Nat'l Bank v. Weld County,
264 U.S. 450 (1924); Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 265 (1924);
Dundee Mortgage Trust Iv. Co. v. Charlton, 32 F. 192 (D. Ore. 1887); Northern Pac.
R.R. v. Patterson, 10 Mont. 90, 24 Pac. 704 (1890); Florenzie v. City of East Orange, 83
N.J.L. 438, 97 Afd. 260 (1916), and early cases cited; Rio Grande R. Co. v. Scanlan, 44
Tex. 649 (1876). As to many tax determinations a rule of finality of administrative
assessments prevailed, precluding resort to judicial remedies to prevent collection, State
R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875), if not, as later suggested, Stanley v. Supervisors of
Albany, 121 U.S. 535, 550 (1887), to actions to recover taxes paid under duress. The
Weld County and Gorham cases, taken together, applied the doctrine of exhaustion to both
kinds of remedies. See generally Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure
to Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28 MxcH. L. Rav. 637 (1930). As to suits in equity
to enjoin the collection of taxes, the requirement of resort to administrative remedies is
aided by regarding these as remedies at law which must be preferred. Wilson v. Green,
135 N.C. 343, 47 S.E. 469 (1904).
5 United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904). Earlier, a requirement that claims
of federal employees against the government be submitted initially to the department con-
cerned, which could consider them, was looked upon as self-evident. United States v.
MacDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833). See generally Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, 48 YA L.J. 981 (1939).6 Compare Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908), with Bacon v. Rutland
R. Co., 234 U.S. 134 (1914). See Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of North
Carolina, 269 U.S. 278 (1925); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S.
159 (1929); Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, affd on rehearing, 287 U.S. 346
(1932) (securities regulation); United States v. Illinois Central R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934).
See also McGaw v. Farrow, 472 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1973) (exhaustion of intra-Army
informal appeals to higher commands); Ogden v. Department of Transp., 430 F.2d 660
(6th Cir. 1970) (appeals of federal employee discharges); Wilmington Chem. Corp. v.
Celebrezze, 229 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (exhaustion of informal negotiations with
reference to labeling requirement for dangerous product); Lutz v. Kaltenbach, 101 NJ.L.
316, 128 Atl. 421 (1925) (exhaustion of zoning appeals).
7Norther Pacific R. Co. v. Patterson, 10 Mont. 90, 24 Pac. 704 (1890); Rio Grande
R. Co. v. Scanlan, 44 Tex. 649 (1876); Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d
280, 109 P.2d 942 (1941); Hayes v. Joseph E. Seagram & Co., 222 Ind. 130, 52 N.E.2d
356 (1944); State ex rel. Jones v. City of Nashville, 198 Tenn. 280, 279 S.W.2d 267 (1955).
8United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1964).
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review of state agency action.9 In relation to this federal-state aspect of
the exhaustion requirement, emphasis on comity toward a coordinate
jurisdiction is involved." Whether comity can also be said to apply to
the relation between courts and administrative authorities in the same
government, such as courts martial, which are subject to only limited
collateral review by the regular federal courts and which constitute an
essentially separate system, is a matter of dispute that involves largely
the proper use of a term. Judicial reluctance to supplant the proceedings
of agencies is likely to be proportional to the means of self-correction
that exist in the agencies' structures and processes, with the consequence
that the exhaustion rule will be applied more readily to some proceed-
ings than to others."
Sometimes the doctrine of exhaustion is closely linked to that of
primary jurisdiction which applies when an unresolved issue, arising
initially in a court proceeding, is also capable of determination by an
agency, and the question is whether the issue should go to the agency
for initial determination or be resolved by the court without such a
reference. If the plaintiff seeks a modification in a completed prior
agency action which is not challenged as a whole-for example, a change
in a specific freight rate established by a general rate order-the pro-
ceeding has some of the aspects of a re-examination of the agency's
general order and may be thought of as a partial review of that prior
action, subject to the doctrine of exhaustion. Alternatively, the court
proceeding may be looked upon as one to secure a new, more limited
order, normally obtainable from the agency, to which the principle of
primary jurisdiction applies. The applicable considerations under both
alternatives are largely the same. 2
9 See notes 4 and 6 supra.
1oNatural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937); Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 229 (1908).
11 See as to courts martial, Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756-760 (1975);
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37-40 (1972); Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 698 (1969);
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 693 (1973) (dissenting opinion); Dooley v. Ploger, 491
F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1974); Sedivy v. Richardson, 485 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1973); Brown v.
United States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 332, 338-40 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Sanders v. McClellan,
463 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (comity between courts and the legislative branch), and,
as to Indian tribal courts, United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
12 Cf. Electronic Indus. Ass'n v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1970),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 967 (1971); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934); Turkel
v. Food & Drug Administration, 334 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1964); FPC v. Union Producing
Co., 230 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Sayers v. Montpelier & Wells River R. Co., 90 Vt. 201,
97 AtI. 660 (1916).
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The exhaustion requirement is often put forward as a broad pre-
requisite to judicial review, applicable whenever disputed issues could
have been or could still be presented to the agency and decided by it
through established processes, but have not been."3 Even in the Supreme
Court's early formulations it was recognized, nevertheless, that when
the question presented is that of agency power to act at all,'14 or in-
volves a pure question of law, the issue may sometimes be considered
by a court even though it has not been presented to the agency.' 5 The
18 Cf. Parisi v. Davidson, note 11 supra, 405 U.S. at 38; Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.Zd
303 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 48 C.C.P.A. (Cust.) 91, 296 F.2d
779 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961); Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
98 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 625 (1938); Abelleim v. District
Court of Appeals, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 109 P.2d 942 (1941); Heron v. City of Denver, 131
Colo. 501, 283 P.2d 647 (1955); Leffler v. Browning, 14 Ill. 2d 225, 151 N.E.2d 342 (1958).
Compare Okla. Pub. Welfare Comm'n v. State ex rel. Thompson, 187 Okla. 654,. 105 P.2d
547 (1940) (administrative remedy still available but plainly inadequate).
1 4 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, note 6 supra, 211 U.S. at 231. Skinner & Eddy Corp.
v. United States, 249 U.S: 557 (1919), is often quoted: "Where the contention is that
the [Interstate Commerce] Commission has exceeded its statutory powers, . . . the courts
have jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not
attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before the Commission." 249 U.S. at 562. See
also the distinction which is stated in the Tucker case, 344 U.S. 33 (1952), note 3 supra,
between the issue there and "one which deprives the Commission of power or jurisdiction,
so that even in the absence of timely objection its order should be set aside as a nullity." 344
U.S. at 38. Even before the Sing Tuck case, 194 U.S. 161 (1904), n.5 supra, the Court held
in Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), that a person seeking admission to the United
States need not, as a condition of bringing a habeas corpus proceeding against detention
at the port, have resorted to agency appeal proceedings when under conceded facts the
only issue was whether the person was an alien subject to exclusion under the governing
statute. Sing Tuck also involved a claim of citizenship and, therefore, of want of agency
jurisdiction to exclude; but there the issue turned on facts concerning the places where the
aliens seeking admission were born, and the Court applied the exhaustion rule. As to the
effects of this distinction between two kinds of jurisdictional issues see text accompanying
notes 143-149 infra.
For recent instances of inapplicability of the exhaustion doctrine to the issue of want
of agency authority to act, see Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 392 F. Supp.
358 (ED. Va. 1975); Ashland Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 389 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
15See, e.g., American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 909
(Em. App. 1974), where, as in other decisions to similar effect, the workability of the
law-fact distinction is necessarily relied upon. A leading instance in which exhaustion was
dispensed with as to questions of law is Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941), which
upheld the decision of the court of appeals which decided an income tax case on the
basis of a statutory provision which had not been relied on by the government in the
Board of Tax Appeals. The Court's opinion, however, is cast in terms relating to roles
of trial and appellate courts rather than of agencies and judicial review. The decision was
aided by a statutory injunction that courts reviewing Board decisions should decide "as
justice may require." Both the statute and the Supreme Court's holding applied only to
cases in which there had been a Board proceeding.
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balance of efficiency and convenience may then swing against the ex-
haustion requirement, because proceedings in an agency with doubtful
authority might be wasteful for all concerned, or because the agency
might be unable to contribute significantly to resolving an issue which
in the last analysis would be for a court to determine.
The foregoing two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement have
been augmented by others and are accompanied by enlarging qualifica-
tions to the doctrine as a whole. The consequence is that the require-
ment, especially in the federal system, has in many instances become a
flexible means of allocating responsibility between agencies and courts,
rather than a rule that operates mechanically or by way of limiting
judicial "jurisdiction." As so developed, the doctrine is clearly "not an
absolute bar to judicial consideration and where justification for invok-
ing the doctrine is absent, application is unwarranted."' 8 The ramifica-
tions of this view are discussed below.
Reinforcements of the Doctrine
Statutes may expressly or impliedly limit judicial review of a par-
ticular agency's actions to court proceedings after additional agency
processes have been completed. To the extent that they do and are valid,
such statutes bind the courts and will defeat attempts to secure review
at an earlier stage, before the prescribed processes have run their
course, whether or not the actions would otherwise be ripe for review.
An important example involves the National Labor Relations Act, under
which it has been established by interpretation that Board determinations
with respect to employees' collective bargaining representation are typi-
cally not open to immediate judicial review, but are subject to challenge
in statutory proceedings to review later Board orders that may, after
further proceedings in the Board, deal with unfair labor practices in the
same bargaining situations.' Under other statutes the prescribed agency
16Ecology Center v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975); Downen v. Warner,
481 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Harvey, 131 F. Supp. 493, 496
(N.D. Tex. 1954). Compare: ". . . the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies
before resort to the courts is not a matter of judicial discretion but is a fundamental
rule of procedure." State ex rel. Scott v. Scearce, 303 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1957), quoting
Clark v. State Personnel Bd., 61 Cal. App. 2d 800, 144 P.2d 84 (1943). Even when the
exhaustion requirement is enforced, it is often stated to be a flexible one, subject to the
adequacy of the available administrative remedy. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunlop, 485 F.2d
666 (Em. App. 1973).17 The determinations in question are either designations of collective bargaining repre-
sentatives (inherently reviewable, apart from the statute) or interim actions in representation
proceedings, which might not, in any event, be ripe for review. Cf. A.F. of L. v. NLRB, 308
US. 401 (1940); Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. Alpert 318 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1963) (order in-
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proceedings leading to opportunity for judicial review may consist
initially of a reopening, wholly or in part, of an original determination by
the same agency or of review by an appellate administrative body, which
may be had as of right."8 Application for discretionary agency recon-
sideration is sometimes a statutory prerequisite to judicial review in
each case," but ordinarily such an application is not a condition of
judicial review unless expressly made so. The Federal AdministratiVe
Procedure Act contains an explicit provision which dispenses with the
exhaustion requirement as to reconsideration and administrative appeals
whether they can be obtained as of right or remain optional with the
agency, except when a statute or regulation provides that one or the
other shall be a prerequisite.20
A different prescription for exhaustion of agency processes arises
when an agency and a party seeking review of its action have provided
by a valid contract for a specific type of agency proceeding to precede
such a resort to court. "Disputes clauses" of varying breadth in federal
government contracts, or other clauses making special provisions for
adjustments, commonly require resort by the contractor to administrative
determinations in order to secure extra compensation or a relaxation of
requirements, or sometimes to establish a breach of obligation by the
Government. The full use of these provisions, leading to judicial review
which is now regulated by statute, is exclusive of any other resort to
court for the same causes, unless the case is exceptional. 21
validating election because of substantive factors). For further discussion of the rule
applicable to actions of the NLRB in representation proceedings, see text accompanying
notes 74-98, infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 57-73, infra. See also Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 337 (1937) (exclusiveness of statutory method of recovering taxes previously
paid and allegedly not owed, as to which refund has been refused, commencing with
petition for administrative hearing); Hughes v. City of Woodward, 457 P.2d 787 (Okha
1969) (exclusiveness of statutory procedure to review public-works wage scale, commencing
with agency reconsideration); Smith v. Highway Bd., 117 Vt. 343, 91 A.2d 805 (1952)
(exclusiveness of statutory method of review of dismissal from state service).
29 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1970) (Natural Gas Act); 16 U.S.C. § 8251(a) (1970) (Federal
Power Act); 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1970) (Communications Act as to previous non-parties and
as to presentation of questions not previously before the Commission). See Wisconsin v.
FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 307 (1963); FPC v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 498
(1955); Utah Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 339 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1964); Southwestern
Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1957); DuPage Util. Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 47 11. 2d 550, 267 N.E.2d 662 (1971); Scherer Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 24 M. 2d 354, 101 N.E.2d 134 (1962); Alton R. Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 407 Ill. 202, 95 N.E.2d 76 (1950).20 See text accompanying notes 46-50, infra.
21United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1966); United
States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); United States v. Joseph A.
Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1946); Patton Wrecking & Demolition Co. v. TVA,
465 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Traditional doctrines, more flexible in operation, relating to parti-
cular judicial remedies, may support the exhaustion principle when these
remedies are invoked against agency action. In this way, mandamus
or injunction proceedings may be excluded because available agency
proceedings which could be invoked are considered remedies "in the
ordinary course of the law" or "adequate remedies at law," foreclosing
the desired action by a court.22
Practical reasons for applying the exhaustion requirement are
strengthened when technical expertness not possessed by the courts
enters into agency determinations; for obviously this expertness should
be drawn upon prior to judicial review.2" Especially with respect to this
element in agency determinations, the creating of an adequate record
of agency proceedings is important to a reviewing court and furnishes
an added reason for requiring that agency processes have been fully
utilized.24 In the federal system, also, uniformity in the application of
agency-administered laws is aided when agency processes are carried
to completion in each instance before review takes place in any of the
numerous district courts or courts of appeals, where review may be had
under most statutes.2
Statutes often contain explicit provisions that the reception of addi-
tional evidence may be authorized by a reviewing court only if reason-
able grounds are shown for failure to present the evidence previously to
the agency.2" Statutes may also provide that objections to agency action,
22 Cf. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1937); Dalton Adding
Mach. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 699 (1915); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Leedom,
284 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Towers Management Corp. v. Thatcher, 271 N.Y. 94, 2
N;E.2d 273 (1936); Wilson v. Green, 135 N.C. 343, 47 S.E. 469 (1904); State ex rel.
Ronald, Inc. v. City of Willoughby, 170 Ohio St. 39, 161 N.E.2d 890 (1959); State ex rel.
Gooden v. Bonar, 183 S.E.2d 697 (W. Va. 1971). As to the flexibility which results, see
Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1952).
23 See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 198 (1969); American Nursing
Home Ass'a v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 909, 913 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974); Bradley
v. Weinberger, 438 F.2d 410, 415 (1st Cir. 1973); Towers Management Corp. v. Thatcher,
271 N.Y. 94, 2 N.E.2d 273 (1936).
2 4 American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 909, 913 (Emer.
Ct. App. 1974); Bradley v. Weinberger, 438 F.2d 410, 415 (1st Cir. 1973); Board of Select-
men v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 346 Mass. 754, 196 N.E.2d 218 (1964).
25Most fully articulated in the development of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
(see, e.g., Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 412 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1973)); this
factor is present whenever determinations under a federal statute are required and the
question of dispensing with agency consideration prior to judicial consideration is raised.
26See. e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1970) (FTC Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1970), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78y (1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 79x (1970) (Review of SEC orders); 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b)
(1970) (Natural Gas Act); 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1970) (Federal Power Act); 15 U.S.C.
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not presented to the agency when they might have been, may not be
made to a reviewing court.2r Such statutes typically provide for excep-
tions under some circumstances. How much rigor, if any, the statutes
add to the nonstatutory exhaustion requirement depends in part on the
wording of these provisions28 and in part on the courts' conceptions of
the nonstatutory requirement.29 At the least, they provide a convenient
reference to support application of the requirement in particular in-
stances.30 The wording of such a statute may also contribute to deter-
§ 1394 (1970) (review of automobile safety standards); 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f)
(1970) (National Labor Relations Act). See also 28 U..C. § 2346(c) (1970) (Review Act
provision as incorporated in Judicial Code). The MODEL STATE ADMIsTRATrVE PROCEDURE
Acr, § 12(5), 9C ULA 184 (1946) and REVISE MODEL STATE ADrmiNsTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, § 15(e), 9C ULA 158 (Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as RvWsED MoDEr ACT], contain
provisions to the same effect.
2 7See, e.g., SEC statutes, Natural Gas Act provision, Federal Power Act provision,
and National Labor Relations Act provision, cited n.26 supra. See also Federal Aviation
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(e) (1970); 30 U.S.C. § 816(a) (1970) (Court of Appeals shall not
"consider" a petition for review under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
unless the petitioner "has exhausted the administrative remedies available... ."); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(c) (1970) (same as to exclusion and deportation of aliens when remedies available
"as of right"). The Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1970), achieves the same general
effect by conditioning judicial review on a prior petition to the FCC for a rehearing if
the challenging party "relies on questions of fact or law upon which the Commission . . .
has been afforded no opportunity to pass." As to the effects of failure to use procedural
opportunities before making application for reconsideration, with and without a statute
relating to such applications as prerequisite, see Easton Util. Comm'n v. AEC, 424 F.2d
847 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also the local statutory and interstate compact provisions cited,
respectively, in Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946), and
D.C. Transit System v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 466 F.2d 394,
413 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The REVISED MODEL Acr § 15(a), limits review of final decisions
in contested cases to actions instituted by aggrieved persons who have "exhausted all
administrative remedies available within the agency," except for review of interlocutory
action if review of the final decision would not provide an adequate remedy. For applica-
tions of some of the foregoing provisions see Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253
(1943); Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 398, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Lile v. SEC,
324 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1963); Siaba-Fernandez v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 139 (9th Cir.
1962) (deportation).
2 8 The National Labor Relations Act provision contains an exception for "extraordinary
circumstances." See NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 358 U.S. 318, 322 (1961); NLRB v.
Jan Power, Inc., 421 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1970). Some of the other cited statutes provide
for exceptions based on "reasonable grounds" for failure to comply.
2 9 For the view that the nonstatutory exhaustion requirement is as rigorous as the
statutes, see Cotherman v. FTC, 417 F.2d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 1969); for reliance on such
a statute as an addition to the strength of the exhaustion requirement, see Presque Isle Tv.
Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 502, 506 (1st Cir. 1967). The court in D.C. Transit System
v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 466 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1972), reserved
the question whether the Compact requirement relied on, which contained no provision for
exceptions, may yield to "exceptional circumstances." 466 F.2d at 414 n.144.
S0 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 157 (1960); Democratic Natl
Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc.,
344 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1965); Street v. FPC, 277 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1960); G'lligan,
Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119
N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954).
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mining the kind of presentation at the agency level which will constitute
compliance. Hence it has been held, although with questionable sound-
ness, that a previously cited provision of the National Labor Relations
Act,8" which limits objections on judicial review to such as have been
"urged before the Board, its members, agent, or agency" except in "extra-
ordinary circumstances," is not satisfied by objections made only to a
hearing examiner, who is not considered an "agent" for this purpose."
Neither a statutory exhaustion provision nor the nonstatutory ex-
haustion prerequisite is satisfied by a presentation in agency proceedings
which does not comply substantially with procedural requirements.'
Hence, for example, an offer of evidence or a legal contention at one
stage in a proceeding may be ineffective unless also made earlier or
repeated at a later stage, if procedural rules or appropriate standards as
to diligence so require ;84 a generalized or vague objection to a document
relied on or intermediate report in a proceeding may not suffice to state
a specific objection ;5 or formal errors may be fatal to attempts at ex-
3 1 See note 27, supra.
3 2 Compare NLRB v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 357 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1966)
with NLRB v. Red Spot Elec. Co., 191 F.2d 697, 698 n.3 (9th Cir. 1951). Failure to repeat
the objection to the Board at a later stage would have been a sufficient additional ground
for holding that the exhaustion requirement was not satisfied. See Cotherman v. FTC, 417
F.2d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 1969); Building Material Teamsters Local v. NLRB, 275 F.2d
909, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1960).
3 Such requirements ought not to be made into a trap by hypertechnical interpretation,
of course; it should suffice if contentions are effectively presented to the agency at the
required procedural stages, whether or not in precisely the manner specified. Compare
Lemoge v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Cal. 1974) with First Nat'l Bank v.
Board of Governors, 509 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1975), in which the alleged agency error
consisted of failure to take account of a legal issue which the petitioner for review had
failed to state to the agency with sufficient clarity.
34 Keco Indus. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 1356 (6th Cir. 1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Solien, 450 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Rod Ric Corp., 428 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Thompson Trans. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Rexall
Chem. Co., 370 F.2d 363 (1st Cir. 1964); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 36 (9th Cir.
1959); Hayes v. Joseph E. Seagram & Co., 202 Ind. 130, 52 N.E.2d 356 (1944). Even
without reference to a specific rule of practice, exhaustion requires that a matter be
"effectively presented" to the agency at the proper time. Reese Sales Co. v. Hardin, 458
F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1972). See Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767
(1947), where the Court held that the exhaustion principle requires "not .. .merely the
initiation of prescribed administrative procedures," but "exhausting them, that is, . . .
pursuing them to their appropriate conclusion," quoted with approval in Spanish Int'l
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 615, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
85 NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 350 (1953); Singer Co. v. NLRB,
429 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1970); Dallas Gen. Drivers, etc., Local 745 v. NLRB, 389 F.2d
553 (D.C. Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gustina Bros. Lumber Co., 253 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.
1958); Gruber v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 510 (D. Ore. 1958). Cf. People v. FPC, 353
F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965) (grounds of objection were sufficiently specified in petition for
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haustion.8 ' Since procedural requirements, including requirements of
due diligence, are binding, failure to comply with them may be a suffi-
cient ground for decision against persons not in compliance, without
reference to failure to exhaust available procedures before invoking
judicial review ;7 but the exhaustion requirement provides an overriding
basis, on which a court may choose to rely, for excluding judicial review
of issues that were not properly raised and preserved at the agency level.
Finality of Failures to Exhaust
Failure to comply with the exhaustion requirement gives rise to
sharply differing effects in two types of situations that are distinguished
by the timing of the administrative remedies referred to. The first situ-
ation involves remedies which lie wholly in the past and were not used,
such as the opportunity to make procedural objections during a hearing
that has ended, or the opportunity to invoke higher administrative
authority within a limited time which has expired. The other situation
involves agency processes that remain available, such as appeals or peti-
tions for rehearing that have not been barred. In the first situation, the
person concerned goes remediless and may be subject to enforcement
proceedings; in the second circumstance, the individual in search of a
remedy may still pursue one through administrative channels and, often,
return to court later to seek review of the resulting agency action. Some
of the clearest expressions of reasons for requiring exhaustion occur in
the first kind of case,3s but counter-considerations of fairness to the
rehearing); Quick v. Martin, 397 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (same as to objection to a
workmen's compensation award); NLRB v. Capital Bakers, Inc., 351 F.2d 4S (3d Cir.
1965) (objection to unit determination was sufficiently made by a succession of relevant
procedural moves).
88Lam Tat Sin v. Esperdy, 227 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (prescribed form not
used to apply for stay of deportation); Marshall v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 324 Mass.
468, 87 N.E.2d 7 (1949) (administrative appeal not taken to a "Department" but to its
"Commissioner").
37 Compare Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404-05 (1971) (want of diligence
in asserting right to cross-examination) with Williams v. Zuckert, 372 U.S. 765 (1963)
(compliance depends on circumstances); Charles v. Blount, 430 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 310 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962) (rule requiring written
exceptions is not satisfied by exceptions stated orally).
38 FPC v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 501 (1955); NLRB v. Cheney
California Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385 (1946); Spanish Int'l Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 385
F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Jeffcoat, 272 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1959);
Democrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Red River Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. dened, 305 U.S. 625 (1938); Elbow
Lake Cooperative Grain Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 144 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1956),
aff'd 251 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1958). Cf. Dupree v. Byrd, 123 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
For a routine application of the exhaustion doctrine in this kind of situation, see Mann v.
Klassen, 480 F.2d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 1973).
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individual affected also operate strongly in other cases of this sort and
lead to a judicial balancing of interests in determining whether the
exhaustion rule should be applied."9
In the Tucker case quoted above40 a motor carrier was precluded
from pursuing an objection to an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission granting a certificate of convenience and necessity to a
competitor, because it had not made this particular contention before the
Commission. Its objection turned on the asserted illegality of the
method of appointment and supervision of the hearing examiner who
conducted the evidentiary hearing in the case-a deficiency which argu-
ably deprived the Commission of authority to proceed further in the
way it did, although not of basic "jurisdiction." The Supreme Court,
while basing its decision on the carrier's failure to object at the proper
time, saw fit to point out also that no actual injury to the interest of
the objector, in the shape of inadequacy or unfairness in the examiner's
performance of his functions, was even claimed.41 The failure was ac-
tually excusable because the particular ground of objection urged in
court became known only after the administrative hearing, in the
Supreme Court's decision of another case.42 If in these circumstances
actual injury had been made to appear, the Court might have found
reason to avoid strict application of the doctrine of exhaustion, as it
could have by virtue of the flexibility to which, as will appear more
fully, the doctrine had become subject by the time of the Tucker deci-
sion. That flexibility has increased in subsequent years. The Court
might now say, for example, that to have attempted to urge the objec-
tion before the Commission would clearly have been futile and was not
required. Nevertheless, by reason of the strict view often taken, past
failure to exhaust an available remedy may defeat otherwise just claims.43
89 United States v. Shapiro, 396 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), which relies heavily
on McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). Both are Selective Service cases, as to
which see text accompanying notes 173-208, infra.
40344 U.S. 33 (1952). See text accompanying note 3, supra.
41 Id. at 35.
4 2 The decision of the Court in Tucker was doubtless influenced by reluctance to give
retroactive effect, such as would have resulted from a contrary decision, to its unexpected
per curiam holding in Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951), that the use of
hearing examiners appointed pursuant to § 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60
Stat. 224 (codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 7521, 5362, 3344, 1305 (1970)), was mandatory
in motor carrier certification hearings.
48 C.F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Morton, 516 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1975); Baskin v. TVA,
382 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
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Exhaustion of Optional Remedies
Some administrative remedies are primarily for the accommodation
of persons who may wish to invoke them rather than means for achiev-
ing the governmental purposes for which the doctrine of exhaustion
was created. Such optional remedies may consist of opportunities for
nonparticipants in pending proceedings to seek entry in order to present
their contentions or, after definitive agency action, of administrative
review proceedings which previous participants can invoke. Sometimes
the agency has the option whether to allow a particular accommodative
remedy, as is usually the case with petitions for participation or for
rehearing or reconsideration; sometimes the remedy, such as review by
a board which can correct injustice when called upon, can be had as of
right, but still provides only a possibility of relief to the person who
invokes it. Unless conservation of judicial time was among the reasons
for providing such a remedy, public policy reasons for requiring resort
to it as a prerequisite to judicial review are not strong; the objector to
agency action may pursue the remedy or not, as he chooses, without
effect upon his right to judicial review."
Such is the dominant view concerning petitions for reconsideration
of otherwise final agency action, when the filing of such petitions is
neither prescribed by statute or regulation as a prerequisite to judicial
review nor designed to require "critical administrative review" of prior
administrative action in the normal case.45 The Federal Administrative
4 4 Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Cf.
Chicago Junction case, 264 US. 258, 268-69 (1924); Smithmeyer v. United States, 147
US. 342, 357-58 (1893) (specially enacted administrative remedy was not prerequisite to
suit in the Court of Claims); District of Columbia v. Brady, 288 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (resort to local administrative Tax Court was not a prerequisite to action in judicial
court to recover taxes paid under protest). See also Girault v. United States, 135 F. Supp.
521, 526 (Ct. CL 1955) (statute of limitations runs from time of original, definitive agency
action because resort to board of review is optional). But see note 45 infra; Mathis v.
United States, 391 F.2d 938 (CL CL 1968). In Brinker v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 13 (8th
Cir. 1975), the failure of a social security claimant to seek reconsideration of his claim,
speciflally made available by statute, was held not to defeat his right to file a statutory
petition to reopen a prior claim that was disallowed or to foreclose judicial review of the
agency's rejection of such a petition.
45 Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219, 222 (1945); Prendergast v. New York Telephone
Co., 262 U.S. 43, 48-49 (1923); Chicago Ry. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n., 277 F. 970
(N.D. I1. 1922); Petition of Village Board, 77 N.D. 194, 219-20, 42 N.W.2d 321, 336
(19S0). See also Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. Higginbotham, 256 Ala. 621, 56 So. 2d
401 (1952). Contra, Alexander v. State Personnel Bd., 22 Cal. 2d 198, 137 P.2d 433
(1943); State ex rel. Scott v. Scearce, 303 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1957). As to statutorily
prerequisite petitions for rehearing, see text accompanying note 19 supra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:817
Procedure Act46 and the administrative procedure acts of several states4"
adopt an even broader view as to petitions for reconsideration, dispensing
with them as prerequisite to judicial review (unless explicitly required
elsewhere) regardless of the kind of re-examination of the prior action
to which they might be expected to lead. The provision contained in
the Federal Act also abolishes the need for resort to administrative
appeals which are not made prerequisites by statute, unless the agency
rule renders them prerequisite and also provides that the agency action
appealed from shall be "inoperative" during the appeal. As respects
most administrative appeals, which can be had as of right and lead to
a "critical," or substantial, re-examination of the prior action, this
provision is contrary to the doctrine of exhaustion as previously under-
stood, and it has been overlooked at times.48 While its application seems
unwise in most situations to which it applies, it must, nevertheless, be
followed when insisted upon, although it may be overcome by suitable
agency regulations.49 The provision dispenses only with the prerequisite
of resort to administrative appeals and reconsideration after otherwise
final action, not with the requirement that issues sought to be raised
46 ,,... Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise
final is final for the purposes of [judicial review] whether or not there has been
presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of
reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that
the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority."
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).4 7 E.g., ALAs. STAr. (1962) § 44.62.560; CAL. Gov'T CODE (West, 1966) § 11523. Comt-
pare Oxi.A. STAT. ANNO. (West 1965) § 75-318, with Hughes v. City, 457 P.2d 787 (Okla.
1969). The provision of RmsED MODFL Acr § 15(a) that "all administrative remedies
available within the agency" must have been exhausted before judicial review can be
had requires interpretation to determine whether "agency" includes administrative appellate
bodies and whether petitions for discretionary reconsideration are "remedies".4 8 Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1964) (public land proceedings);
Coy v. Folsom, 228 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1955) (Old Age & Survivors Insurance benefit
claim); Batista v. Nicolls, 213 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1954) (deportation). The present provision
of the deportation statute, see supra note 27, requires resort to the Board of Immigration
Appeals prior to judicial review, consistently with the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vision. Rodriguez-DeLeon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 324 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.
1963). The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970), provides for judicial review
of final decisions of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare "made after a hear-
ing," but imposes no other prerequisite. The Secretary, as authorized, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)
(1970), has provided opportunities for claimants to seek further consideration, including
hearings, by an Appeals Council. See 20 C.F.R. (1975) §§ 404.940-404.950. Decisions at each
stage become final "unless further considered." The intention obviously is to bind the
parties by them if further consideration is not sought, but additional steps following the
first decision after a hearing are not expressly made prerequisite to judicial review. Ex-
haustion of these steps has nevertheless been required. Coy v. Folsom supra; Burge v.
Richardson, 321 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Haubner v. Ribicoff, 207 F. Supp. 430
(E.D. Ky. 1962); Smith v. Ribicoff, 206 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.W.Va. 1962); Harris v. Ribi-
coff, 200 F. Supp. 318 (N.D.W.Va. 1961).4 9 See Rawls v. Secretary of the Interior, 460 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1972), distinguishing
United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1971); Mount
Sinai Hosp. v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 1099, 1124-25 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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in court have been presented properly at some stage of the agency
proceedings that took place50
Reconsideration serves a further purpose when it is sought to enable
a party or would-be party to present evidence or urge a contention
which for sufficient reason was not offered in the prior agency proceed-
ings. In this situation the agency should have an opportunity to take the
material into account prior to judicial review. Unless a statute provides
otherwise, a petition for reconsideration for this reason becomes a pre-
requisite to judicial review as to the admissibility of evidence or argu-
ment.51
It is not always easy to determine whether a statute or regulation
which provides opportunity for reconsideration or some other kind of
supplementary review of otherwise final agency action does so to afford
an optional mode of relief to persons concerned or to provide the agency
with an additional means of accomplishing its task. Relatively early in
the development of the exhaustion doctrine the Supreme Court held
that failure of a party seeking judicial review to have invoked an Inter-
state Commerce Act provision for petitions for "rehearing" of divisional
orders by the full Commission did not deprive the reviewing court of
"jurisdiction" to review the divisional order, but did enable it, if it
saw fit to do so in the exercise of a judicial discretion, to deny relief
until a petition for rehearing had been presented and acted upon.5"
Later the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in a declaratory judgment action decided to stand on the same "middle
ground" in 'relation to exhaustion of proceedings before armed services
military records correction boards, which it characterized as not part
50United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 423, 451-53 (9th
Cir. 1971), adopting the view of Davis, ADNmaTmATv LAW TmnsE § 20.06 (1958).51 Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (party to prior
proceeding, seeking to raise new point); Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 282
(D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 625 (1938) (non-party with knowledge of agency
proceeding). At the time of the Red River decision, the Communications Act had not been
amended, as it was in 1952, 66 STAT. 720, to render a petition for rehearing an expressly
required prelude to judicial review in this kind of situation. See notes 19 and 27, supra.
52 United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 282 (1924). As to further statu-
tory and decisional developments concerning exhaustion of Interstate Commerce Com-
mission review of divisional decisions see National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. ICC, 352 F.
Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (review of order while petition for reconsideration by the
Commission was still pending; exhaustion issue not discussed); Meat Packers Express,
Inc. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1965); Malone Freight Lines v. United
States, 204 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ala. 1962). By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has held that a federal employee's opportunity to challenge before the
Civil Service Commission the Commission's classification of his and other identical posi-
tions in prior open proceedings constitutes a meaningful remedy by "appeal," which must
be invoked before judicial review of the classification can be obtained. Marrone v. Immi-
gration & Naturalization Serv., 500 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1974).
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of the "administrative process itself" but "of a different and subsequent
procedure.""8 In this view a district court in such a case may either
afford review or refuse review of the prior service actions, as the interests
of justice may require, even though the decision of a correction board
has not been sought. The correction boards, on petition, re-examine
actions affecting service personnel, sometimes long afterward, and may
authoritatively recommend corrective action to the military department
heads. Although their advice is not always followed, a failure to follow
it is subject to review for arbitrariness." Consequently, some decisions
since Ogden v. Zuckert have been based on the view that the exhaustion
principle applies to the use of available correction board proceedings.55
Optional "remedies" for nonparticipants who are seeking participa-
tion in ongoing agency proceedings are often unaccompanied by any
clear indication of whether the opportunity is only for accommodation
or exists also to serve a public purpose to achieve full agency consider-
ation of all relevant aspects of a pending matter. The openness of most
rulemaking and licensing proceedings provides examples under a variety
of circumstances. Notice of the proceedings may be disseminated or be-
come available in various ways; actual knowledge on the part of par-
ticular interested persons may or may not arise. Once the agency has
acted, the public interest and that of beneficiaries of the action in avoid-
ing new obstacles to prompt effectuation of the resulting rule or deci-
53 Ogden v. Zuckert, 298 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1961), limited in Sohn v. Fowler, 365
F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court held that the district court should suspend its
proceedings until the correction board had reached a decision, and discussed further in
Hayes v. Secretary of Defense, 515 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Nelson v. Miller,
373 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1967); Turner v. Callaway, 371 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1974);
Williams v. Froehlke, 356 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 490 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974).
In mandamus proceedings to compel action to correct the consequences of allegedly
invalid court martial convictions, and in other collateral attacks on such "convictions, the
principle of Ogden v. Zuckert also appears to apply. Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp.
328, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir.
1974). As to the absence of a requirement that alternative relief in another agency be
sought see Elton Orchards, Inc. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1974).
54 Horn v. Schlesinger, 514 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1975); Champagne v. Schlesinger,
506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974); Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 1974);
Weiss v. United States, 408 F.2d 416, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474,
478-79 (3d Cir. 1967).
5 5 Seepe v. Department of the Navy, 518 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1975); Horn v. Schlesinger,
514 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1975); Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974);
Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1974); Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.
1961). However, in habeas corpus proceedings to challenge denials of release from an
armed service on account of conscientious objection, exhaustion of remedies before cor-
rection boards is not required, but consideration by such a board may be ordered by a
reviewing court prior to its action. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 n.3 (1972); Ludlum
v. Resor, 507 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1974); Pitcher v. Laird, 421 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir.
1970); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, 412 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir.
1969), with which compare Krieger v. Terry, 413 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Aukee
v. Carlson, 365 F. Supp. 624 (D. Alaska 1973).
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sion may vary. All of these factors enter into the determination of
whether exhaustion by a nonparticipant of available opportunities to
seek entry into particular agency proceedings which are open in nature
is prerequisite to judicial review of the resulting agency action at his
instance.58
Administrative Remedies Linked to
Exclusive Judicial Review Proceedings
At the opposite end of the exhaustion spectrum from the optional
remedies is the administrative review proceeding which is no longer
available but which a statute renders prerequisite to an exclusive, pre-
scribed method of judicial review of agency action. The landmark deci-
sions of the Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States57 and Bowles v.
Willingham8 sustained as valid, and gave drastic effect to, a provision
of this kind in the original Emergency Price Control Act of World
War II which denied judicial review of price and rent regulations,
schedules, and orders, except through specified administrative review
proceedings available for a limited time, followed by judicial review in
the Emergency Court of Appeals established for this purpose. The
statute specified that no other court, except the Supreme Court when it
reviewed Emergency Court judgments, should "have jurisdiction or
5 Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and Gage
v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (participation in prior rulemaking proceedings
held prerequisite to challenge of resulting regulations). Cf. Red River Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 98 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 625 (1938) (exhaustion doctrine
applied to objector to radio license issued to another, where objector had knowledge of
the licensing proceedings but did not seek to participate); Spanish Int'l Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 385 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (same ruling, but statute and regulations construed
to require attempts to enter the licensing proceedings); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp.
99, 115-17, 127-28 (D. Alaska 1971) (environmental groups and persons interested in
Forest Service authorization of timber project denied judicial review because of laches
and failure to participate in pre-authorization proceedings). Compare Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1960) (objector held not to
have been obliged to seek participation in ex parte proceeding authorizing competitor's use
of a trade name, of which the objector did not have notice); Dobbs v. Train, 409 F. Supp.
432 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (nonparticipation in rulemaking proceeding held not to bar review
of the regulation in a later challenge to a denial of benefits under it).
As to the justification for a statutory prerequisite of participation in response to pub-
lished notice, see People v. Francis, 40 IlH. 2d 204, 210, 239 N.E.2d 129, 133 (1968). See aso
United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 48 C.C.P.A.(Cust.) 91, 296 F.2d 779 (1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 899 (1961) (actual participant in rulemaking proceeding cannot secure judicial
consideration of issue he did not raise there); Lyons Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. I11. 1974) (same as to proceeding to authorize
competitors' branch operations and prior proceeding to establish applicable policy). Compare
National Broiler Council v. Federal Labor Relations Council, 382 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D.
Va. 1974), and Izaac Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 292 (D.D.C. 1971)
(failures to participate in available open proceedings adequately explained).
57 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
58 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
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power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price
schedule.. . ." This provision was held in the Willinghan case to exclude
the power of a United States district court to consider a challenge to
the validity of a rent regulation in a civil enforcement suit by the Price
Administrator against a landlord;" in Yakus the court sustained the
prescribed procedure in all respects and held, over dissent by Mr. Justice
Rutledge joined by Mr. Justice Murphy," that a district court was
similarly powerless in a criminal prosecution for violation of a price
regulation which had not previously been reviewed, even though some
of the grounds of attack on the regulation related to its constitutional
validity. The dissent was based on the asserted constitutional scope of
the judicial power in criminal cases. The Court did, however, consider
and sustain the validity of the statute as a whole, including the review
provisions."'
One can only speculate whether there could have been exceptions
of any kind to the exclusiveness of the statutory mode of review of
administrative action under the Price Control Act. Mr. Justice Rutledge,
concurring in Willingham, entered a reservation as to regulations and
orders challenged as invalid on their face.62 Those involved in Yakus
and Willingham were not so challenged; rather, the objections to them
turned on economic and cost factors difficult to appraise. Even in wartime
when policy considerations pulled strongly in the direction of unimpeded
administrative action, challenges to agency measures on the ground that
on their face they inflicted invidious racial or religious discrimination
might have been entertained without exhaustion of the statutory review
proceedings, at least in defense of enforcement actions.6" With or with-
out this possible relaxation, the exhaustion and exclusive-method-of-
review provision of the Emergency Price Control Act, construed in the
59 Previously, in Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943), the Court held that the
same provision validly prevented a district court from entertaining a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of an allegedly invalid price regulation. As to later application of the Willing-
ham rule see Applewhite v. Jones, 207 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1953).6
oMr. Justice Roberts dissented in both cases on the ground that the Act unconstitu-
tionally delegated legislative power and that the procedure for review of regulations, price
schedules and orders violated due process. 321 U.S. at 448; 321 U.S. at 529.
61The statute did not purport to exclude consideration of these issues. For further
discussion of the operation of the review provisions in price and subsidy cases, see River-
view Packing Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 207 F.2d 415 (Emer. Ct. App. 1953).
62 321 U.S. at 526. See also the view of the court of appeals in the Yakus case, entitled
Rottenberg v. United States, 137 F.2d 850, 857 (1st Cir. 1943).
63 Cf. Rutledge, J., dissenting, in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. at 470, 484. The
latter passage couples invidious discrimination in enforcement, which would not appear
on the face of any document and would require proof, with facial invalidity as properly
subject to review in a criminal enforcement proceeding. The majority opinion did not deal
with such possible exceptions to its view.
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Yakus and Willingham decisions, was a harsh one toward the extremely
numerous small enterprises which might be affected and, realistically,
might not have had an opportunity to invoke the prescribed remedies.
Shortly after those cases were decided, Congress amended the Act to
afford relief by providing that for good cause shown the district court
in any civil or criminal enforcement proceeding might suspend the case
pending decision by the Emergency Court of Appeals on a complaint
by the defendant in the enforcement action, challenging the validity of
the regulation, order, or price schedule involved. The Emergency Court
might order evidence to be introduced before itself or before the Ad-
ministrator, when needed to decide the issues. 4 In this manner, an oppor-
tunity was afforded to employ a remedy which supplemented the admin-
istrative-judicial remedy originally available.
Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 5 civil enforce-
ment of the obligations of commodity handlers under agency orders
can take place without a review of those orders, not only when pre-
scribed means of administrative review have not been invoked, but
even when they were previously invoked in timely fashion by a defendant
but had not yet led to a conclusion 0-- although the enforcement court
probably could stay its hand pending completion of the review proceed-
ing.67 The statute itself provides for the suspension of penal enforcement
proceedings if statutory review proceedings have been instituted in
good faith by a defendant.6" The handlers subject to the Act are for
the most part knowledgeable and not likely to be caught by surprise.
Even more so are the carriers who under the Interstate Commerce Act
64 58 Stat. 639 (1944). For the history of the Yakus case and this legislative sequel, see
Nathanson, The Emergency Court of Appeals, in OrricF or TnIMoRARo CoNTRoLs, O.P.A.,
PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: LEGAL PHAsEs (1947), 1-4; H. MANsFIELD, A SHORT HisToRy
oF OPA 276-79 (1947).
65 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., 608a(6), 608c(15) (1970).
66 United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287 (1946) ; United States v. Lamar's Dairy, Inc.,
500 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Yadkin Valley Dairy Coop., 209 F. Supp. 634
(M.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1963). As to enforcement of an order when
no attempt has been made to secure review of it by statutory means, see United States v.
Country Lad Foods, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United States v. Sanitary
Dairy Prod., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. La. 1962). As to the unavailability to handlers
of a remedy by injunction against enforcement of an order for which statutory review has
not been sought, see Rasmussen v. Hardin, 461 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
Kresse v. Butz, 409 U.S. 933 (1972); Wifllow Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Benson, 270 F.2d 856
(4th Cir. 1960).
67 United States v. Brown, 331 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1964) (preliminary injunction
denied to the Government because of pendency of statutory administrative review pro-
ceedings); United States v. Titusville Dairy Prod. Co., 63 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1945).
Cf. United States v. Sunny Ayr Farms Dairy, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
United States v. Abbotts Dairies, 315 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v.
Farm Dairy Coop., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 769 (N.D.W. Va. 1969).
687 U.S.C. §608c(14) (1970).
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may find themselves subject to penal proceedings to enforce Interstate
Commerce Commission regulations, without opportunity to challenge
the validity of the regulations because of failure to invoke available
administrative-judicial review proceedings that have been made exclusive
by statute."9
The World War II Renegotiation Act70 provided for agency deter-
minations of excess profits repayable by contractors to the Government.
These could under 1944 amendments to the Act be redetermined in
appeal proceedings 'by the Tax Court, whose "determination shall not
be reviewed or redetermined by any court or agency." The Tax Court
remedy was itself administrative, and its exhaustion became prerequisite
to any attempt to secure judicial review in an Article III court,72 except
that in some instances collateral review of original agency determinations
might take place in private actions by subcontractors against prime con-
tractors in which it might be contended that agency decisions adverse
to the subcontractors were not valid.78
Administrative remedies for National Labor Relations Board actions
in proceedings to determine the collective bargaining representation of
employees in designated employment units consist of further Board
proceedings which must go forward and produce final orders as to re-
69United States v. Southern R. Co., 364 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1031 (1967).70 Currently codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 1191 (1970).
71 Cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 790 (1948). The statutory finality of
Tax Court decisions in renegotiation cases did not extend to issues as to the coverage of
contracts by the Acts. Determinations of coverage could be reviewed by the courts of
appeals. United States v. California Eastern Line,.Inc., 348 U.S. 351 (1955). Similarly, Tax
Court decisions of constitutional issues could also be reviewed. Metallurgical, Inc. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 382 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1967); Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film
Co. v. Renegotiation Board, 375 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1967). The Renegotiation Act of 1951,
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211, 1218, 1218a (1970), excluded certain new coverage issues from
determination by that Court. Litton Indus. of Md. v. Renegotiation Board, 298 F.2d 156
(4th Cir. 1962). That Act also broadened the scope of review of Tax Court decisions and
finally supplanted Tax Court review of agency decisions by proceedings in the Court of
Claims. See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211, 1218, 1218a (Supp. IV, 1974).
72 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (completion of Tax Court remedies
is prerequisite to defense 'of enforcement suits brought by the United States to recover
excess profits as determined by agencies); Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752
(1947) (same as to attempted injunction and declaratory judgment action to halt enforce-
ment of liability); Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946) (same as to
action brought while agency; proceedings were pending). As to judicial determination in
such cases of the constitutionality of the governing statutes, see text accompanying notes
99-108, infra.7 3 Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. at 761, 775 (1947). Suspension of the
collateral proceedings instead of actual review there, pending the outcome of statutory
review proceedings, might often be appropriate. Id. at 775 n.39.
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lated unfair labor practices before statutory judicial review can be had."4
These remedies differ from those which must precede judicial review
under other statutes because they are not always available at the option
of persons seeking to make use of them. An employer confronted by
a union certified by the Board as the representative of the employees in
a bargaining unit can refuse to negotiate with it, thereby inviting an
unfair labor practice proceeding on account of the refusal, but cannot
be sure that such a proceeding will actually be instituted. 5 A union
wishing to challenge the certification of a rival union with which the
employer then bargains can only picket the employer's business in order
to invite proceedings against itself which may never eventuate.7 6 If
unfair labor practice proceedings do not take place in these situations,
the objectionable prior actions of the Board become unreviewable for
all practical purposes.7 Nevertheless the legislative policy of not permit-
ting judicial interruption of the total administrative process of monitor-
ing collective bargaining according to the statute has consistently been
held-with very limited exceptions-to restrict review to that which
can be had as an incident to review of unfair labor practice orders.78
74 See text accompanying note 17, supra. Board actions which are thus immune from
immediate review include not only those certifying or refusing to certify a union, but also
interlocutory orders, such as one ordering an election, which arguably could not be re-
viewed in any event until additional proceedings had taken place. See International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 2,
173 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1949).
75 Cf. Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354, 356 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968); Atlantic Metallic
Casket Co. v. United Paperworkers of America, 87 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
76 Cf. United Fed. of College Teachers v. Miller, 479 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (2d Cir.
1973); Lawrence Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 379 F.2d 704, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(Bazelon, Ch. J., concurring). This means of challenging a certification results from a
1959 amendmerit to the National Labor Relations Act, 73 Stat. 544, which is codified at
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1970).
77 Cf. Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 133 (2d Cir.
1960); Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union v. Miller, 357 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). An attempt to forestall other possible proceedings or to anticipate the possible
absence thereof by suing the beneficiary of an allegedly invalid Board certification order
failed in Atlanta Metallic Casket Co. v. United Paperworkers of America, 87 F. Supp. 718
(N.D. Ga. 1949). As to the availability and efficacy of unfair labor practice proceedings
as a means of challenging Board actions in representation proceedings see Goldberg, District
Court Review of NLRB Representation Proceedings, 42 INn. L.J. 455, 490-509 (1967).78 Application of this policy by the Supreme Court began with Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), in which there had been no Board order and the
question was whether the administrative proceedings could be halted in their incipiency on
the ground that the plaintiff's enterprise was not subject to the Board's authority. The
policy was carried forward in A.F. of L. v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), where it was
held to preclude immediate review of a certification order by the statutory process in the
Courts of Appeals, which is reserved for unfair labor practice orders, see note 17 supra.
Injunction suits in the District Courts, aimed at such orders or others which determine
the outcome in representation proceedings have been equally futile, apart from limited
exceptions. Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945) (allegations insuffi-
dent to bring the case within any possible exception); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S.
473 (1964), see note 92 infra & text accompanying. The same policy prevails under some
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Exceptions to the foregoing restriction have arisen in several situ-
ations in which courts have held that injunction or declaratory judg-
ment suits will lie to challenge particular kinds of Board actions in
representation proceedings. The Supreme Court anticipated the possibility
of such suits under "some portion of the original jurisdiction" of the
district courts in its A. F. of L. opinion denying immediate statutory
review of representation orders, but did not define the circumstances
in which they might be brought.79 In the later Inland Empire case the
Court again contemplated a possible exception by way of suit in a district
court, if there was a sufficient showing of unlawful action by the
Board;80 but the pleadings which were before the court failed to set
forth actions violative of due process or of statutory right, such as were
claimed. 8' Later, as will appear, sufficient allegations of constitutional
violation or violation of a clear statutory right by the Board were recog-
nized as bases for immediate district court review of actions in represen-
tation proceedings. To them the Supreme Court added a circumstance
in which the Board, by conducting a representation proceeding covering
the crews of an American-owned, foreign-flag shipping concern, had
precipitated "public questions particularly high in the scale of our na-
tional interest because of their international complexion,"82 which war-
ranted immediate judicial review of the Board's action, even though the
case- turned on a difficult question of statutory interpretation normally
reviewable only after full agency proceedings.
In Fay v. Douds3 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit gave
effect to the constitutional issue basis for district court review of Board
action in representation proceedings. Even before proceedings looking
to the decertification of a union had been completed, the union's claims
of violations of procedural due process, which were not "transparently
state labor relations acts. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 312 Mass. 597,
45 N.E.2d 925 (1942); see Wallach's, Inc. v. Boland, 277 N.Y. 345, 14 N.E.2d 381 (1938);
Southeast Furniture Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 154, 11 P.2d 153 (1941); but
see N.Y. Post Corp. v. Kelley, 296 N.Y. 178, 71 N.E.2d 456 (1947), note 144 infra. Com-
pare, under different statutory provisions, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Butz, 411
Pa. 360, 192 A.2d 707 (1963); Milwaukee Dist. Council, Amer. Fed. of State, County &
Municipal Employees v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 23 Wis. 2d 303, 127 N.W.2d
59 (1964).
79 A.F. of L. v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 412 (1940).
80 Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 700 (1945).
81The Court did review the allegations of procedural shortcomings, made in the
complaint, and found that there was no illegality. If there had been illegality alleged,
the question of reviewability of the merits would have been raised.
82 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963).
83172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
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frivolous," sufficed to establish district court jurisdiction.84 In later cases,
claims of procedural or substantive unconstitutionality of Board action
in representation -proceedings have nevertheless fared badly on the
whole as a ground for judicial review before related unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings have run their course.85 The reason lies partly in the
purely statutory origin of the rights involved in controversies over col-
lective bargaining, which renders the statute rather than the Constitution
the measure of their scope.8" Doubt has arisen concerning the continued
validity of the theory of jurisdiction enunciated in Fay v. Douds; 7 but
allegations of discriminatory administration of the statute have recently
given rise to colorable claims that the principle of equal protection of
the laws has been violated. District court review of Board action in
representation proceedings has been undertaken on this basis.88
The second leading exception to the requirement that review of
NLRB actions in representation proceedings await the outcome of re-
lated unfair labor practice proceedings was initially defined and applied
by the Supreme Court in Leedom v. Kyne. 9 In that case the Board had
designated a collective bargaining unit and certified a union to represent
the employees in that unit, without complying with a provision of the
National Labor Relations Act that the Board "shall not ... decide that
any unit is appropriate ... if such unit includes both professional em-
ployees and employees who are not professional . . . unless a majority
of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit."" The
Board's action, said the Court, "was an attempted exercise of power that
had been specifically withheld," thereby depriving "the professional em-
84 The decision on the merits was in favor of the Board. See also Leedom v. Int'l
Bhd. of EIec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960), as to the issue of constitutionality
of a collective agreement. Compare Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1968),
where allegations of procedural unconstitutionality were held to be frivolous.
85 United Fed'n of College Teachers v. Miller, 479 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1973) ; Lawrence
Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 349 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Local 130, Int'l Union
of Elec. R. & M. Workers v. McCulloch, 345 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Eastern Greyhound
Lines- v. Fusco, 323 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1963); Department & Specialty Store Employees
Union v. Brown, 284 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961); Catalytic Indus. Maintenance Co. v. Comp-
ton, 333 F. Supp. 533 (D.P.R. 1971).
88 Cf. McLeod v. Local 476, United Bhd. of Indus. Workers, 288 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.
1961); Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960);
Goldberg, District Court Review of NLRB Representation Proceedings, 42 IND. LJ. 455,
467-68 (1967).87 Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1968), and cases cited, especially
Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 377- F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1967), and Boire v.
Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 21 n.7 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
824 (1965).8sCouncil 19, Am. Fed'n of State & Munic. Employees v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1100
(N.D. Ill. 1968).
89 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
90 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1970).
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ployees of a 'right' assured to them by Congress."' The narrowness of
this basis for immediate review of an action of the Board in a representa-
tion proceeding was emphasized in Boire v. Greyhound Corp.,92 where
the Board had allegedly erred in designating a collective bargaining unit
based on a determination that the employees in the unit were employees
of Greyhound within the meaning of the Act, as well as of a contractor
with Greyhound who had engaged their services. The issue turned, ac-
cording to the Court, on an "assessment of the particular facts," leading
to a Board conclusion which allegedly did "not comport with the law."
Hence the issue did not depend "solely upon construction of the statute,"
as had been the case in Leedom v. Kyne. "The Kyne exception," the
court emphasized, "is a narrow one ... ""
Application of the criteria of immediate reviewability laid down in
Kyne and Greyhound Corp. has been predictably difficult. The lower
federal courts have heeded the admonition in Greyhound that the Kyne
exception is narrow, in preference to adopting the view that any issue
depending "solely upon the construction of the statute" comes within
the exception.9 4 The question must at least involve either a claimed viola-
tion of a "specific prohibition in the Act" or the asserted "obliteration of
a right" bestowed by Congress, both of which were involved in Kyne.
Either should suffice ;95 but decision under the second criterion has been
difficult. Under it a mere right to have the statute correctly interpreted
and applied after the facts have been established is not sufficient ;96 there
must be disobedience to the statute rather than mere failure to follow it.
Two circumstances additional to that in Kyne have been held by some
courts to provide a statutory basis for immediate district court review
of Board action in a representation proceeding under this rubric: dis-
regard of the right of a union to be certified on the basis of a valid
91 358 U.S. at 189.
92376 U.S. 473 (1964).
93 Id. at 481.
9 4 McCulloch v. Liby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969) (involvement of question of statutory interpretation does not result in
district court jurisdiction to review action in a representation proceeding unless the action
appears plainly beyond the bounds of the statute); Firestone T-ire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff,
365 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1966); Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 280 F.2d
127 (2d Cir. 1960). Cf. Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 21 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965); National Maritime Union of America v. NLRB,
267 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); and see the thorough discussion in National Maritime
Union v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
95Violation of a statutory prohibition may in itself "obliterate a right" that depends
on the prohibition. In some contexts the absence of a prohibition may mean that there is
no clear right, as the court indicated in Potter v. Castle Constr. Co., 355 F.2d 212, 217
(5th Cir. 1966); but a right may also be unambiguously conferred in affirmative terms.
96Local 130, Int' Union of Elec., R. & M. Workers v. McCulloch, 345 F.2d 90
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
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election which it has won9K and denial of the right of proponents of the
decertification of an established union to a decertification proceeding for
which they have properly petitioned.98
Exhaustion Concerning Constitutional Issues
Constitutional issues in judicial review of agency action may con-
cern either the validity of the governing statute on its face or the alleged
violation of constitutional rights by an agency in interpreting or apply-
ing the statute. Judicial determination of the former kind of issue may
ordinarily be had by persons possessing standing, without prior resort
to available administrative review processes. 9 In some such instances,
however, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
applied to justify judicial deferment or avoidance of delicate constitu-
tional questions; for if injury to the challenger's interest should be ob-
viated by favorable agency action on other grounds, the issue of consti-
tutionality could be avoided.100 Judicial opinions concerning this applica-
tion of the exhaustion requirement disclose a number of pertinent con-
siderations but yield no decisive principle. Decisions rest predominantly
9 7 Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); United Auto, A. & A.I. Workers v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(jurisdiction not contested on appeal). Compare Midway Clover Farms Mkt., Inc. v.
NLRB, 318 F. Supp. 375 (D.D.C. 1969) (employer plaintiff; election found invalid by
Board).
9 8 Surratt v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing
Co., 444 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra: National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F.
Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1974).9 9 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742 (1941) (authority of the Court to decide the constitutional issue not challenged, see id.
at 774); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); N.Y. State Broadcasters Ass'n v.
United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1969); Johnson v.
Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D. Ill. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 847 (1969); City
of Miami Beach v. Perell, 52 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1957) (zoning ordinance); Pierce v. Carpen-
tier, 20 I1. 2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747 (1960) (motor vehicle act driver's license provision);
Levitt v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 523, 158 A.2d 177, 181 (1964)
(housing act provision against discrimination); Scarsdale Supply Co. v. Village of Scars-
dale, 8 N.Y.2d 325, 170 N.E.2d 198 (1960) (zoning ordinance); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (zoning ordinance). See also Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17 (4th
Cir. 1961) (constitutionality of challenged procedures sustained; other issues rejected
until administrative process exhausted).
10 0 Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Tyler v. Judges
of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); see also Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co.,
347 U.S. 535 (1954) (except that the Court, without requiring exhaustion, determined one
of several constitutional and statutory issues posed-whether the challenged administrative
authority had actually and validly been bestowed and continued in effect. Other issues
were rejected because of the exhaustion rule. 347 U.S. at 553. Compare Franklin v. Jonco
Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868 (1953), relying broadly on the exhaustion rule as a basis for
reversing the lower court decision in a similar case. See also Christian v. N.Y. Dep't of
Labor, 414 U.S. 614 (1974) (judicial consideration of objections to agency procedure on
constitutional grounds should await resort to that procedure because a "favorable agency
decision on the merits ... may moot the objection to the procedure employed").
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on a balance between, on the one hand, judicial reluctance to risk up-
setting important legislative measures quickly and, on the other hand,
willingness of the courts to pass judgment promptly on legislative
abridgment of preferred constitutional rights 01 or on state interference
with federal authority.
10 2
Decisions not to apply the exhaustion rule in this kind of situation
sometimes stress that the province of agencies does not extend to enter-
taining questions about the validity of the statutes under which they
operate, unless special authorization is given.' At best, an agency might
by its action shed light on the operation of the statute it administers,
thereby aiding a later decision as to its validity-a consideration which
sometimes contributes to decisions to require exhaustion of agency pro-
cesses. 10 4 Because of the prevalent limitation on agency competence in
this regard, past failure in agency proceedings to raise an issue of consti-
tutionality of the governing statute should not be considered a failure
to exhaust an available administrative remedy. 10 5
Sometimes the challenge to a statute or to agency action relates
to the validity of the very agency proceedings which would be available
to fulfill the exhaustion requirement. In such a case the question is in
effect the validity of the exhaustion requirement itself under the circum-
stances. It should ordinarily be answered before the requirement is en-
forced." 6 Also relevant to determining the application of the exhaustion
1o Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
102 Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 554 (1958).
10 3 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd. No.
11, 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968); Finnerty v. Cowen, 508 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1974);
Panitz v. District of Columbia, 112 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (validity of tax statute's
coverage of particular type of business); Kroeger v. Stahl, 148 F. Supp. 403 (D.N.J. 1957),
aff'd, 248 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1957) (validity of zoning ordinance provision); Long v. City
of Highland Park, 329 Mich. 140, 45 N.W.2d 10 (validity of zoning ordinance terms
applicable to plaintiff's property). As to the general absence of powers of agencies in
this regard, see Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936, 961-63 (D.C. Cir. 1943),
judgment vacated as moot, 332 U.S. 788 (1947).
104 In Robinson v. Dow, 522 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1975), the court gives effect to
this point, quoting from W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312
(1967), the view that "important and difficult constitutional issues would be decided
devoid of factual content . . ." in situations where determinations of constitutionality
require the development of factual applications of the statutory provisions in question and
judicial review came too early. See also Jordan v. United States, 522 F.2d 1128, 1132
(8th Cir. 1975).10 5 United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd,
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (exhaustion of court
martial remedies not required as to a constitutional issue involving the validity of a
statutory bestowal of jurisdiction).
10 6 "[W]here the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administra-
tive procedure onto a litigant, the administrative agency may be defied and judicial relief
sought as the only effective way of protecting the asserted constitutional right." Public
Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 540 (1958), see note 102 supra. The actual
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requirement when a statute is challenged may be the ultimate availability
or unavailability of adequate alternative means to secure judicial deter-
mination of the constitutional, issue presented. If such a means exists,
there is less reason to omit intervening agency proceedings than if an
immediate judicial decision provides the only adequate opportunity to
resolve the problem,' as may be the case if delay would add irremediably
to the injury suffered by the challenger.'
In contrast to the validity of a statute on its face, alleged violation
of constitutional rights by an agency in interpreting or applying a statute
that leaves alternatives open involves issues which are subject to agency
determination in the first instance. Therefore the exhaustion require-
ment should be applied, unless there are reasons to the contrary other
than the mere presence of a constitutional issue.'0 9
challenge in that case was aimed, however, more at the substantive than the procedural
aspects of the state statute. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In Freed-
mam the challenge was to statutory procedures which, the Court held, did not need to
be invoked before their constitutionality could be litigated; Fuentes v. Roher, 519 F.2d
379 (2d Cir. 1975); Finnerty v. Cowen, 308 F.2d 979, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1974); Huntley v.
Board of Education, 493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974); Stokes v. INS, 393 F. Supp. 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Frost v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Givens v.
Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Jeffries v. Swank, 337 F. Supp. 1062, 1066
(N.D. IL 1971). See aso National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 229 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1955), c'ert. denied, 351 U.S. 927 (1956), where the court applied the exhaustion doctrine
with respect to substantive issues concerning the constitutionality of the governing Execu-
tive Order, but determined that the administrative procedures which would have to be
exhausted were constitutionally valid.
The decision in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), holds similarly that in a
proceeding under a Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), even assuming that the
doctrine of exhaustion may apply in such a case (see notes 110-137 infra & text accompany-
ing), the court should decide a question relating to the constitutional fairness of the
available administrative process without requiring exhaustion of that process prior to
judicial decision. See also Beattie v. Roberts, 436 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1971). This reasoning
may at times call upon the court to require resort to an allegedly constitutionally deficient
procedure, if still open, because it may result favorably to the challenger on the merits
and thereby obviate the constitutional objection. See Christian v. Department of Labor,
414 U.S. 614 (1974) (case remanded for retention by District Court, subject to suspension
pending resort to administrative remedy if open); Smith v. Duldner, 175 F.2d 629 (6th
Cir. 1944). Compare Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954), where
exhaustion was required with respect to a similar procedural issue, as well as others, at
the same time as the statutory and constitutional issue of whether the agency's authority
had been validly bestowed was decided without reference to exhaustion.
19 7 Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947), stresses this point
at 331 U.S. 774-81, see note 100 supra.
'
0 8 See Part I at note 103.
20 9 Association of Civilian Technicians v. Young, 514 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Rigby
v. Rasmussen, 275 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1960); Ogletree v. McNamara, 448 F.2d 93, 99 (6th
Cir. 1971) (exhaustion rule applied with relation to determining validity of alleged racial
discrimination.by agency); Allegheny Airlines v. Fowler, 261 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(same as to agency interpretation of state statute which might or might not invade the
federal sphere or impair the objector's asserted rights); United States v. Brown, 211 F.
Supp. 953 (D. Colo. 1962); Brader v. City of Chicago, 39 Ill. 2d 152, 185 N.E.2d 848 (1962);
INDIANA LAW IOURNAL
Claims of unconstitutional action by state officers arise frequently
in proceedings pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts, notably under Section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, derived from the Act of
1871,110 whereby, in effect, any person alleging that any other person
has under color of state law deprived him of his rights, privileges, or
immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, may seek redress at
law, in equity, or in other proper proceedings in a United States district
court."' The extent to which, if at all, such a proceeding is subject to
the prerequisite of prior resort to any available administrative remedies
for the same deprivation presents a special problem. The answer to it
depends on several interacting factors.
The most fundamental factor was enunciated by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Raines,"2 after it had emerged in lower-court deci-
sions." 8 That case involved the Voting Rights Act of 1957;114 but its
N.H. Lyons & Co. v. Corsi, 3 N.Y.2d 60, 143 N.E.2d 392 (1957). But see Wills v. United
States, 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967) (added reason for not applying exhaustion rule stated
to be that, in any event, challenge was to an alleged denial of constitutional right by the
agency in its application of the law).
110 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
111 Ile implementing jurisdictional provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) which limits
the statutory rights that may be vindicated to such as are bestowed as "equal rights of
citizens or of all persons ... "
Section 1981 of 42 U.S.C. (1970) implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970), added
in 1957, 71 Stat. 637, as well as by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), seemingly extends to federal
agencies' racial discrimination, including that in federal employment. Courts have differed
both over whether it does (see Cozed v. Johnson, 397 F. Supp. 1235 (W.D. Okla. 1975)),
and if so, whether the exhaustion prerequisite applies to actions invoking this section. See
Penn v. Schlesinger, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974), holding that the exhaustion prerequisite
applies, and Kurylas v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1974),
aff'd without opinion, 514 F.2d 894 (1975), holding that exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not required in relation to § 1981. Ficklin v. Sabatini, 383 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), rejects the Kurykas view and accords with the decision in Penn v. Schlesinger.
More specifically applicable to federal employment is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. II 1972)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added in 1972, 86 Stat. 111, which may have super-
seded § 1981 in this area and which includes explicit provisions for initial resort to admin-
istrative remedies. These provisions also have given rise to a conflict of decisions over
the exhaustion requirement. The Fifth Circuit in Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1975), held that the exhaustion requirement does not apply under this legislation; but
the Kurylas case and Spencer v. Schlesinger, 374 F. Supp. 840 (D.D.C. 1974), held to
the contrary, as does Ettinger v. Johnson, 518 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1975). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1964), mainly if not exclusively applicable to private and local governmental employ-
ment, also contains specific provisions for invoking administrative action initially. A
large body of law, relating to the prerequisites to action against private and local govern-
ment employers, has arisen under this section.
112362 U.S. 17 (1960).
113 Carter v. School Bd., 182 F.2d 530, 536 (4th Cir. 1950): "Nor can it be said that
a scholar who is deprived of his due must apply to the administrative authorities and not
to the courts for relief. An injured person must of course show that the state has denied
him advantages accorded to others in like situation, but when this is established, his right
of access to the courts is absolute and complete"; Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271
(5th Cir. 1957). Other lower court cases, e.g., Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950), without differentiating Civil Rights Act cases from
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theory is applicable to other Civil Rights legislation as well. It is that a
deprivation at which the federal statute is aimed is complete when state
officials at any level commit a violation, without reference to whether
further action in the matter under state law could end the violation or
change its impact." 5 Since the violation is complete, the federal statutory
remedy can then be invoked.
A second factor, which also tends to eliminate the exhaustion re-
quirement from Civil Rights cases, is that the federal remedy is inde-
pendent of ("supplementary to") state judicial or administrative rem-
edies and in no sense conditioned on their inadequacy or failure in par-
ticular instances."' It was, indeed, the general failure of state remedies
for the evils at which the 1871 civil rights legislation was aimed that
led to its enactment."" Hence it would be strange if the availability of
such local remedies, whether judicial or administrative, were to impede
relief in the federal courts.
An alternative analysis, which interprets the legislative purpose in
enacting the 1871 Act as merely to fill a void when state remedies are
actually absent or inadequate,"" has not met with favor,"9 and the basic
view remains that federal court relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not
others, applied the doctrine of exhaustion to them. See the summary in the opinion of
Judge Motley in Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 881 n.13 (1970), modified as to
other issues, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049,
405 U.S. 978 (1972). See also Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 328
F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1964); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959). Cf. Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies Under the
Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. Rav. 565, 570 (1975).
114 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970).
115 362 U.S. at 25.
1168 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). This point was elaborated further in
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), which has become the leading authority
for the inapplicability of the exhaustion principle to Civil Rights Act cases. In the situation
presented, however, inadequacy of the available state administrative remedies, to which
the Court pointed, was a sufficient basis for the immediate availability of federal court
relief. As to the effect of the McNeese and later decisions, see Comment, Exhaustion
of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cm. L. Rav. 537 (1974);
Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HAnv. L. Rav. 1352 (1970); Note, Limit-
ing the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1486 (1969);
Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies under the Civil Rights Act, 68 CoLuTr. L. Rv.
1201 (1968).
117Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80 (1961).
118 Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex.
1970). As to reconciliation of this view with the opinion in Monroe v. Pape, note 116
supra, see also Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1967), asserting that the
Supreme Court "surely had no intention to abrogate in civil rights cases the historic rule
... that suits in equity shall not be entertained in courts of the United States 'in any case
where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.'
119 This analysis was criticized and repudiated in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430,
434-36 (5th Cir. 1970), Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970), and Hobbs v.
Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1971), but was again defended by the same judge
in Eigner v. Texas City Independent School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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conditioned on fulfillment of the doctrine of exhaustion. However, policy
considerations in situations that have developed relatively recently, in
which the increased reach of the fourteenth amendment provides protec-
tion to a wide range of interests, can pull strongly in the direction of a
requirement that state administrative proceedings be exhausted before
resort to a federal court. These situations involve the interests, some-
times weighty, sometimes petty, of prison inmates, welfare recipients,
public school pupils, university students, local government employees,
and persons subject to license requirements, who may allege injury
through violations of due process or denials of equal protection of the
laws in the treatment meted out to them.120 Where invidious discrimi-
nation or serious personal hardship is not involved, there may be superior
reasons for requiring that redress be sought through safeguarded state
administrative channels before judicial relief, including federal Civil
Rights Act relief, can be had.
In the analogous matter of habeas corpus relief on federal grounds
from imprisonment imposed by state court action, the Habeas Corpus
Act, in order to afford the states opportunities to correct their own
transgressions and for the purpose of minimizing the burden on the
federal courts, requires the exhaustion of state remedies before federal
habeas corpfis relief can be secured. 2' In relation to prison conditions
and penal treatment, habeas corpus and Civil Rights Act proceedings
often are interchangeable; but the Supreme Court held in Preiser v.
Rodrigues that in so far as the continuance or duration of imprisonment
is in issue the proceeding must be treated as habeas corpus; yet in rela-
tion to recovery of damages, which cannot be awarded in habeas corpus,
Civil Rights Act principles of exhaustion apply. 2 The Court did not
distinguish for Civil Rights Act purposes between exhaustion of judicial
and of administrative remedies, both of which are covered by the Habeas
Corpus Act requirement. The decision creates the anomaly 2 3 that Civil
Rights Act proceedings in which the conditions of confinement but not
the continuance or duration of imprisonment are challenged, and which
are not to be treated as habeas corpus cases, remain free of the Habeas
120 As to whether there is a limitation on the reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 turning on
the relation of the rights violated to those at which the 1871 Civil Rights Act was aimed,
see Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). As
that opinion brings out, even if there is such a limitation it leaves room for a large array
of administrative determinations to be challenged under the Act.
12128 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1966).
1 22Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). As to Civil Rights Act damage
actions see also Ray v. Fritz, 468 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 554-55 (1974).
12 8 See 411 U.S. at 506-08 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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Corpus Act exhaustion rule, whereas that rule continues to apply to
duration cases of at least equal gravity. As to Civil Rights actions, ear-
lier indications by the Court that exhaustion of state remedies in pris-
oner cases is not a prerequisite still stand.12 Later dicta in other kinds
of Section 1983 cases have repeated with apparent deliberateness prior
statements that "[elxhaustion of state judicial or administrative reme-
dies" (emphasis added) is not required in any such actions1 5 These
earlier decisions, however, did not deal fully with the possible reasons
for holding to the contrary in relation to administrative remedies.112
Some federal district courts, in consequence, continue to adhere to the
view that in Civil Rights Act cases involving state prisoners the ex-
haustion rule should be applied as respects state administrative remedies
which are available and adequate;" but the courts of appeals have re-
124 See VWTilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Padilla v. Ackerman, 460 F.2d
477 (9th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
125Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975), repeating Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974).
126Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968), held in a brief per curiam opinion that
administrative remedies at the hands of state penal authorities need not be exhausted,
but those which were available in the case had been partially invoked with results that
caused the Court to characterize the remainder as clearly futile. In Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249 (1971), the Court expressly construed Houghton to mean that resort to
effective as well as ineffective state administrative remedies is unnecessary, although Wit-
wording itself involved state judicial remedies. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973),
the Court appeared to assume throughout a full opinion that in Civil Rights Act cases
generally neither state judicial nor state administrative remedies need be exhausted before
federal relief is sought.
Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), cited in Houghton, was a welfare case
decided in a brief per curiarn opinion, which enunciated broadly the rule that in Civil
Rights Act cases state administrative remedies need not have been sought. See also Carter
v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972). However, in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1968),
also a welfare case, the statement was that exhaustion of state administrative remedies in
such cases is not required "where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial,
as here, to require the summoning of a three-judge court." The challenge in the case
was to a substantive regulation. The statement appears to narrow the Civil Rights
exhaustion-rule exception to one which applies only to issues (involving the validity of
a statute) which the agency could not decide or which (in a case involving the validity
of a regulation) it would be unlikely to decide in the particular case. As to the former
situation see Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973) (broader rule
dispensing with exhaustion in civil rights cases also espoused); School Bd. v. Atkins, 246
F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957); cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F.
Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973); Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (N.D. Ill. 1967), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 847 (1969). See also note 99 supra and text accompanying. As to diffi-
culties in applying the King v. Smith distinction see Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d 1353
(7th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 406 U.S. 914 (1972), especially the dissenting
opinion of Reynolds, D.J.127See Washington v. Boslow, 375 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Md. 1974), and McCray v.
Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), both rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1974).
Compare Borror v. White, 377 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Va. 1974); Jones v. Superintendent,
370 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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versed their decisions.12 Legislation is needed to resolve the problem
satisfactorily,129 especially in the light of application of the exhaustion
requirement in federal prisoner cases. 180
Similar practical considerations apply to a possible requirement of
exhaustion of state administrative remedies in other areas of administra-
tion mentioned above, involving constitutionally protected personal in-
terests. In these areas some decisions have applied the over-all rule
based on Raines and Monroe v. Pape,8' that exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is not required under the Civil Rights Acts,182 while other
decisions have stated the contrary or carved out various exceptions and
qualifications.1
12SHiney v. Wilson, 520 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1975) (brief per curiam opinion; reversal
possibly occasioned by presence of damage claim); Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295 (5th
Cir. 1975) (a damage case); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1974) (damage
claims included).
129 The Maryland statutory procedure described in the McCray opinion appears to
be generally of a high order. Federal legislation conditioning an exhaustion requirement
on the availability of adequate state procedures could stimulate the enactment of more
such statutes and, increasingly, reduce the necessity for civil rights litigation brought by
state prisoners in the federal courts. An act of Congress providing a federal administratvie
remedy for both state and federal prisoner complaints is also possible. See ADnmasRTiv
OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE
CASELOAD OF TnE SUPREmm COURT 12-14 (1972).
180 Waddell v. Alldredge, 480 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1973); Pace v. Clark, 453 F.2d 411
(5th Cir. 1972); Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1972).
181 See notes 112 & 116, supra.
182 Gillette v. McNichols, 517 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1975); Hayes v. Board of Regents
of Ky. State University, 495 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1974); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748,
751 n.3 (1st Cir. 1973) (court adheres newly to this principle in a case involving refusal
of a motor vehicle operator's license, subject to a requirement of ripeness of agency action
suffmicient to give rise to a § 1983 cause of action in the first place); Gilliam v. City of
Omaha, 459 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1972); Powell v. Workmen's Comp. Ed., 327 F.2d 131
(2d Cir. 1964) (noting earlier authority to the contrary); Carrera v. Municipality of
Rayamon, 370 F. Supp. 859, 867 (D. Puerto Rico 1974); Davis v. Barr, 373 F. Supp.
740 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. Wallace, 362 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ala.
1973); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn. 1973); Cook v.
Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307, 310 (D.N.H. 1972). As to Second Circuit decisions, see
Gonzales v. Shanker, 533 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1976).
133 Fuentes v. Roher, 519 F.2d 379, 386 (2d Cir. 1975) and Piano v. Baker, 504
F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1974) (exhaustion not required in these particular cases, however);
Canton v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974) (exhaustion rule
applies, but not when remedy inadequate because Civil Rights injury has already been
inflicted); Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1186 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970)
(dictum in school teacher nonretention case, that "[w]e . . . normally require resort to
an available hearing prior to initiation of a section 1983 action"); Stevenson v. Board of
Educ. of Wheeler County, 426 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. dended, 400 U.S. 957
(1970) (students excluded from school because of violation of hair grooming regulations-
see the District Court opinion, 306 F. Supp. 97, 101-held not to have suffered final
injury until administrative appeal exhausted or shown to be ineffective); Salvate v. Dale,
364 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (license application case); Becker v. Oswald, 360 F.
Supp. 1131 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (student expulsion case); Boyd v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 844
(N.D. Ind. 1973) (same); Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550
(S.D. Tex. 1971) (case similar to Stevenson, supra).
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In matters close to the concerns which gave rise to the Civil Rights
Acts, involving race discrimination and abuse of law enforcement pow-
ers, the proposition that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite
to federal Civil Rights Acts actions has been a convenient means of
dispensing with case-by-case determination of whether on other grounds
resort to state administrative remedies should be required in circum-
stances involving persistent violations.184 It would be possible to enact
statutory authorization for this practice of dispensing with case-by-case
decision in relation to a historically-based category of cases, leaving
others to be governed by a flexible exhaustion rule. The American Law
Institute makes such a distinction in its solution to the related problem
of federal-court stay of proceedings when there is a plain, speedy, and
efficient judicial remedy in the courts of the state. The Institute's draft
of new federal legislation to govern the division of jurisdiction between
state and federal courts would authorize a stay of district court pro-
ceedings in favor of state jurisdiction under specified conditions, in-
cluding availability of the requisite kind of state remedy, but not the
stay of "actions to redress the denial, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of the right to vote or
of the equal protection of the laws, if such denial is alleged to be on the
basis of race, creed, color, or national origin."185 No such exception can
with complete accuracy state the area of greatest current need for un-
conditional protection at the hands of federal authorities; at best a reason-
able approximation must serve, responsive to the need for conservation
of federal judicial resources and respect for state administrative oppor-
tunity to rectify wrongs at the local level, as well as for safeguarding
the interests requiring maximum protection. Infliction of physical suffer-
ing under color of state law might, for example, be included as a kind
184McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1961), note 116 supra, illustrates this
point See also Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 336-337 (5th Cir. 1963). In
other decisions both after and before Armstrong, the Fifth Circuit has relied instead on
the futility of attempts to exhaust administrative remedies in the actual situations pre-
sented, because of fixed policies applied by the agency involved, as a basis for not
requiring resort to those remedies. See Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist.,
328 F.2d 408 (1964); Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 290 (1963); Orleans Parish School Bd.
v. Rush, 242 F.2d 156, 162 (1957); Bruce v. Stilwell, 206 F.2d 554 (1953). See also Farley
v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960); School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957). Compare Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959).
1S5 ALI, STuDY or T DIVISI0iON o JURISDICTION BETwEErN STATE AND FEDEaA
CouRTs (1969) and Commentary at 297-98 (1969). A more comprehensive proposal for
federal legislation to deal with same problem is made in Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of
Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 L. & Soc. ORDER 557, 577-78.
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of action giving rise to the right to seek redress in the federal courts, for
which exhaustion of state administrative remedies would not be a pre-
requisite.
A related problem surrounds the determination of whether the
action that allegedly deprives someone of a constitutional right has
actually become effective. If the action is merely a recommendation to
higher authority, it has not inflicted a deprivation which is reached by
42 U.S.C. .§ 1983.188 Even action which purports to be definitive may
be so subject to easy appeal, without adverse effect in the interim, as
not to be subject to imediate Civil Rights Act review."37 The issue in-
volved is really one of ripeness. Nevertheless the federal remedy should
not be withheld during successive stages of agency proceedings ac-
companied by protracted deprivation of the federally secured right.
Neither the conception of official action which precipitates the right to
federal relief nor the doctrine of exhaustion so far as it may apply
should cause deferment of that relief while such aggravated deprivation
continues.
Exhaustion in Relation to Agency Power to Act
It has already been stated that from the inception of the exhaustion
rule the courts have recognized an exception which dispenses with the
exhaustion requirement in relation to the question of agency power to
act in the matter presented. 138 The exception has continued to be recog-
186 ee Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 (1973), with reference to whether the
exhaustion rule applies in a Civil Rights Act case "where the individual charged is to be
deprived of nothing until the completion of [the administrative] proceeding." See also
Blanton v. State Univ. of N.Y., 489 F.2d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 1973) (absent special circum-
stances, a student whose suspension has been recommended suffers no injury before
adverse action is taken); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 436 n.11 (5th Cir. 1970), note 119
supra; Chaney v. State Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1011 (1968); Depperman v. Univ. of Ky., 371 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Ky. 1974). Compare
Smith v. Board of Commissioners of the D.C., 380 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where the
relief sought was only against allegedly threatened future violations of cvil rights under
the aegis of agency heads whose sanction of past infringements by subordinates was not
shown. See also Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 957 (1970), note 133 supra.
137 Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973).
See also Whitmer v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969), relied on in Toney, and Stevenson
v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1970). A variant arose in Suckle v. Madison
General Hospital, 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974), where the only claimed civil right was
opportunity for a formal, procedurally safeguarded hearing which had not been expressly
demanded and was held not to have been impliedly refused by the offer of an informal
appearance before the deciding agency.
18 8 See note 14 supra & text accompanying.
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nized with some frequency.13 9 It was limited or negated, however, in
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation,140 a leading case, which
applied the exhaustion requirement in a district court suit to enjoin the
National Labor Relations Board from continuing a complaint proceeding
against Bethlehem on the ground that the Board's authority did not
extend under the statute to Bethlehem's operation because it was not
related to interstate commerce. The National Labor Relations Act itself
was held to require clearly, by its bestowal of "exclusive power" on the
Board and on reviewing courts of appeals, that the issue of Board auth-
ority, along with other issues, be determined by the Board in the first
instancel---a sufficient ground for the decision that the district court
should have dismissed the complaints of the corporation and of a local
union. The Court, however, also invoked without qualification "the long
settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial
relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed admini-
strative remedy has been exhausted," which the Court said "has been
repeatedly acted on in cases where, as here, the contention is made that
the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.' '1 42
Reconciliation of the view stated in the Bethlehem Shipbuilding
case, that the exhaustion rule applies even when agency power over the
subject matter is challenged, with the oft-stated exception embracing
questions of agency power, depends on whether the decisions in the two
139 Cf. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 499 n.5 (1962) (concurring opinion).
In Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973), the justices seemed to agree that an issue of
court martial jurisdiction would not be waived by failure to raise it in the court martial
proceedings, but divided on the question of whether the challenge there was to jurisdiction
or to the observance of applicable due process and related constitutional safeguards. See
also Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592 (1964); Horan v.
Foley, 39 Ill. App. 2d 458, 188 N.E.2d 877 (1963); and, as to the exception embodied in
one provision of the Illinois Review Act, Skokie Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Savings &
Loan Bd., 88 Ill. App. 2d 373, 382, 232 N.E.2d 167, 172 (1967). As to interaction between
the exception and the traditional availability of the remedy of prohibition to test the
jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal, see People ex rel. Hurley v. Graber, 405 Inl. 331, 90
N.E.2d 763 (1950); Willamette Valley Lumber Co. v. Ellis, 226 Ore. 543, 359 P.2d 98
(1961).
140 303 U.S. 44 (1938). For a discussion of the dimensions of the exception in the
wake of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding decision, see Schwartz, Jurisdiction to Determine Juris-
diction in Federal Administrative Law, 38 Gao. L.J. 368 (1950).
141303 U.S. at 48-50.
142 Id. at 50-51. Of the cases cited by the Court in support of this statement, all but
two involve ripeness primarily and are dealt with in note 148 infra. Of these two, FTC v.
Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927), involved alternative judicial remedies rather than
further resort to the administrative agency sought to be enjoined; and the other, Western
& Atlantic R. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 493 (1925), involved the
primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to the impact
on interstate commerce of a final order of the defendant state commission.
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lines of cases can be distinguished on a consistent basis. They can be
if agency authority in one line involves undisputed fact situations in
which agency power depends wholly on how statutory terms or consti-
tutional provisions apply 43 and in the other line turns also on the
ascertainment of facts. Such fact ascertainment will be aided by an
agency record and findings, which should justify the expense and delay
of securing them. Hence the exhaustion rule should apply. 44 The situ-
ation in the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation case was of this second
variety; for at the time of the decision, although the National Labor
Relations Act's coverage of a steelmaking enterprise that drew to a
large extent on interstate commerce for raw materials and shipped much
of its product into such commerce had been established,'45 the relation
of even such large enterprises to the interstate flow of goods was not
looked upon as self-evident and was still regarded as determinable case
by case after the facts were developed. 146 In Allen v. Grand Central Air-
craft Company, on the other hand, where the Supreme Court decided
the question of agency authority without requiring exhaustion of agency
processes, 147 the question turned not at all on the facts of the situation
presented but entirely on the meaning of statutory terms, the applicable
legislative history, and the constitutional context of the authority be-
stowed. Other decisions concerning the exhaustion requirement in rela-
148 This formulation of the kind of question of power which is not subject to the
exhaustion requirement seems preferable to one that speaks of whether the agency "has
patently traveled outside the orbit of its authority," NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co.,
327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946). This alternative supplies no criterion of when an issue of "patent"
excess of authority is presented, or else it assumes the answer to the question which needs
decision.
144 See the cogent analysis in the dissenting opinion of Judge Desmond in New York
Post Corp. v. Kelley, 296 N.Y. 178, 71 N.E.2d 456 (1947), in which the majority held
that a Special Term of the Supreme Court had discretion to entertain a declaratory judg-
ment action, challenging the jurisdiction of the state Labor Relations Board before repre-
sentation proceedings had run their course, when the challenge involved factual as well
as legal issues.
14 5 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
14 6 The Jones & Laughlin decision, although it set the pattern of future decisions on
this point, was limited in terms to the particular employer's business. The Court said:
"Whether or not . . . particular [conduct] . . . does affect commerce in such a close and
intimate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to be within the authority
conferred upon the Board, is left by the statute to be determined as individual cases
arise." 301 U.S. at 32. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946), note 72
supra, which specifically relies on the Bethlehem Shipbuilding case, cannot be explained
in the same way, for the challenged authority of the Renegotiation Board turned on the
statute in relation to undisputed facts. The Court stressed, however, not the general
principle of exhaustion, but the "exclusive [statutory] jurisdiction" of the Tax Court
"to decide questions of fact and law" before an Article III court's authority could be
invoked. Id. at 544.
147347 U.S. 535 (1954).
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tion to the issue of agency power conform on the whole to this law-fact
distinction. 48
The difference between the two lines of cases can be expressed by
formulating the exception to the exhaustion requirement as one which
applies when agency power to act in a defined kind of situation is chal-
lenged, but not when the challenge relates to agency power under cir-
cumstances that remain to be ascertained. In the former instance the
court may decide the question of power to act without need for prior
agency determinations; in the latter the circumstances need to be devel-
oped, preferably through agency processes initially, as part of the ascer-
148 See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), and United States v. Sing Tick, 194
U.S. 161 (1904), as compared in note 14 supra; Dooley v. Ploger, 491 F.2d 608 (4th Cir.
1974) (exhaustion rule applied to issue of court martial jurisdiction because of need to
determine impact of accused serviceman's alleged offense on operation of armed forces;
excellent discussion by court of agency-power exception to exhaustion rule in relation to
two kinds of jurisdictional issues); Lone Star Cement Corp. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 505 (9th
Cir. 1964) (agency power turning on facts relating to involvement of local cement business
with interstate commerce; exhaustion doctrine applied); Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 235 F.
Supp. 606 (D. Colo. 1964) (authority of agency turning on direct Supreme Court precedent;
exception to exhaustion rule applied; decision on merits, 261 F. Supp. 954 (D. Colo. 1966),
aff'd 406 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'd, Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970));
Blake v. Public Util. Comm'n, 120 Cal. App. 2d 671, 261 P.2d 773 (1953) (validity of the
agency decision did not become a question of jurisdiction because of alleged total absence
of supporting evidence; exhaustion was required). See also Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp.
v. Kelley, 296 N.Y. 178, 71 N.E.2d 456 (1947), declining to follow the Bethlehem Ship-
building view in a case where the state labor relations board's authority with respect to
a category of workers turned partially on facts to be determined; Schwebel v. Orrick, 251
F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958), and Camp v. Herzog, 190
F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1951), in which the court held the exhaustion rule applicable to the
issue of implied authority of agencies to regulate practice before them, perhaps because
of agency expertise concerning the actual need for such regulation. The Supreme Court's
departure from the Bethlehem Shipbuilding exhaustion doctrine in Leedom v. Kyne, 358
U.S.,184 (1958), note 89 supra, conforms to the distinction here drawn. In addition to
ihe issue of denial of a specific statutory right, which justified immediate judicial review
of a certification order of the NLRB without further proceedings before the Board, the
Court referred also to the agency's action "in excess of its delegated power" under the
statute as written. 358 U.S. at 188. See also Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd., 392
U.S. 233 (1968).
As to the related question of need for agency determinations before issues of agency
power to act are ripe for judicial consideration, see Part I at notes 54-55, supra. In such
cases exhaustion principles apply. See note 1 supra. The following cases of this nature, in
which judicial intervention was held to be premature, involved situations where facts,
still to be ascertained, bore on the question of agency power: St. Louis-San Francisco R.R.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 279 U.S. 560 (1929); Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R.,
274 U.S. 588 (1927); Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 699 (1915); American
Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Fowler,
261 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
.. The Court in Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943), before
holding that a railroad's attack on a Commission rate proceeding on various grounds was
premature, decided the question of Commission jurisdiction over the subject matter,
which also was raised, on the basis of its interpretation of the effect of an Interstate
Commerce Commission order which had a bearing (accepting for this purpose the ICC's
own interpretation). As to this question, no development of facts was necessary. 318 U.S.
at 685-86.
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tainment of agency authority. A problem remains, however, of determin-
ing whether a challenge is to agency power, i.e., "jurisdiction," or
merely to the legality of actions within the general range of agency
authority. 49 In the latter event the agency-power exception to the
exhaustion rule does not come into play, but a closely related question,
of whether the exhaustion rule requires initial presentation of issues of
law to the agency involved, is raised instead.
Exhaustion in Relation to Questions of Law
The view which has been taken from time to time, that the exhaus-
tion requirement does not apply when the challenge is only to a deter-
mination of law involved in an agency's action, seems to be based largely
on the practical reasons for prompt judicial decision of questions of law
without awaiting prior agency decision of the same questions. This view
must yield, nevertheless, to statutory provisions that objections not
raised before an agency may not be relied on in court; and it is suspect
when technical considerations within an agency's special competence af-
fect the constitutional or statutory interpretations in question. The ex-
ception, accordingly, is often stated as a qualified one, dependent on the
nature of the legal issue presented. It may relate either to substantive
issues or to questions of agency procedure.
New Jersey cases have been especially influential in developing the
issue-of-law exception to the exhaustion rule. The earliest New Jersey
decisions that gave effect to it stated the exception broadly, on the ground
that the courts rather than the local zoning boards involved in the
cases were the proper tribunals to determine issues of law.:' 5 After the
federal exhaustion rule had developed, Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Ward
v. Keenan"5 afid Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,52 shortly after World War II,
articulated the practical reasons for an inclusive view as to issues of law.
149 Cf. Dragna v. Landon, 209 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1953) (whether defects in a resident
alien's entry from Mexico on return from a visit there could be the basis of deportation
proceedings); Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FPC, 242 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957), in which the
court treated as jurisdictional, and therefore as not subject to the exhaustion requirement,
an issue concerning a procedural defect which consisted of the denial of a hearing that
was required by law; Cotherman v. FTC, 417 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the
issue of whether the Commission's authority over unfair methods of competition and
unfair practices in commerce extended to conduct in the loan business was held to be
nonjurisdictional and to have been waived by the party later seeking to raise it. Compare
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33 (1952), note 40 supra & text
accompanying.
15OLosick v. Binda, 102 N.J.L. 157, 130 A. 537 (1925); Conaway v. Atlantic City,
107 N.J.L. 404, 154 A. 6 (1931); Lane v. Bigelow, 135 N.J.L. 195, 50 A.2d 638 (1947).
1513 N.J. 298, 70 A.2d 77 (1949).
152 9 N.J. 477, 89 A.2d 13 (1962).
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He stated the exception broadly in the latter case, to embrace all issues
of law, as a counterweight to the strict federal exhaustion rule which had
been stated in the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation case.153 The two
New Jersey cases were proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs, chal-
lenging agency determinations 1 4 that were still subject to administrative
review. In this context the Chief Justice was able to ascribe to the ex-
ception strong historical roots in the shape of prior enlargement of the
scope of the prerogative writs. These had come to be used not only to
test the jurisdiction, narrowly conceived, of inferior tribunals or offi-
cials prior to their decisions, but also to check the exercise of allegedly
"merely colorable" jurisdiction in cases in which these tribunals were
acting on a basis that was "palpably defective" for legal reasons."' 5 A
constitutionally authorized New Jersey rule of court applicable to writ
proceedings, which required exhaustion of administrative remedies
"[e]xcept where it is manifest that the interests of justice require other-
wise," was held to call for an exception when a court could, by deciding
a dispositive question of law without a prior agency decision, dispense
with the need for continued agency proceedings. 5
Shortly before these New Jersey decisions the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit decided Wettre v. Hague,'57 in which
a similar view was stated without a corresponding articulation of reasons
for it. The court held that the district court properly entertained a suit
to enjoin the Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard from dispensing
with the services of the plaintiffs, employees at the Yard, through a
reduction in force in alleged violation of statutory veterans' preference
rights of the plaintiffs, under facts which were not in dispute. The
essential question was whether the statute relied upon for job protection
had been impliedly limited by a later one. The plaintiffs had not availed
themselves of administrative appeal proceedings, but the court declared
15 8 See notes 140 & 142 supra.
154 Ward v. Keenan involved a challenge to agency proceedings against an employee
for conduct while he was on leave of absence, over which the agency allegedly had no
authority; Nolan v. Fitzpatrick involved a contention that the defendant members of a
county board of freeholders were under a legal duty to honor a requisition for funds from
the plaintiff Boulevard Commissioners.
155 Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. at 308, 70 A.2d at 82.
156 Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. at 484, 89 A.2d at 16. See also Hormel v. Helvering,
312 U.S. 552 (1941), where a corresponding result was based on a similar provision govern-
ing statutory review of decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals.
157 168 F.2d 825 (Ust Cir. 1948), followed in Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125
(N.D. Cal. 1949), Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), and Group v.
Finletter, 101 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1952). See also Hardy v. Rossell, 135 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), where, after trenchant criticism of the Wettre rule, the court applied it
in deference to the Court of Appeals.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that in view of the pure question of law presented, "there is no . . .
occasion for the requirement that they exhaust whatever administrative
remedies they may have before seeking to vindicate their rights in
court... ." The court relied in part on Order of Railway Conductors v.
Pitney,68 a case which applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine by
holding that a private dispute should have been presented initially to
an administrative agency which could entertain it, but, at the same
time, recognized that where "a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which
Congress . . . created" is obvious, a court of equity can, "in a proper
case," intervene.1 59
Wettre met with a mixed reception in other government personnel
cases. The force of its recognition of the issue-of-law exception to the
exhaustion requirement was diminished because after the argument, but
before the decision in the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court in another
case had settled the question of law involved 6 ' and had thereby elimi-
nated any practical need to apply the exhaustion principle in this in-
stance. Other courts disagreed with the opinion's statement of the- ex-
ception to the exhaustion rule and declined to follow it in similar but
not identical situations. 6' The First Circuit itself in Fitzpatrick v.
Snyder 62 limited Wettre to the precise situation presented, emphasizing
that the exception applies only when a clear violation of statutory right
has occured. This narrower formulation was derived in Fitzpatrick from
Breiner v. Wallin,' a case decided before Wettre and similar in its
facts, in which, however, the issue-of-law exception to the exhaustion
rule was held not to apply because the legal answer was not clear. As
authority for the narrow exception, Breiner adduced decisions which
awarded specific relief by mandamus or injunction against administrative
action based on a clear error of law. In each instance the agency's action
was administratively final,164 and the question at issue was whether that
158326 U.S. 561 (1946).
15 9 Id. at 566.
160 Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323 (1948).
161 Young v. Higley, 220 F.2d 487 (D.C. App. 1955); Hills v. Eisenhart, 256 F.2d
609 (9th Cir. 1958).
162220 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1955). See also May v. Glore, 132 F. Supp. 327 (E.D.N.Y.
1955); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971).
168 79 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
164In one of the cases cited, Waite v. Macey, 246 U.S. 606 (1918), further ad-
ministrative proceedings could have been had, but the disputed issue was the validity
of a controlling regulation which would not be questioned in those proceedings. In Ham-
mond v. Hull, 131 F.2d 23 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777 (1943), also cited, the
challenge was by a foreign service officer to an efficiency rating of "unsatisfactory," assigned
to him by an official action which was final as a record even though it would have no
specific effects unless made the basis of further action. The opinion of the Court of
Appeals relied upon both mandamus and exhaustion-of-remedies precedents.
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action was subject to control at all by means of the particular remedies
sought, not whether otherwise appropriate judicial review was pre-
cluded because an administrative remedy was available. The grossness
of an alleged agency error of law could be relevant to both of these
issues; but the sufficiency of legal error to warrant judicial scrutiny
of final agency action may differ from its sufficiency to justify judicial
intervention when there are, or were, unused opportunities for the
agency to correct its error.
The suitability for the latter purpose of defining the issue-of-law
exception to the exhaustion rule as relating to clear agency violations
of law is open to serious question, partly because it may be difficult to
decide whether a particular illegality is a clear one. 6 5 As stated, more-
over, the exception operates in one direction only; clear error of law on
the part of the agency dispenses with the exhaustion rule, but a chal-
lenge to an obviously correct agency determination, offered without
exhaustion of an available administrative remedy, may lead, not to a
judgment on the merits, but to dismissal for failure to exhaust.' The
court under this formulation must examine the merits and go on to
decide them when there is clear error, in the name of determining
whether to assume the reviewing function. It would be preferable to
say, instead, that the exhaustion rule will be followed when issues of
law are presented which involve technical or specialized historical or
policy considerations,'167 but not when legal answers turn on the interpre-
tation of ordinary words used in statutes. In the former situation the
rule would operate to secure the benefit of specialized agency knowl-
edge ;168 in the latter the court would decide without this benefit because
165 See the opinion of Judge Ryan in Hardy v. Russell, 135 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), note 157 supra.
16 6 See May v. Maurer, 185 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1950) (challenge to an obviously
correct agency decision of an issue of law raised a "substantial" question requiring exhaus-
tion. Compare Zerillo v. Local Bd. No. 102, 440 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1971), where the court,
which in its view was required to examine preliminarily the merits of the issue of law
presented, in order to determine the jurisdiction of the district court, went ahead to
decide the issue adversely to the challenger, so as to dispense with the need for additional,
wasteful litigation, even though in that case the merits were not obvious.
16 7 See the comment of Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Breen v. Selective Serv.
Local Bd., 396 U.S. 460, 468 (1970), that it is preferable to have the availability of judicial
review turn, "not on what amounts to an advance decision on the merits, but rather on
the nature of the challenge being made." Cf. Johnson v. War Assets Administration, 171
F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1949) (question of whether statutory veterans preference for retention
in government positions extended to non-permanent incumbents as against permanent-status
nonveteran personnel); Wettre, note 157 supra, distinguished; People v. Carpentier, 17
Ill. 2d 303, 161 N.E.2d 97 (1959) ("interpretation of policy" in classification of motor
vehicle operating companies for the assessment of fees).
16CWf. Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1973) (drug regulation).
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it would be at least as well qualified as the agency involved to determine
the issue, even when problems of interrelating several statutory provi-
sions were presented. 69
Such a formulation provides no easy touchstone, because ordinary
words in a statute may be used in a context that includes the complex
history of a specialized subject. In such a situation the court would have
to choose which aspect of the problem to emphasize in deciding whether
to apply the exhaustion rule."'7 In this way, the court would at least
be considering factors relevant to the satisfactoriness of alternative
routes for a resolution of the legal issues presented, instead of having
partially to judge the merits of those issues in the process of deciding
whether to entertain them.
Selective Service Cases*
As the law relating to the exhaustion of administrative remedies
as a prerequisite to judicial review in Selective Service cases has evolved,
issues relating to agency authority and to determinations of law have
169 Consumers Union v. Cost of Living Council, 491 F.2d 1390 (Em. App. 1974), in
which the court, assuming that additional administrative remedies were available to the
plaintiffs, who were seeking public disclosure of business information filed with the Council
but withheld by Council regulations, decided that, nevertheless, a judicial determination
of the validity of the regulations should be had, because the regulations were dear and the
court could determine the only issue presented, namely the meaning of the interrelated
statutory provisions involved. The Supreme Court impliedly took this view in Hilton v.
Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323 (1948), in which the exhaustion issue was not raised, doubtless
because the challenge was to the statutory interpretation embodied in Civil Service Com-
mission regulations which governed the plaintiff's case before the agency and, arguably,
would have rendered the administrative remedy futile. See Waite v. Macey, 246 U.S. 606
(1918), note 164 supra. See also Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653
(1974), involving an issue of statutory construction, in which the court of appeals in,
United States ex rel. Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary, 483 F.2d 656, 659 (3d
Cir. 1973), had held that the exhaustion rule need not be followed because the question
was only one of law not calling for the exercise of agency expertise.
17 In Hilton v. Sullivan, see note 169 supra, the Court, in determining the merits,
confidently construed the statutory language involved with reference to legislative history
but not to administrative practice. The court of appeals in Hilton v. Forrestal, 165 F.2d
251 (D.C. App. 1947), reaching a contrary conclusion, had looked upon agency discretion
as operative and important. The same divergence of approach would apply to the question
of need for exhaustion of administrative remedies. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 448
F.2d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972), and McCurdy v. Steele,
353 F. Supp. 629, 639-40 (D. Utah 1973), in each of which the court held the exhaustion
rule not to apply because a purely legal question of statutory construction was involved,
even though the issue could easily have been regarded as one that could best be resolved
with the aid of specialized knowledge. See also Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975) (failure of Secretary of Labor to raise
an important question of statutory interpretation before a statutory tribunal sitting in
judgment on his actions did not bar his doing so before a reviewing court).
* Although the suspension of Selective Service by Proclamation no. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg.
14567 (1975), eliminates the current impact of this topic, the discussion of it here is
retained because past development in the law of exhaustion of remedies, arising in Selective
Service administration, continues to be significant.
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frequently been the basis, together with other grounds which will be
specified, for exceptions to the exhaustion rule. That rule as elaborated
in the Selective Service context gives effect to principles of ripeness as
well as to the usual aspects of exhaustion, by requiring a registrant, as
a condition of judicial review, not only to have exhausted all available
administrative recourse against a classification which he wishes to chal-
lenge, but also to have submitted to the very last phase of the selection
and induction process in which a determination, affecting his liability
to serve could be made."' After that the registrant can either submit
and seek his subsequent release'72 or refuse to take the final formal step
and defend a prosecution for the refusal on the ground of invalidity in
the proceedings.'
Despite the rigor of this two-fold exhaustion requirement and limi-
tation of remedies, the lower federal courts in several cases of apparent
administrative neglect or unfairness entertained injunction suits against
future enforcement of service, because of alleged illegality in the pre-
vious draft classification process. 4 In Wolff v. Selective Service Local
Board,7 1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a case in which
available administrative appeals had not been taken, held that review
should be allowed in such a suit with respect to an alleged usurpation of
authority by the Selective Service Administrator which resulted in the
17 United States v. Matson, 262 F2d 914 (7th Cir. 1959); Mason v. United States,
218 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1955). Under the regulations which were applicable in Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), this step was submission to a physical examination
at the time of induction, and was followed by the purely formal step of taking the oath.
Refusal to take the latter step would follow exhaustion of administrative "remedies," and
prosecution for it could be defended on the ground of invalidity in the prior proceedings.
The regulations were later changed to provide for pre-induction physical examinations
in the localities, leaving the whole process of reporting for induction a formal one which
need not be undertaken as a prerequisite to defending, on the ground of prior invalidity
in the proceedings, a prosecution for noncompliance. See Gibson v. United States, 329
U.S. 338 (1946), involving a refusal to report to civilian work camp pursuant to con-
scientious objector classification, because of a claim of ministerial exemption.
172 Release might follow either a successful habeas corpus action challenging continued
detention in the armed forces or the successful defense of a prosecution for disobedience
to an aspect of civilian service as a conscientious objector on the ground that the duty
to serve was not validly imposed. As to the former remedy see Estep v. United States,
at 327 U.S. at 124, see note 171 supra; Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946); Witmer v.
United States, 348 U.S. 375, 377 (1955); Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S.
233, 235 (1968). As to the latter remedy see Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947).17 3Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1956). As to the previous view based on
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), that submission to induction was mandatory
and habeas corpus the sole remedy, see Mr. justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
BEsteP, supra.
174 Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956); Ex parte Fabiani, 105
F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (habeas corpus supplemented by injunctive relief); Diamond
v. Berman, 95 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
175372 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1967).
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punitive I-A classification of the plaintiffs, rendering them subject to
immediate induction orders, because of their participation in student
demonstrations against the Vietnam war. The reclassification was held
illegal. Since it deterred registrants from engaging in the exercise of
First Amendment rights to demonstrate peacefully, the justification for
an immediate judicial remedy was great. At the same time, since the
reclassifications were the result of a national Selective Service policy,
which the administrative appeal tribunals would have had no authority
to overrule, resort to appeals would have been futile.
Largely because of this decision the Congress, aroused by a likeli-
hood of frequent litigious interference with allegedly invalid Selective
Service proceedings that had not run their full course, amended the
Selective Service Act by an express provision that "[n]o judicial re-
view shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant"
except in a criminal prosecution for disobedience "after the registrant
has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report
for induction or for civilian work. .. "" The statute, however, almost
immediately proved ineffective to prevent review prior to an induction
order that might result from the punitive revocation of a registrant's
statutory exemption. Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Board,"fl in
which a suit was brought to enjoin induction, involved reclassification
of a divinity school student, revoking his ministerial-student exemption
bestowed by statute, because he had returned his Selective Service regis-
tration card as a protest against the Vietnam war, thereby engaging in
disobedience, punishable in itself, to a regulation which required regis-
trants to keep such cards in their possession. The arbitrary and illegal
reclassification, the Court held in effect, was not actually a "classification
or processing" of a registrant, to which the 1967 statutory restriction
would apply. It was, rather, "basically" and "blatantly lawless, without
authority, and a clear departure . . . from the statutory mandate,"' '
rendering an immediate remedy appropriate.
In Oestereich the registrant had exhausted his administrative ap-
peals from the reclassification; but in Breen v. Selective Service Local
Board, where the Oestereich holding was extended to include a challenge
to the punitive withdrawal of a student deferment which was authorized
but not required by statute, the suit had been brought before an ad-
17681 Stal 104 (1967), 50 U.S.C. §460(b)(4) (1970). By common consent, the
amendment was not intended to exclude and did not rule out relief through habeas corpus
after induction. Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 235, 248 (1968).
177393 U.S. 233 (1968).
1T8 Id., 238.
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ministrative appeal proceeding was completed.Y19 In Clark v. Gabriel,'80
decided at the same time as Oestereich, the statute was held applicable to
prevent judicial review after administrative appeals had been exhausted
but prior to completion of the selection process. The challenge was to the
withholding of a conscientious objector classification, which allegedly re-
sulted from hostility on the part of the Selective Service local board and
"misapplied the statutory definition of conscientious objector." "Here,"
the Court stated, "there is no doubt of the Board's statutory authority to
take action which appellee challenges, and that action inescapably in-
volves a determination of fact and an exercise of judgment."''
In McKart v. United State' 82 the 1967 statutory provision did
not exclude review because the case was a prosecution for refusal to
report for induction. The district court excluded review of the registrant's
classification because he had not taken an administrative appeal from it
and had, indeed, repudiated the Selective Service System after the initial
stage and failed to report for a preinduction physical examination when
ordered to do so. The question involved in his classification was whether,
following the death of his mother, the registrant was entitled to retain
a previous statutory draft exemption as the "sole surviving son" in a
"family" in which the father had been killed while serving in the armed
forces, when there were no other children. As to this question, which
was "'solely one of statutory interpretation," it was not necessary, the
Supreme Court held, to resort to administrative appeals, because the
decision "[did] not require any particular expertise on the part of the
appeal board" or require an exercise of discretion.'83 In this respect it
was unlike the issues raised by claims of conscientious objection or
claims for deferment on account of civilian activities deemed "necessary
for the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest ;" judicial
review would not have been "significantly aided" by further administra-
tive consideration. The registrant had presented the facts initially to the
local board.' His failure to report for a pre-induction physical exam-
ination, although punishable in itself, was superseded by the subsequent
'79 396 U.S. 460 (1970). In Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970), where
t6e Oestereic holding was extended to a punitive acceleration of the plaintiff's order of
call for induction, no administrative appeal was available. See 396 U.S. at 299-301. Shea
v.' Mitchell, 421 F.2d 3162 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which Oestereich, Gutknecht, and Breen
were followed, involved both a reclassification, from which no appeal was taken, and an
accelerated order of call.
180 393 U.S. 256 (1968).
181 Id., 258.
182395 U.S. 185 (1969).
183 Id., 198.
184 Id- at 198 n-15.
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order to report for induction, which was issued in spite of the failure
and was the last significant step in the selection-induction process.'8 5
Mr. Justice White, concurring in the result, disagreed with the Court's
itapparent conclusion that petitioner's failure to exhaust appellate reme-
dies within the system can be disregarded on the... ground that only a
question of law is involved."' 18 6
In McGee v. United States,8 '7 where the registrant's opposition to
the Selective Service system led him to refuse either to seek a personal
appearance before the local board or to prosecute an appeal from rejec-
tion of his conscientious objector claim, the registrant's failure to ex-
haust his administrative remedies was held to have thwarted "the pur-
pose of ensuring that the Selective Service system have full opportunity
to 'make a factual record' and 'apply its expertise' in relation" to the
claim. In the face of these consequences of the registrant's failure, he
could not raise his objections by way of defense to a prosecution for
refusal to report for induction.
The question arises whether the asserted violations of law by Selec-
tive Service agencies that will overcome the barrier to pre-induction re-
view under the 1967 Act and those that will dispense with the exhaus-
tion requirement are essentially the same or whether "lawlessness" for
the former purpose is a narrower concept. In relation to the statute sev-
eral courts at first held rather technical errors of law to be sufficient,"'
but the Supreme Court held sharply, although far from clearly, to the
contrary as to both substantive and procedural illegality. In Boyd v.
Clark's9 the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, on the scarcely ap-
plicable authority of Clark v. Gabriel,'90 a three-judge court decision
denying review of a claim in a pre-induction suit by non-students that
the statutory foundation for student deferments was unconstitutional.
In Fein v. Selective Service System Local Board'91 the Court, under the
1967 statute, denied review of a claim that the procedures which had
185 Id. at 201-03.
186 Id. at 205.
187 402 U.S. 479 (1971). See also United States v. Alford, 471 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. McDuffie, 443 F.2d 1163 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 859 (1971); United States v. Houston, 433 F.2d 939
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 910 (1971).
188 Naskiewicz v. Lawyer, 456 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1972); Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d
504 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Piercy v. Tarr, 343 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Contra, Gregory
v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1971); Morrisania Community v. Tarr, 329 F. Supp. 1261,
1266-1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Thomas v. Tarr, 328 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. La. 1971). Cf. Murray
v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I. 1969).
189393 U.S. 316 (1969).
19'See note 180 supra.
191405 U.S. 365 (1972).
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been accorded in Selective Service consideration of a conscientious ob-
jector claim failed to satisfy the Constitution and the governing statute.
The case, according to the Court, did not present the "unusual circum-
stances" envisaged in Oestereich, in which the administrative authorities
could be charged with flouting the law. The opinion of the Court was
ambigious, however, in that it rested the decision mainly on the ground
that the registrant claimed conscientious objection, requiring the exer-
cise of administrative judgment and discretion, rather than on the
nature of the procedural questions at issue.
The lower federal courts have since continued to struggle with
the contept of "lawless" action, relative to the 1967 statute. The Third
Circuit in Morgan v. Melcher, 92 which had been remanded by the Su-
preme Court at the same time as Fein was decided, adhered to the Fein
view as to a procedural issue. The Fifth Circuit did likewise in relation
to the interpretation of regulations governing the sequence of desig-
nations for induction into the armed forces, 93 as did the Ninth Circuit
in relation to the interpretation of statutes and regulations determining
the bestowal of fatherhood deferments.'9 In that case Judge Ely, dis-
senting, subscribed to the view espoused in the Fifth Circuit case by
Chief Judge Brown, concurring, and by Mr. Justice Marshall, dis-
senting in Fein, that an interpretation of a statute can be the subject of
pre-induction review, whereas an interpretation of a regulation cannot.
The Second Circuit, in the meanwhile, has adhered to the view it pre-
viously advanced, that any substantial issue of law, whether arising under
the Constitution, the statutes, or regulations, is subject to pre-induction
review despite the 1967 statute. 95
When the 1967 statute does not present a barrier to review in Selec-
tive Service cases, the decisions tend to permit review despite any failure
to exhaust available administrative appeals, if an error of law falling
within a rather broad range of such errors is alleged. The concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in McKart took cognizance in a foot-
192437 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1972).
193 Crowley v. Pierce, 461 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1972).
194 Porter v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Eldridge v. Tarr,
462 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1972) (interpretation of procedural regulation); McCarthy v.
Director of Selective Service, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972) (alleged unconstitutionality
of procedure accorded to registrant).
19 5 Horey v. Tarr, 470 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1972); Levine v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.,
458 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1972). The court in these opinions did not distinguish Fein v.
Selective Serv. System Local Bd., 430 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1970), which the Supreme Court
affirmed in its Fein decision, see note 189 supra, nor did the court in Naskiewicz v. Lawyer,
see note 188 supra. It did, however, in the former two cases distinguish the Supreme Court's
Fein decision on the ground of the presence there of a conscientious objector determination,
dependent partially on the judgment of the evidence by the Selective Service authorities.
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note of the caveat entered by Mr. Justice White'96 that the involvement
of an error of law does not always dispense with the exhaustion require-
ment, by pointing out that, unlike the regulatory agencies whose statu-
tory interpretations are entitled to deference, Selective Service boards
"have no claim to that kind of expertise."' 9 7 Hence, a requirement that
such issues be raised before them prior to a judicial determination often
lacks the justification that agency expertise should have been invoked.
Partly for this reason, the Selective Service court opinions have tended
to state that all determinations of law, including those involving statu-
tory or due process procedural rights,19 statutory interpretation, 99 and
interpretation of regulations, 0 0 may be challenged without exhaustion
of administrative appeals.
Selective Service cases typically involve additional factors which
tend to produce a somewhat relaxed application of the exhaustion re-
quirement. Many registrants are untutored and not aware of procedural
rights. If a registrant has been misled or allowed to remain uninformed
of the issues in his case or of the means of appeal supposedly open to
him, his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, caused by his ignor-
ance, may be excused by a reviewing court.20 1 Furthermore, at the stage
196 Text at note 186 supra.
197 395 U.S. at 204. The opinion of the Court, at 198-99, recognizes the expertise of
Selective Service boards in matters of policy requiring the exercise of discretion and the
absence of this factor in the matter of interpretation involved in McKart, but does
not deal expressly with other kinds of issues of law or of statutory interpretation
involved in Selective Service administration. It appears that, in general, there may be
expertise involved in the interpretation of statutes or regulations governing such technical
matters as determining the order of call of registrants whose liability to serve has been
determined, but that most problems of interpretation in Selective Service administration
involve the meaning of ordinary terms or of larger concepts such as religion or religious
ministry.
198United States v. Nelson, 476 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Collins,
339 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Weaver, 336 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
199 United States v. Eades, 430 F.2d 1300 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Davila,
429 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1970).
200 United States v. Bender, 469 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1972).
201 United States v. Newmann, 478 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Tara-
nowski, 467 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Rabe, 466 F.2d 783 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. Davis, 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Wilson, 345
F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Powers v. Powers, 400 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1968). Compare
United States v. Sanders, 470 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1972) (failure of registrant to complete
conscientious objector claim because of administrative failure to give evidently needed
advice), with United States v. Hunter, 482 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1973). It has been held
that when there is nothing in the record to overcome a registrant's prima fade case for
an exemption or deferred classification and it appears that he submitted himself in good
faith to Selective Service processes, the burden is on the Government to establish that
he "knowingly and intelligently" failed to invoke an available appeal. United States v.
Boston, 334 F. Supp. 971, 975 (W.D. Mo. 1971). See Glover v. United States, 286 F.2d
84 (8th Cir. 1961). As to the obligation to follow procedural requirements in good faith
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when judicial review becomes possible in Selective Service cases, no
administrative remedies remain open and the hardship of criminal pun-
ishment or continued military or civilian service becomes inevitable in
the absense of ability to present a possibly meritorious claim to a court.
The foregoing factors are stressed or are implicit in the opinion in
McKart,"2 where counter-considerations are also set forth. These are
generally the same in Selective Service cases as in others ;.03 but the
volume of such cases renders the need to discourage premature dis-
obedience particularly important in them, except in some rather rare
cases like McKart itself.
20 4
In Selective Service administration the local board is especially
significant, 205 because it is composed of local persons whose judgment
is desired and because, until 1972 when the regulations were amended,206
it alone offered opportunity for the registrant to appear before deciding
officials. The appeal tribunals newly classify the registrant and do not
remand for correction of procedural errors. Until personal appearances
before them were permitted there was no way to counteract the weight
which local board conclusions reflecting demeanor and credibility neces-
sarily received or to undo procedural errors which might have affected
or obscured these conclusions. Hence a registrant's resort to an appeal
board in relation to several varieties of alleged local board errors might
be ineffective and could then be omitted without loss of the right to
judicial review. 27 By the same token, because of the importance of local
board consideration and the ease of requesting it, failure of the regis-
trant to seek it was more likely to be regarded as failure to satisfy a
prerequisite to review.20 '
and with reasonable diligence, which rests upon a registrant, see United States v. Sweet,
499 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Kincaid, 476 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Palmer, 223 F.2d 893 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 873 (1955);
United States v. Quattrucci, 329 F. Supp. 612 (D. Me. 1971). As to mitigation of this
obligation by circumstances other than draft board failure or fault see Donato v. United
States, 302 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1968); Moon v. United States, 220 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1955).
202395 U.S. 185, 197, 199 (1969), note 182 supra.
203 See note 2 supra & text accompanying, citing the McKart case.
204 395 U.S. at 200.
205 MCKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969); United States v. Wainscott,
496 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Polites, 448 F.2d 1321 (3d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Prescott, 301 F. Supp. 1116 (D.N.H. 1969).
20637 FED. REG. 5123 (1972) as amended, 32 C.F.R. §1626.4 (1973). The earlier
regulation is at 13 FED. REG. 4874 (1948) as amended, 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.21-1626.26 (1972).
207 United States v. Weaver, 474 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rabe,
466 F.2d 783, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1972), Mintz v. Howlett, 207 F.2d 758, 762 (2d Cir. 1953);
United States v. Godfrey, 346 F. Supp. 671 (D. inn. 1972).2 0 8 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. at 198 n.15. See also United States v. Kincaid,
476 F.2d 657, 658 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lopez, 448 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.
1971).
In United States v. Shapiro, 396 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the registrant's full
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Factors Leading to Case-by-Case Flexibility
of the Exhaustion Doctrine
A variety of factors, including those which have just been sum-
marized in relation to Selective Service administration, frequently have
the effect in many subject-matter areas of rendering the exhaustion
requirement a relatively flexible one, leading to discretionary court
determination case-by-case of whether challengers to agency action are
barred because the requirement has not been met. Some of these factors
are embraced in the frequent statement that the doctrine requires ex-
haustion of only "adequate" or "effective" administrative remedies." 9
This qualification relates to such differing aspects of the remedies as
the extent of the authority of the tribunal, its prior commitment (if any)
with regard to controverted issues, its methods of operation, and the
effect on the challenger's interest of resorting to the administrative
remedy which is or was available.
If the issue raised by the challenger of agency action, such as the
validity of an established law, regulation, or policy which has led to
the action complained of, would be beyond the purview of the available
agency proceedings, those proceedings would be futile as to the issue
and in most instances need not have been undertaken in order to satisfy
the exhaustion rule.21 Similarly, under varying circumstances, an ad-
presentation of his contention to the local board, coupled with a less-than-adequate com-
munication to him of the appeal procedures available, was held sufficient to dispense with
exhaustion of these procedures as a prerequisite to judicial review.
209 "It is axiomatic that plaintiffs are not required to exhaust an administrative
remedy which is inadequate." Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394, 401 (M.D. Ga- 1961).
See also R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (partial
administrative remedy would be inadequate and need not be exhausted); Blackwell College
of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (remedy by ad-
ministrative review was too informal to be prerequisite to resort to court); A Quaker
Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (informal agency proceeding
held inferior to judicial trial in relation to constitutional issue).
21OUnited States v. Fargnoli, 458 F.2d 1237 (1st Cir. 1972) (agency was bound,
adversely to challenger, by prevailing interpretation of statute, which was later changed
by Supreme Court); Hayes v. Boslow, 336 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1964) (state agency bound
by adverse state court decisions to decide adversely to challenger); Mohr v. Jordan, 370
F. Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1974) (same); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir.
1968) (the "remedy" in question, defense of a possible court martial proceeding, probably
would not reach the question of petitioner's claimed conscientious objection); Morin v.
Grade, 301 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (same); Russi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp.
1349, 1355 (E.D. Va. 1974) (administrative appeal would not have reached the issue of
the validity of procedural regulations); United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225, 235-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961). Cf. Mr. Justice
White, concurring, in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 206-07 (1969). See also
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405-07 (1970) (alleged administrative remedy non-
existent); Barrera v. Wheeler, 491 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1971) (same); U.S. Alkali Export
Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (agency proceeding would have been advisory
only); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24, 34 (1934). Note, however,
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ministrative remedy need not be exhausted if the agency: although.legally
empowered to consider the challenger's contention, has become rigidly
precommitted against it.2" Notable examples have arisen in civil rights
racial desegregation cases.212 Whether the agency's precommitment is
actually beyond change often is difficult to determine, however, and the
usual purpose of available proceedings, to provide case-by-case determi-
nation of the issue being urged, is not easily cast aside merely, because
success from the standpoint of the challenger appears unlikely.213 Even
short of futility of an administrative remedy, an absence of need for
it because other parties to the same agency proceeding have invoked
it,214 or impairment of the remedy by procedural shortcomings on the
part of the agency,215 may excuse resort to it in the particular instance.
Another factor which introduces discretionary considerations into
decisions about exhaustion relates to the fairness to a challenging party
of applying the exhaustion requirement when there are exculpatory
that as to the issue of constitutionality of a statute the court may decide to postpone
consideration because, if administrative remedies are exhausted, the case may be decided
on another ground. See notes 99-105 supra & text accompanying. Also, the omitted remedy
may by statute have been made a prerequisite to judicial review. See notes 17-20, 57-98
supra & text accompanying.211Houghton v. Scranton, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (Civil Rights Act case); Goetz v.
Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973) (agency attitude clear from action in related matter);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agency attitude clear from previous
action in same matter); United States v. Bautista, 497 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1974) (same);
Beaty v. Kenan, 420 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1970) (same); Koepke v. Fontecchio, 177 F.2d 125
(9th Cir. 1949) (agency would not have changed previously-announced policy); United
Black Fund, Inc. v. Hampton, 352 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1972) (previous agency actions
established its policy adversely to challenger); United States v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 268
F. Supp. 176 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (same as to issue of liability); State ex rel Killeen Realty
Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 375, 160 N.E.2d 1 (1959) (same as to zoning
of land); Herman v. Village of Hillside, 15 Ill. 2d 396, 408, 155 N.E.2d 47, 53 (1959). The
court might easily have held to similar effect, instead of to the opposite effect in Marrone
v. United States, 500 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1974).
212United States v. Jefferson County Ed. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 864 (Sth Cir. 1966),
aff'd en banw, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Marsh v.
County School Ed., 305 F.2d 94, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1962); Gibson v. Board of Pub. Instruc-
tion, 246 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1957); Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394, 401 (M.D. Ga.
1961); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Ed., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956).21SEnsey v. Richardson, 469 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1972); Ogden v. Department of
Transp., 430 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1970); Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 11. 2d 493,
150 N.E.2d 97 (1958); United Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 127 Cal. App. 2d 155, 163, 273 P.2d
579, 583-84 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 937 (1955) (extensive discussion, emphasizing
need for exhaustion, in a situation involving in reality a ripeness issue).
214Wilson & Co. v. United States, 335 F.2d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 1964); Hennesey v.
SEC, 285 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1961); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741, 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
215 Deep South Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 347 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (party not
required to raise particular objection at agency level when need and effectiveness of doing
so were obscured by agency's handling of issue); Vistamar, Inc. v. Vazquez, 337 F. Supp.
375 (D.P.R. 1971); United States v. Harvey, 131 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1954); cf.
United States v. Heaton, 195 F. Supp. 742, 746-47 (D. Neb. 1961).
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reasons why an available remedy has not been invoked, especially ignor-
ance or stress to-which the agency may have contributed.21 The public
importance of prompt final decisions of certain issues, which at times
weighs in favor of relaxing the exhaustion rule, may also be taken into
account.217 So may any especially serious effects on a challenging party
of applying the rule, whether because an administrative remedy is no
longer available and the case would be closed, perhaps with resulting
civil or criminal liability,21 or because excessive hardship would result
from delaying a final decision until additional agency proceedings, not
accompanied by a stay, had taken place.219 Excessiveness is necessarily
a matter of judgment which requires weighing the hardship involved
against a public interest to be served, as may be the case when a license
is withdrawn during an appeal from its suspension or revocation.220 The
issue may be couched in terms of whether injury is "irreparable" in the
sense of the traditional justification for injunctive relief.22
That aspect of the exhaustion doctrine which requires a participant
to offer in agency proceedings all the evidence and contentions he may
21OBrandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970); Hagarty v. United States, 449
F.2d 352, 355 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Piccone v. United States, 407 F.2d 866, 869-70 (Ct. Cl.
1969); Universal Sportswear, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 391 (Ct. CI. 1959) ; Elliott
v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974); Nickles v. Richardson, 326 F. Supp. 777
(D.S.C. 1971); Lewes Dairy, Inc. v. Hardin, 29 Agr. Dec. 121 (D. Del. 1970). Exculpation
seems to have been carried too far, in the absence of facts showing excusable misunder-
standing, in Spasbury v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 785 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
217 Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1073-76 (5th Cir. 1969); A
Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Relaxation of the ex-
haustion rule for this reason is related to the rule concerning mandamus, that the writ
may be sought without prior demand upon the respondent if the purpose is to vindicate
a public right. See, e.g., People ex rel. Meyer v. Kerner, 35 Ill. 2d 33, 219 N.E.2d 617
(1966); Dresser v. Inspector of Buildings, 348 Mass. 729, 205 N.E.2d 724 (1965).
2181n McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), the fact that criminal conviction
and punishment would result from application of the exhaustion rule is stressed. See also
Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952) (civil liability for rent over-
charges violating applicable order not previously challenged). Compare United States v.
Ulvedal, 372 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1967), applying the exhaustion rule to a government con-
tractor sued for liquidated damages, with consequent liability, distinguishing Smith v.
United States by the "equitable nature" of the liability there involved.
219 Sims v. Fox, 492 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1974); Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745
(8th Cir. 1915); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pacific
Inland Tariff Bureau v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 472, 478 (D. Ore. 1955), aff'd on
rehearing, 134 F. Supp. 210 (1955) (injury to business pending further agency action).
220 Stay of the suspension of a personal driver's license after a hearing was, for example,
not considered requisite to the adequacy of an administrative appeal in Ulliam v. Registrar
of Motor Vehicles, 325 Mass. 197, 89 N.E.2d 780 (1950).
221 See the different views as to irreparability of injury inflicted by an employee's
dismissal with right of review, expressed in the majority opinion and dissenting opinions
in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), where the question arose with relation to the
justification for a judicial stay of agency action pending agency review proceedings. See
also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923); Emma v. Armstrong,
473 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1970); Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1955).
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know of or be chargeable with knowing, as a prerequisite to offering
them later on judicial review,"2 may conflict in a de novo judicial re-
view proceeding 5 with the court's normal openness to evidence or with
its obligation to re-examine the merits of the issues decided. The court's
duty to proceed de novo may rest on a statute or be implied by the
nature of the action in which review is had, sometimes combined with
specific judicial responsibility for an especially sensitive interest at
stake.' The duty of the court is nevertheless tempered by the fact that
the case is not fresh and that a specialized agency's action is under
review. The matter calls for the exercise of a refined judicial judgment
which effectuates the court's responsibility but does not disregard the
agency's role and contributions. 5 Such a case is really a special instance
of the exercise of judicial discretion in applying the exhaustion doctrine,
which has come to prevail in numerous situations.226
PART III: STANDING TO SECURE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Criteria and Sources of Standing
Standing to challenge agency action in court is the eligibility of
persons, by reason of interests they possess, to contest the validity of
222See notes 2, 13-15, 38-39 supra & text accompanying.
22 There are various meanings of the term "de novo". Here it signifies a proceeding
in which the reviewing court is able to receive evidence for itself and is empowered to
reach conclusions of fact without giving more than prima fade weight to agency findings,
as well as reach conclusions of law that accord only a merited deference to specialized
agency interpretations.
224 See United States v. First National City Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967). The
decision did not involve application of the exhaustion doctrine, but the opinion stressed
the duty of the courts to "inquire de novo" in antitrust trials in which bank mergers
approved by federal bank regulatory agencies are challenged and statutory "review" of
the prior approvals is had. It seems highly unlikely that in such a case the defendants
would be restricted to evidence and contentions that had been offered before the regulatory
agency.2 2 5 See Brown v. United States, 396 F.2d 989 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Sierra Club v. Hardin,
325 F. Supp. 999, 3114 (D. Alaska 1971); Nolen v. Schlesinger, 492 F.2d 787 (5th Cir.
1974). The Supreme Court has emphasized that, absent special factors which enlarge
judicial responsibility, the district courts should avoid an ample interpretation of de novo
review which would result in ready reception of evidence and free re-evaluation of the
merits of agency conclusions. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). The same considerations
militate in favor of enforcement of the exhaustion requirement in the face of judicial
opportunity to override it. As to district court review of Patent Office determinations in
proceedings to secure patent rights, see California Research Corp. v. Ladd, 356 F.2d 813,
820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Globe Union, Inc. v. Chicago Tele. Supply Co., 103 F.2d 722
(7th Cir. 1939) (held, new material can be received in court, but should not be if the
party offering it was blameworthy in failing to do so before the Patent Office). As to the
same problem in judicial review by mandamus when an administrative record is available,
see Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790, 136 P.2d 304 (1943).
226 Cf. the opinion of the court in A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854,
860-62 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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an action on grounds which they are entitled to present. Such a chal-
lenge may be in a suit brought for that purpose, in defense of a proceed-
ing to effectuate the action, or collaterally in other litigation. In deter-
mining standing the focus is on the interest presented, but it must be
considered in relation to the injury allegedly suffered which must be
both actual and legally cognizable.
Standing in the federal courts is conditioned by the constitutional
provision which defines the judicial power in terms of cases in law
and in equity and certain other cases and controversies.' This definition
is understood to require that there be genuinely adversary parties to
the issues in litigation. Many state constitutional provisions for judicial
jurisdiction embody the same conception, conferring jurisdiction "in
law and equity" or over "cases" variously designated.' Hence standing
to challenge agency action in court proceedings requires as one element
an adequate allegation that the interest of the person lodging the chal-
lenge is involved and is adversely affected by the action, with the conse-
quent likelihood that a sufficient presentation in support of the chal-
lenge will be made in court. In addition, the interest must be one which
the court is legally empowered to consider in relation to the issues
raised; to confer standing it must, in the prevailing view, have been
recognized constitutionally, under the common law, or by statute.'
The effect of the agency action upon the interest asserted must also not
1U.S. CoNsT., Art. III, § 2.
2 See COLUMBIA UNIv. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, INDEx DIGEST OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (1959 and Supplements), 239, 241-43, for a compilation of the pertinent
provisions.
3 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (lack of standing to challenge a
general regulation merely because it curtails eligibility to contract with the government);
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) ("legal right" is required for
standing); International Placement Serv. v. Shultz, 461 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1972); Rasmus-
sen v. Hardin, 461 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1972) (consumer economic interest, impliedly placed
by statute beyond protection through review of agency action adverse to it); Velvel v.
Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) and Gravel v.
Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972) (lack of standing of citizens and taxpayers to chal-
lenge constitutionality of undeclared war) but see Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); Fugazy Travel Bureau v. CAB, 350 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (absence,
under statute, of cognizable interest in freedom from business handicap imposed on
travel agent by Board approval of arrangement among air carriers); Berry v. Housing
& Home Fin. Agency, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965); Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570
(8th Cir. 1962); American Lecithin Co. v. McNutt, 155 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 763 (1946) (absence, under statute, of cognizable interest permitting the
maker of a product to challenge a regulation which failed to secure mention of the product
on labels of food processors who used it). Compare Dayao v. Staley, 303 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.
Tex. 1969), aff'd on other grounds, 424 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970), with In re Robert J.
Amoury, 307 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Enciso-Cardozo v. INS, 504 F.2d 1252
(2d Cir. 1974). The analysis in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), whereby
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be too slight or remote;4 and if the interest consists of qualifying .for a
benefit or of a legal privilege such as running for office, travelling,
entering a business or employment, or engaging in a pleasurable pursuit,
its possessor must have taken significant steps toward enjoying or
exercising it, often including application for a permit or other agency
action required by statute, before standing to challenge withholding .or
limitation of the privilege can arise.5
an independently derived right of liberty or property is prerequisite to fourteenth amend-
ment procedural protection, implies that a serious allegation of such a right is prerequisite
to standing to claim such protection.4 Edward Hines Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923); Hotzman v. Schles-
inger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (as to standing of
military service personnel to challenge presidential combat mission); Finley v. Hampton,
473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682 (DC. Cir. 1970)
(member of television viewing public lacks standing under statute to challenge license
renewal of stations, if he is beyond their range, because of assertedly poor programming
which affects programs he views on other stations); Talmanson v. United States, 386 F.2d
811 (1st Cir. 1967); Association for Fair Competitive Practices in Air Conditioning v.
Public Serv. Comm'n., 372 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d
518, 531-33 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States Cane Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. McNutt, 138
F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943), compare with Land O'Lakes Creameries v. McNutt, 132 F.2d 116
(8th Cir. 1943); Lampkin v. Connor, 239 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1965) National Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, FCC v. National Broadcasting
Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R. Co. v. United States, 130
F. Supp. 76 (El). Mo. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (carriers lack standing
as "parties in interest" to challenge agency approval of merger of other carriers who
compete with them); Interstate Elec., Inc. v. FPC, 164 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1947) (same
issue as to electrical utilities under "party aggrieved" provision); W.H. Smith Lbr. Co. v.
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 3 Div. 438, 439, 24 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1946) (absence of
standing of customer of power company to challenge rate reduction to others); Keystone
Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A.2d 97 (1961) (absence
of standing of license applicant to challenge grant of license to another which merely
reduces chances of similar grant to it). Cf. Iacope v. FCC, 451 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1971)
(strong doubt as to standing of minority shareholder to challenge an order which merely
changes the identity of the majority shareholders of the corporation). Compare California
v. FPC, 353 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1965) (standing based on slight market consequences of
price allowed to gas producer). It is difficult to distinguish quantitative slightness of injury
from remoteness in a sense which leads to an inference of want of relevance to the purpose
of the governing statute (e.g., injury to the producer of a product because a competing
product is not excluded from a market) or to the conclusion that there is an insufficient
showing of causal connection between the action complained of and the injury on which
the claim of standing is based. See Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
First Nat'l Bank v. Watson, 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973). Either deficiency or both
may be present in the foregoing examples. See also text accompanying notes 292-99 infra.
5 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.'490, 509-10 (1975); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 67-68, 73, 76 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-60 (1974);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (as to challenge to regulation requiring
denial of membership in organization); New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S. 488 (1927); McCabe
v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 162-64 (1914); League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Hampton, 501 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (challengers of allegedly
discriminatory federal hiring practices held to lack standing in the absence of a claim that
any of them had sought employment); Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Freeman, 351 F.2d 832
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According to a variant view,' the issue of standing should be
limited to the constitutional, clearly jurisdictional, case or controversy
aspect, leaving the question of legal recognition of the relevant interest
to be gauged as an aspect of the court's authority to afford relief. This
view is, of course, supportable; yet the presence of a case or controversy
and legal cognizance of the interest presented in a particular context
may both turn in part on the substance of the interest in question, its
relevance to the issues sought to be raised, and the adequacy of the
connectibn between the challenged action and the injury alleged. Both
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Democratic State Cent. Comm. v. Andolsek, 249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md.
1966); Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n v. Federal Security Adm'r, 156 F.2d
589 (9th Cir. 1946) (apple growers challenging an order limiting the amount of pesticide
residue on fruit lack standing when they do not allege that they produce apples having
the residue); Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions & Security, 400 F. Supp. 249 (M.D.
Ala. 1975); Jackson v. Sargent, 394 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1975); Hockett v. Administra-
tor of Veterans Affairs, 385 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Ohio 1974); George Benz & Sons v.
Hardin, 342 F. Supp. 88 (D. Minn. 1970) (milk handler lacks standing to challenge an
order applicable to a market in which he does not yet participate). But see Nyberg v. City
of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1974) (physicians
have standing to challenge *rule limiting future performance of abortions); Singleton v.
Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2871 (1976), and Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) (same as to statutory provisions); Marine Space Enclosure, Inc. v.
FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 590-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (bona fide corporate enterprise with plans
but no other arrangements for constructing a marine terminal has standing to challenge
the validity of an order approving an agreement for a municipal terminal that would
foreclose its access to future business, where antitrust grounds are alleged); Harney, Inc.
v. Contractors' State Licensing Bd., 39 Cal.2d 561, 247 P.2d 913 (1952). In International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954), the decision as
to standing to challenge a threatened interpretation of a statute which would deny benefits
to the plaintiffs seems wrong for reasons stated in the dissenting opinion. As to steps
required before standing arises to bring an action challenging the validity of a statute on
its face because of its prohibition or curtailment of voluntary conduct or conditioning such
conduct on official permission, see Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), and same case
on appeal after remand, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964);
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1960); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958); Chicago
v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 89, 92 (dissenting opinion) (1958); Adler
v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 503-05 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-94 (1947); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931);
Lion Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy, 330 F.2d 833, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 401 U.S.
154 (1971) (review of bar admission rules because of alleged inhibitory effects on first
amendment freedoms of law students). See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974),
in which official harassment, but not a statute, was challenged and the plaintiffs, in the
eyes of a majority of the Court, failed to allege that they planned to engage in conduct
which would precipitate the illegal law enforcement activities they complained of. See also
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972). Cf.
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (Marshall, J., in
chambers).
6 See Brennan and White, JJ., concurring and dissenting, 397 U.S. at 167, in Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 183-89 infra.
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questions relate to whether the court should consider the issue of the
validity of the agency's action. The second threshold question can be
held in reserve under either view until the first has been answered; but
little would seemingly be gained by their doctrinal separation and a
merger of part of the presently initial issue of standing into the contro-
versy on the merits. It is true that then the statutory issue could be
decided on the basis of a fuller record; but a trial would be required
unless the complaint were subject to dismissal anyway, for failure to
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, or unless
summary judgment could be had.
Interests recognized at common law,' by constitutional provision,8
or by a combination of the two9 are legion. Litigable statutory interests,
7 Cf. Rockville Reminder v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp. 590 (D. Conn.
1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1973) (use of physical property and legal privilege to
contract are the apparent basis of standing, not challenged or discussed, to secure review
of a restrictive postal regulation); Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla.
1962) (right to engage in a business, as constitutionally protected).
sFirst amendment rights, the right to be free of bills of attainder or ex post facto
laws, and the like, rest on constitutional provisions which require no reference back to
other legal sources. As to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, swe
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Hamm v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 158
(E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd, 379 U.S. 19 (1964); Bryant v. State Bd. of Assessment, 293 F.
Supp. 1379 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
9 Many traditional common law rights are self-evidently embraced by the "liberty"
or "property" which is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments and are there-
fore assumed to be the basis of standing to challenge agency action which allegedly invades
them. Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64-65 n.6 (1963) (constitutional
protection to the right to publish books covers the common law right to maintain advan-
tageous business relations with distributors of them). When an interest comes less evidently
within constitutional protection, its recognition at common law may still be a factor which
aids in bringing it within a zone of protection and of standing under the general jurisdiction
without reference to any statute except, in some instances, a statute that refers to pre-
existing "legal rights." joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 157-60
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (right not to have reputation impaired by official
pronouncement made without prior hearing, in alleged violation of due process); cf. Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (standing assumed, because reputation is dam-
aged by exclusion from government employment on account of refusal, to subscribe to an
allegedly unconstitutional disclaimer oath). In Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958),
a right with common-law overtones, not to have one's reputation impaired without justifi-
cation, underlay the Court's recognition of the standing of a former member of the Army
to challenge his less-than-honorable discharge on harmful as well as allegedly irrelevant
grounds. The same interest underlay the assumed standing to challenge invidious exclusions
from employment by allegedly unauthorized procedures in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331
(1955), Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), and Cafeteria Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), and in Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Recognition of emerging interests, such as the right to marital privacy, as against govern-
mental impairment, may draw support from common-law analogies. See, e.g., Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). It may also stem from more
recent policies which also enlarge the scope of constitutional provisions or other enact-
ments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Cf. Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d
570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (contractor has standing to challenge debarment from government
business because of misconduct). Protection of a contract right to a given level of trans-
portation fares was the basis of statutory standing in United States v. Hubbard, 266 U.S.
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sometimes confirming or altering common law rights, are at least as
abundant under modern legislation and take many forms.'0 Statutory
474 (1925), explained in Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 257 n.5
(1930).
10 As to standing based on interests created or endowed with essential recognition by
statute, see, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957) (standing based
on minority stockholder's interest in preventing dilution in value, made possible by agency
order); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (state's
statutory right to federal funds, if conditions are fulfilled, confers standing to challenge
validity of a particular condition) ; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944). See also Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969) (standing of milk producers to challenge actions affecting a
statutory fund maintained for their benefit); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 267
(1924); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919), explained in Alex-
ander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 257 n.5 (1930); Constructores Civiles
de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (interest of foreign
firm as participant in the economy of its country, sought to be aided by Congress); Citi-
zens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 975 (1969) (statutory recognition of interest of neighboring property owners con-
cerning proposed renewal of tavern license); Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington,
387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968) (economic interest of
persons in area affected by highway location); Green v. United States, 349 F.2d 203 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (interest of public hospital patient in continued treatment there); Atchison,
Topeka & S.F.R. Co. v. Summerfield, 229 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 926 (1956) (interest of railroads in continued opportunity to use property they were
required by statute to acquire); Farmer v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of
America, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954) (interest of
unions in eligibility for collective bargaining representation under National Labor Relations
Act); West Coast Constr. Co. v. Oceano Sanitary Dist., 311 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal
1970); Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669, 675
(N.D. IIl. 1959) (interest of corporation in kind of market in which its securities are
traded); Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P.2d
935 (1941) (interest of experience-rated employer in unemployment compensation fund
as basis of standing to secure review of an award from the fund); State ex rel. West Flager
Amusement Co. v. Rose, 165 So. 60 (Fla. 1935) (right of dog track licensee to equal treat-
ment); Collins v. Industrial Comm'n, 12 Ill. 2d 200, 145 N.E.2d 622 (1957) (interest of
counsel in fee from workmen's compensation claimant, as basis of standing to review
amount allowed in award); Bay State Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. State Racing
Comm'n, 342 Mass. 694, 175 N.E.2d 244 (1961) (statutory right of one of two license
applicants to joint consideration of its application with that of the other applicant, where
the two were in part mutually exclusive); Senior Citizens League v. Department of Social
Security, 38 Wash. 142, 228 P.2d 478 (1951) (interest in statutory public assistance).
The effect of Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., note 3 supra, was overcome by express statutory
bestowal of standing on manufacturers or dealers adversely affected or aggrieved by action
conditioning their opportunities to contract with the government. 41 U.S.C. § 43a (1970);
George v. Mitchell, 282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1960). As to the relation of common law to
statutory rights of shippers by common carrier see McLean Lumber Co. v. United States,
237 Fed. 460, 464-67 (E.D. Tenn. 1916). The standing of shippers to challenge orders on
the ground that they prescribe rates which are allegedly too high and hence violative of
statutory standards is well established. Utah Citizens Rate Ass'n v. United States, 192 F.
Supp. 12, 15 (D. Utah 1961), aff'd per curiant, 365 U.S. 649 (1961). As to the standing of
users of the postal service to challenge allegedly arbitrary, discriminatory rates, see Doehla
Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1953); as to the interest
of public office-holders in retaining their positions see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 241 (1968); McKee v. Board of Elections, 173 Tenn. 276, 287-88, 116 S.W.2d 1033,
1037 (1938). Treaty obligations benefiting challengers of alleged violations may be a basis
of the challengers' standing. People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 502
F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d
461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
[Vol. 51:817
1976] PREREQUISITES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 917
franchises or other grants bestowing rights to protection of the market
position of those on whom they are conferred become the basis of
standing to challenge agency action that allegedly impairs the resulting
interests.1 Protection may be accorded in consideration of the grantee's
investment, often accompanied by his assumption of an obligation to
serve all members of the public on request ;12 but the statutory require-
ment that those seeking permission to enter a business make a showing
that their admission will serve the public convenience or necessity need
not by itself imply any right to protection of those who are admitted,
as against the entry of others,"3 despite the great value that often at-
taches to the resulting market positions.'4 The ensuing problem of inter-
pretation is sometimes a difficult one."6
The effective recognition of interests for purposes of standing is
"1 Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); Chicago junction Case, 264
U.S. 258 (1924); Public Serv. Co. of Indiana v. Hamil, 416 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969),
ert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1970); Keating v. State ex rel. Ausebel, 173 So. 2d 673
(Fla. 1965); People ex rel. N.Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N.Y. 86, 100 N.E. 705 (1912);
Brazospoit Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1961);
Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, 103 W. Va. 173, 136 S.E. 833 (1927). Cf. State Chartered
Banks v. Peoples Nat'1 Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180, 184 (W.D. Wash. 1966). The extension
of procedural protections to persons claiming rights to governmentally-provided oppor-
tunities and services results in enlarged standing of business enterprises to secure these
protections through court action, even though the advantage which is sought is authorized
for the benefit of other persons, not for the sake of the claimant. See W.G. Cosby Transfer &
Co. v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973), involving a possible exclusion from doing
business in a military installation.
12 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 565 and (Story, J.,
dissenting) 639 (1837); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885);
People's Transit Co. v. Henshaw, 20 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1927).
23 Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-41 (1939).
14The values based on liquor licenses in the states and radio and television broad-
casting licenses under the Federal Communications Act, by reason simply of expectations
of renewal and of limitations on competition which are founded on statutory provisions
and consequent agency policies, are well known. Cf. Keating v. State ex re. Ausebel, 173
So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1963), basing procedural rights of liquor licensees and their lessors partly
on the values created by restrictive licensing policies. The Communications Act contains
an explicit provision that "no . . . license sball be construed to create any right, beyond
the terms, conditions, and periods of the license." 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
15lBrandeis, Stone, and Holmes, JJ., dissenting in Frost, 278 U.S. at 528 (1929), thought
that no protective "franchise" was involved there. The proposition (State v. Woodmanse,
1 N.D. 246, 46 N.W. 970 (1890)), or a stipulation (Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v. Robertson,
190 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1960)), aff'd as to the substantive issue, 294 F.2d 714 (1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961) that only authorized enterprises are privileged to engage
in a given line of business hardly suffices to establish the conclusion that these enterprises
have rights to the restriction of competition with them, conferring standing to challenge
agency action that admits others. Nevertheless, the conclusion has been reached that
state banks, chartered under statutes that bestow no specific protections, have standing
to challenge in their own interest the authorization of new institutions that would compete
with them. Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966); cf. Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1969),
rev'd as to other issues, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also the author's suggested extension of
standing to cover these situations, in the text accompanying note 242 infra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:817
by the court in which review proceedings take place, even though the
recognition, when explained, is attributed to prior legal sources and
often does actually rest upon them. In significant instances the courts,
including the Supreme Court, have not identified these prior sources.'0
There is strong reason to believe that in these instances and in some
others in which explanation is offered, standing is in reality determined
by whether the interests that are presented seem to the courts to possess
sufficient importance in current ideology to justify litigation over agency
action that affects them. WVhen standing is held to be absent, the require-
ment which has not been met, that the interest presented be a "legal
right," has often been stated;17 but this term can embrace any interest
which, on whatever legal basis, has become entitled to protection. The
statement therefore embodies a conclusion as to these instances, rather
10Thus in International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 515 (1922), the proprietors
of an international toll bridge were held entitled to challenge the allegedly unlawful with-
holding of weekend customs inspection service from patrons of the bridge entering from
Canada, the absence of which would discourage much travel, simply because "it is clear
that the instructions given [to withhold the service] threaten vital interests of the bridge
company to which a court of equity should afford protection." The interest protected was
that of a business in continued government service, upon which patronage depended, and
is somewhat analogous to the similar interest in avoiding physical obstruction of access
by customers over a street, as to which see text accompanying note 56 infra, or over the
navigable waters as in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851),
and Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1863), where the obstruction is a
public nuisance if not authorized. Prohibition of patronage or use of a product, for regu-
latory reasons, without enforcement against the seller, did not traditionally give rise to
standing on the part of the seller to challenge the restriction, Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 115 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1940); Arrow Lakes Dairy, Inc. v. Gill, 200 F. Supp.
729 (D. Conn. 1961), but this view has been largely superseded, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d
132, 140 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. California Bd. of Pharmacy, 50
Cal. Rptr. 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); American Can Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 313 Mass. 156,
46 N.E.2d 542 (1943); Al Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 132 A.2d 372
(1957). Standing has also been held to arise under varying circumstances, to challenge a
variety of governmental regulatory or proprietary acts which have reduced the business op-
portunities of the challengers (other than acts merely strengthening competitors, as to which
see text accompanying notes 203-231 infra). City of Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R.
Co., 357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958); Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Patton v. Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics, 217 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1954); Los Angeles Customs & Freight Brokers Ass'n
v. Johnson, 277 F. Supp. 525 (C.D. Cal. 1967). As to standing based on business uses
of federal government lands, as against government action curtailing or reducing the benefit
from those uses, see Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1960); LaRue v.
Udall, 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964); McNeil v.
Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.
1938); C. McFARLAND, ADiNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND THE PUBLIC LANDs 185-86 (1969).
17 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-83 (1938); Alexander Sprunt & Son
v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930) (no "legal wrong" to any "independent right" of
the person asserting standing) ; Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1962), see note 3
supra. The Supreme Court repudiated this requirement as essential to the existence of
a case or controversy in the constitutional sense or of standing under the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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than a reason for the result reached. The real question is whether there
must always be a reference back to prior law to support the interest and
establish the right, or whether de novo recognition of the interest can
suffice. The desirability of furtherance of current economic and social
needs as seen by the courts supports the latter alternative; the need to
avoid unpredictability or laxity in court decisions and the volume of
litigation which these adjudicatory flaws can encourage tends to sup-
port the former. It is also true, however, that the courts' discovery,
under the first alternative, that interests have previously become legal
rights which those who possess them have standing to assert in court
as against agency action, is in some instances an unpredictable conse-
quence of ideas about desirable policies rather than a genuine discovery
that common law, constitutional, or statutory support exists for the
conclusions reached. The tendency to base decisions about standing on
policy views which are read into the prior law has been displayed for
a long time.18
Rather frequent statements are made that a person has stand-
ing when unlawful agency action actually has inflicted or significantly
threatens to inflict injury to his legally recognized interest. As pointed
out by Thomberry, J., concurring separately in Saxon v. Georgia As-
sociation of Independent Insurance Agents, 9 where the opinion of the
court took this view, such statements "imply that standing . . . may
depend on the way in which the merits of the case are decided. This
simply cannot be right." As the Supreme Court has clearly held, stand-
ing exists or not on the basis of adequately pleaded allegations, some-
times buttressed by preliminary proof, as a precondition to a court pro-
ceeding on the merits.20 The provision of the Federal Administrative
18 See the discussion of Supreme Court decisions concerning the standing of shippers
to challenge rate orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in Goldman, Standing to
Challenge Orders of the I.C.C., 9 Gao. WAsH. L. Rnv. 648 (1941), where it appears that
certain decisions, otherwise seemingly inconsistent, fall into place under a judicial policy
of assisting shippers to achieve or maintain competitive equality with others, but not to
gain or retain competitive advantages. In Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d
577, 590-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969), note 5 supra, this policy, evidenced elsewhere in the law,
becomes explicit in relation to standing.
19 399 F.2d 1010, 1020 (5th Cir. 1968). See also the comment of the court in Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 1969),
rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and see Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust
Co., 323 F.2d 290, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 411 (1965);
Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1958), note 16 supra;
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962): "It would not be necessary to decide whether
appellants' allegations . . . will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief, in order to hold
that they have standing to seek it;" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, $00 (1975):
"[S] tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular
conduct is illegal...."2
oUnited States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Procedure Act that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof"2 means of necessity,
in relation to standing, that a person who sufficiently indicates injury to
a legally relevant interest may secure a decision on the merits in a re-
view proceeding, not that an unfavorable outcome somehow deletes the
proceeding. Equally, statements in judicial opinions that surely standing
must exist to challenge unlawful agency action are shorthand ways of
stating that agency action must be challengeable when a question as
to its legality is sufficiently raised. 22
Statutes often specifically confer a right to secure review of agency
action on persons possessing designated interests adversely affected by
that action, such as persons denied licenses or other statutory benefits, 2
or regulated persons or enterprises with respect to rules or cease-and-
desist orders affecting them.24 The constitutional aspects of the standing
requirement are fulfilled in these proceedings because clear interests are
adversely affected and genuine controversies involving these interests
are presented.25 More broadly, much modem legislation bestows stand-
ing to secure judicial review of agency action by providing in general
21 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970); cf. Utility Users League v. FPC, 394 F.2d 16 (7th Cir. 1968).
Compare the provision of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, quoted at note
47 infra, that review of a rule may be had "if it is alleged that" it impairs a legal right
or privilege.
22 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). Arkansas-Missouri Power Co.
v. City of Kenneth, 78 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1935), is, however, an explicit holding that
standing to challenge agency action which creates business competition with the chal-
lenger depends on the lawfulness of the competition (1962). The statement in Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 484-85 (1938), that the plaintiff power company lacked
standing to complain of a federal loan to a municipal competitor because competition by
the municipality was "entirely lawful" seems beside the point, for the legality of the
loan, not of the competition, was complained of. The remoteness of the injury to the
plaintiff from the challenged transactions was probably the factor the Court was alluding
to. It could be argued, as also was held in Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. City of Kennett,
that as a matter of degree, an enterprise should have standing to challenge agency action
which authorizes or initiates competition with it, but not action which facilitates or
assists competition that is authorized to continue in any event. The decision in Tennessee
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), although it involves a challenge based on consti-
tutional grounds, stands in the way of such a differentiation.
2352 Stat. 1370 (1939) as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g) (1970) (parties to Social
Security Act claim proceedings); Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, 151 F.2d 337 (Em. App.
1945) (claimant of subsidy under Emergency Price Control Act). Cf. Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1969), discussing the issue of standing for persons denied
voting rights under new state election laws, pending federal review of those laws under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV. 1974).
2438 Stat. 719, 734 (1914) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(c), 45(c) (1970) (persons
subject to FTC cease and desist orders under the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
acts). See Ted Bates & Co. v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975).2 5 Cf. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 155 U.S. 1 (1894), holding that the assertion
by an agency and denial by an individual that he is under a duty to testify or produce
documents before the agency presents a controversy which Congress can require a court
to decide in an enforcement proceeding. More broadly, so can an assertion of an agency's
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terms that persons "aggrieved" or whose interests are adversely affected
or "parties in interest" may institute review proceedings.2 6 These terms
bestow standing or confirm pre-existing standing on the basis of interests
that exist in fact, whether or not they constitute "legal rights" in some
traditional or larger sense, provided they are significantly affected and
other reasons precluding review do not arise." Under such provisions,
for example, customers or patrons of regulated enterprises may become
entitled to challenge agency action that affects the rates or prices they
are required to pay or the service they receive;2 persons who will be
disadvantaged by a general regulation may be able to challenge its
validity;2 persons whose business or other interests will be affected by
authority to take a particular action or impose a particular requirement or prohibition,
opposed in a review proceeding by a person whose interest is affected. See FPC v. Pacific
Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939).2 6 See, e.g., the Communications Act with relation to specified orders in broadcasting
proceedings, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1970) ("person who is aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected"); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825m(b) (1970), and Natural Gas
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970) ("party to a proceeding . . . aggrieved by an order in
such proceeding"); Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (a) (1970) ("any person disclosing a
substantial interest in... [an] order"); Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77i (1970), and Secu-
rities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1970) ("any person aggrieved"); Bank Holding
Company Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §1848 (1970) ("[a]ny party aggrieved");
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970), ("[i]n a case of actual contro-
versy as to the validity of any order" containing specified regulations, "any person who
will be adversely affected"). Review proceedings in the Court of Appeals with respect
to the orders of several agencies, for which the Review Act provides, may be instituted by
"[a]ny party aggrieved." 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970); see Easton Util. Comm'n v. AEC, 424
F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1970).2 7 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Utility Users League v. FPC, 394 F.2d 16 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968) (requisite showing of effect not made);
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 547-49 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, FCC v.
National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 237 (1943); Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board
of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949) (cf. Cord Meyer Development
Co. v. Bell Bay Drugs, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 211, 229 N.E.2d 44 (1967)); Nebraska Power Co.
v. Omaha Ice & Cold Storage, Inc., 147 Neb. 324, 23 N.W.2d 312 (1946).28 Citizens for Allegan County v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Lynchburg
Gas Co. v. FPC, 336 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Bebcheck v. Public Util. Comm'n, 287
F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Mondakota Gas Co. v. FPC, 232 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694
(2d Cir. 1943), remanded for further proceedings, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); Federation of
Homemakers v. Hardin, 328 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1971); Nader v. Volpe, 320 F. Supp.
266 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 475 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Utah Citizens Rate Ass'n v.
United States, 192 F. Supp. 12 (D. Utah 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 649 (1961); Premier Peat
Moss Corp. v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Gardiner v. Kennelly,
79 R.I. 367, 89 A.2d 184 (1952). Cf. Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968).2 9 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods
Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407
(1942); Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1965); Air
Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960); A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v.
Secretary of Agriculture, 120 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1941). Cf. Southwestern Elec. Power Co.
v. FPC, 304 F.2d 29, 41 (5th Cir. 1962) (standing of numerous utility concerns to chal-
lenge an order directing them to follow accounting rules that might affect future rate
orders adversely to them).
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the commencement, continuance, or expansion of others' enterprises,
whether carriers, taverns, or something else, may be able to secure re-
view of orders authorizing these others to enter or remain in business
or to expand; 80 and persons suffering injury to various other interests
from a variety of agency actions may challenge those actions.,1
Statutes which limit standing to "parties," 2 usually have reference
80 American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 364 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1960); Alton R. Co.
v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942), and Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States,
285 U.S. 382 (1932) (carriers have standing as parties "in interest" to challenge orders
authorizing competitors to enlarge their operations); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v.
FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 590-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969), note 5 supra; Brooks Gas Corp. v. FPC,
383 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Mid-America Pipeline v. FPC, 330 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946
(1959) (advertiser over broadcasting stations, allegedly discriminated against as such in
favor of a competitor affiliated with the stations, may secure review, as a "person who is
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected," by an order rejecting its protest to
the agency, available to a "party in interest," against renewal of the station's licenses);
City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (transporters of oil by barge
have standing as parties "aggrieved," to challenge an order enabling a pipeline operator
to convert it to the transportation of petroleum products between the same terminal
points); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 514 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (news-
paper publisher has standing with respect to licensing of a television station in the paper's
area of circulation); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (same
holding as to an association of members of the coal industry, a union of their employees,
and an organization representing railroads, with respect to an order granting a certificate
of convenience and necessity for a new natural gas pipeline, because of threatened effects
on the demand for coal and for its transportation); North Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Becker, 24 Ill. 2d 514, 182 N.E.2d 155 (1962); A.B. & C. Motor Transp. Co. v. Dep't of
Pub. Util., 327 Mass. 550, 100 N.E.2d 560 (1951). But see L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac.
R. Co., 311 U.S. 295 (1940) (shippers by a railroad do not have standing as parties "in
interest" under the terms of the statute involved in the Alton and Claiborne-Annapolis
cases, supra (cf. Frankfurter, J., concurring) to challenge allegedy unauthorized construc-
tion by another railroad, beneficial to shippers over its line who compete with the plain-
tiffs); Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 164, 477 P.2d 602
(1970) (broadcaster is not "interested party" under a declaratory judgment statute, en-
titled as such to challenge an ordinance permitting a competing cablecasting service); and
Shaker Communuity, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 346 Mass. 213, 190 N.E.2d 897 (1936)
(landowners near a race track lack standing as persons "aggrieved" to challenge licensing
of races there). See also text accompanying notes 59-71, infra, where it appears that in
some of the cases just cited the governing statutes do not permit the challenging party to
urge the interest which results in standing, but only relevant public interests, on the court.
81 Lodge 1858, Amer. Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (government employees' interest in their jobs); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433
F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 950 (1971) (statutory preference
in securing government contracts); Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Vainas v. Board of
Appeals, 337 Mass. 591, 150 N.E.2d 721 (1958) (interest of property owner as a basis
for challenging a zoning variance for other property in the same zoning area); Holmes v.
Miller, 71 S.D. 258, 23 N.W.2d 794 (1946) (interest of lessee of public property, subject to
its sale, as a basis for challenging the legality of a particular sale transaction).
3 2 Federal Power Act, Natural Gas Act, and Review Act, note 26 supra. The Com-
munications Act requires non-parties to commission proceedings to petition for rehearing
as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review. 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1970). See Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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to parties to the prior agency proceedings,8" although the word is used
at times in the same sense as "person. '8 4 Under such statutes, prior
participation as a party in agency proceedings is commonly a prerequisite
to standing to secure judicial review.85 Even in relation to informal
agency proceedings which do not have "parties" in a strict sense, but
which result in action that is subject to statutory review at the behest
of "parties," standing has been held to depend on participation before
the agency when contributions to an agency record underlying the action
would have facilitated judicial review.8" Generally speaking, the con-
nection between eligibility to participate before the agency and stand-
ing to secure review of a resulting agency action turns on the inter-
relation of the purposes for which these capacities are, respectively,
considered to exist.8 7
38 Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. v. FTC, 284 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Memphis Gas
& Water Div. v. FPC, 243 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Southwestern Publishing Co. v.
FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wallach v. SEC, 206 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
Wilmington v. Department of Pub. Util., 340 Mass. 493, 165 N.E.2d 99 (1960); Arsenal
Bd. of Trade v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 166 Pa. Super. 548, 72 A.2d 612 (1950).
8 4 As interpreted, § 1(20) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970),
affords a remedy in court to "parties in interest" against the construction of unauthorized
railroad extensions, whether or not prior proceedings before the Commission have taken
place. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & S.F.R. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 273 (1926); Western
Pac. R. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 284 U.S. 47 (1931). That provision is said to have been
"incorporated by reference" in § 205 of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 305(g) (1970),
as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974), which authorizes "any party in interest" to seek review
of an Interstate Commerce Commission authorization of new motor carrier service. Alton
R. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15, 19 (1942); American Trucking Ass'ns v. United
States, 364 U.S. 1, 18 (1960). In these cases, however, the persons seeking review had
actually been participants in prior Commission proceedings. In Lafayette Radio Electronics
Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1965), the action of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission which was challenged was a general regulation issued after informal rule-
making proceedings. Such proceedings have participants rather than "parties." Without
referring to possible participation by the petitioner in such proceedings, the court held
"status as a [citizens band radio] licensee" rendered the petitioner a "party aggrieved"
under the Review Act, note 24 supra. See also Christian v. United States, 152 F. Supp.
561, 569 (D. Md. 1957). Compare Guam v. FMC, 329 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Whitney
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 422 (1965), and Kirsch v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 353 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1965) (under the Bank Holding
Co. Act, note 26 supra.
3 5 Lake County Contractors Ass'n v. Pollution Control Bd., 54 11. 2d 16, 294 N.E.2d 259
(1973); Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 243 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1957); cf. Kirkby v.
Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 320 Mich. 608, 32 N.W.2d 1 (1948).
36 Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214, 1218-20 (D.C. Cir. 1973).37 See FCC v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239, 246-47 (1943); Chicago
Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1924), modified by Pittsburgh & West Va. R. Co.
v. United States, 281 U.S. 479, 486 (1930); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch,
429 F.2d 725, 732-33, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Utility Users League v. FPC, 394 F.2d 16
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968), note 27 supra; Interstate Investors, Inc.
v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 374, 392 (1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 479 (1969); E. Brooke
Matlack, Inc. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Pa. 1961); Jersey City v. United
States, 101 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Seatrain Lines v. United States, 152 F. Supp.
619, 622 (D. Del. 1957), aff'd, 355 U.S. 181 (1957); Temescal Water Co. v. Department
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The Federal Administrative Procedure Act deals with standing to
challenge federal agency action in the Act's general provision that "a
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute," is entitled to judicial review of that action."8 The terms
"adversely affected or aggrieved" may have been intended to include
only persons coming under a statute which incorporates this or a similar
phrase in an express authorization of judicial review;39 but the provi-
sion has been construed to apply also, with relation to statutes having
no similar provision, to persons whose interests, even though they fall
short of "legal right" in some previously established sense, become
sufficient because a statute takes cognizance of them in an identifiable
manner." Such a recognition may appear in statutory statements or
other indications of purpose,41 in directives to an agency to take a par-
of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 280 P.2d 1 (1955); Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Employment
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 330, 109 P.2d 935, 941 (1941); Castleman v. Civil Serv. Conm'n,
58 Ill. App. 2d 25, 206 N.E.2d 514 (1965); Insurance Comm'r of Indiana v. Mutual
Medical Ins. Inc., 251 Ind. 296, 241 N.E.2d 56 (1968); State ex rel. Rouveyrol v. Donnelly,
365 Mo. 686, 285 S.W.2d 669 (1956); Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. v. State, 5 N.J.
196, 210, 74 A.2d 580, 587 (1950) (participants in agency proceedings as of right, but only as
nonparties, probably have standing to secure review). Cf. Independent Investor Protective
League v. SEC, 495 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1974) (difference between "interested" person,
allowed to participate in agency proceedings, and "person aggrieved" having standing to
secure review of order).
38 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The wording of this section as codified is identical to that
of the original subsection 10(a) except for the substitution of "a" for "any" in both places
where "a" now occurs.
89 E.g., the Federal Aviation Act which, at 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970), provides for
judicial review at the instance of "any person disclosing a substantial interest ... " See
Airline Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, 515 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
40 Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974); Lodge 1858, American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959); Lloyd Wood Construction Co. v. Sandoval, 318 F. Supp.
1167, 1171 (N.D. Ala. 1970), rev'd oan other grounds, Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd
Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d
690 (5th Cir. 1961). The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
(1947), at 96, notes that various earlier statutes designate persons who may obtain judicial
review in language similar to that of the Administrative Procedure Act; but the legislative
history is silent on the question whether, in the absence of such language, other indications
of legislative concern with particular interests may suffice.
41 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hodgson, 515 F.2d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1975) (violations of constitutional rights also
claimed); Barrera v. Wheeler, 441 F.2d 795, 798-99 (8th Cir. 1971); Peoples v. United
States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d
461 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973), the court upheld the standing of individuals
to sue to secure agency observance of a treaty on the ground that the purpose of the
treaty included pressure on a foreign government to cease practices inimical to the interests
of persons such as the plaintiffs, from which the plaintiffs and others had suffered and
continued to suffer.
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ticular interest into account,42 or even in legislative history standing
alone.4" If the modifying phrase in the Administrative Procedure Act
provision, "by agency action within the meaning of any relevant statute,"
were considered to limit only "persons . . . aggrieved" and not those
"adversely affected," the latter would become entitled to seek review
by virtue of the Administrative Procedure Act alone, without reference
to any other law. Adverse effect in fact, whatever the nature or source
of the interest involved or the presence or absence of prior legal recog-
nition of it, would suffice to bestow standing." The structure of the
provision tends to contradict this interpretation, however, and there
is no indication that the Act was actually intended to enact such a
broadening of standing without reference to other legislation.45 Never-
42 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1
(1968); Shannon v. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Hahn
v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency,
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); The Bootery, Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
326 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1971); Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney,
316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315
F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971); Western Addition Com-
munity Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), vacated on other
grounds, 320 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v.
Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (ED. Pa. 1968); Road Review
League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf. Van Hoven Co. v. Stans, 326 F.
Supp. 827 (D. Minn. 1971) (standing assumed without discussion, on basis of. statutory
provision); Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975, note 10 supra (District of Columbia statutory provisions).
43 Cf. Wingate Corp. v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (1st Cir.
1969), cited by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155-56 (1970).44 This view has been stated in Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm.
L. REV. 601, 619-23 (1968); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Car. L. Rv.
450, 465-68 (1970), and was made a basis of decision in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Keco Indus. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. CL 1970);
Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1971);
Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970); but see American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882, 887-92 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Pullman Inc. v.
Volpe, 327 F. Supp. 432, 439-40 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates v.
Warner, 348 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Fla. 1972), Scanwell is followed but is interpreted as
resting on the Administrative Procedure Act in conjunction with the Walsh-Healey Gov-
ernment Contracts Act. Mulrey v. Driver, 366 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1966), appears to have
accepted the broader view stated in Scanmell, the pros and cons of which were not
discussed, as did Hom Sin v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 903 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), where the court
asserts, but does not demonstrate, that Congress was concerned in the Immigration and
Nationality Act with the interest of aliens whose admission to the country for certain
kinds of employment was authorized. American President Lines v. FMB, 112 F. Supp. 346
(D.D.C. 1953), seemingly took the same position, but relied also on recognition of the
plaintiff's interest by the Merchant Marine Act. See also Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v.
United States, 129 F. Supp. 472 (D. Ore. 1955).4 5 See Rasmussen v. United States, 421 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 1970); Los Angeles
Customs & Brokers Ass'n v. Johnson, 277 F. Supp. 525, 535 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Sapp v.
Hardy, 204 F. Supp. 602 (D. Del. 1962). The bills which originally were introduced in
each house of Congress would have had the broad effect suggested, by providing that
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theless, as appears later in this article, the Supreme Court and other
federal courts which have not adopted the broadened interpretation are
reaching a result not far short of it by concluding in particular cases,
on the basis of very slight indications, that other statutes do indeed
contain recognition of actual, existing interests in some manner which
in conjunction with the APA confers standing on those who possess
them.
The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act contains
separate formulas with respect to standing to secure judicial review of
rules on the one hand and of final decisions in contested cases on the
other hand. As to the former, review may be had in a declaratory judg-
ment action "if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application,
interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the
legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff."46 Review of decisions in con-
tested cases may be had in proceedings which the Act itself establishes,
brought by persons "aggrieved"; but other, existing means of judicial
review are expressly preserved.4 7 The original Model Act provided that
judicial review of rules could be had in declaratory judgment proceed-
ings brought by "any interested persons."4 State administrative proce-
dure legislation for the most part follows these provisions, with occa-
sional variations. This legislation consequently establishes new bases of
standing, but also preserves the requirements of standing which attach
to the pre-existing modes of review that are retained.
"(a)ny person adversely affected by any agency action shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof ... ." ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEG ISLATIVE HISTORY, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.,
S. Doc. No. 248 at 160 (see p. 11 with regard to the identity of the two bills). In the
Senate committee the provision became at one point that "(a)ny person suffering legal
wrong because of any agency action shall be entitled to judicial review." Id. at 36. There-
after the final wording appeared in the drafts considered in both houses. Id. 222, 240. Each
chamber's committee report included a curtailed text by way of "summary" of the pro-
vision, which omitted the words "or aggrieved," thereby causing the phrase "within the
meaning of any statute" to attach directly to "adversely affected," and then explained
that "any person adversely affected in fact by agency action or aggrieved within the
meaning of any statute" would have the right of review. It seems fair to say that the
editing of the reports was defective as to this point and that the text is valueless as an
indication of the committees' intentions. The interpretation of the Attorney General, ac-
cepted by Senator McCarran, the chief Senatorial sponsor of the bill, was that the
provision "reflects existing law." Id. at 230, 413, 309-10. Senator McCarran's own explana-
tion at one point was that "any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action,
or adversely affected within the meaning of any statute, is entitled to judicial review." Id.
at 323.
The related question of whether the A.P.A. is an independent source of federal court
jurisdiction at the instance of persons having standing, on which the lower courts have
divided, is not considered here.
4 6 PRzv. MODEL STATE A.P.A. § 7 (1970), 9C ULA 181 (1946).
47 Id. § 15(a).
4 8
MODEL STATE A.P.A. § 15(a) (1946). 9C ULA 174 (1946).
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Standing of Private Persons to Vindicate the Public Interest
At common law, recognition that particular interests might form
the basis of standing to challenge official acts depended, as it still does
in England and to some extent in the United States, on criteria which
may vary according to the remedies invoked. The prerogative proceed-
ings or extraordinary legal remedies in theory implement the Crown's
concern or, in the United States, the constitutional or statutory .concern
with requiring administrative officials to perform their duty and to
remain within the limits of their authority. In some contexts, especially
in relation to the actions of local authorities, the standing of members
of the public as such to bring mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, or
other proceedings to check excesses of authority or compel legally
mandated action has been recognized in judicial decisions and opinions.4 9
This reasoning has not been applied to habeas corpusa however, and
the persons whose standing as members of the public has been recognized
4 9 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1875), citing English and state
cases (statutory mandamus to a railroad company); Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222,
80 N.E. 821 (1907) (mandamus), quoting from J. HrGH, EXTAoRnNARY LEGAL Rxoaxas
(3d ed. 1896); People ex rel. Stonebraker v. Wood, 90 Colo. 566, 10 P.2d 331 (1932);
Baker v. State ex rel. Hi Hat Liquors, Inc., 159 Fla. 286, 31 So. 2d 275 (1947); State
ex rel. Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 95 Fla. 14, 116 So. 48 (1928); Stephens v.
Moran, 221 Ga. 4, 142 S.E.2d 845 (1965); People ex el. Newdelman v. Swank, 263 Ill.
App. 2d 599, 264 N.E.2d 794 (1970) (mandamus and declaratory judgment); Zoercher v.
Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 222, 172 N.E. 186, 189 (1930) (declaratory judgment); compare
Nickols v. Commissioners of Middlesex County, 341 Mass. 13, 166 N.E.2d 911 (1962)
(mandamus) with O'Donnell v. Board of Appeals of Billerica, 349 Mass. 324, 207 N.E.2d
877 (1965) (certiorari); Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.
2d 621 (1951) (mandamus); Driscoll v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 8 N.J. 433,
476, 86 A.2d 201, 222 (1952) (remedies in general), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952);
State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 Pac. 242 (1926) (mandamus);
Whitt v. Cook, 255 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio C.P. 1970), citing earlier cases (injunction); Lien
v. Northwestern Eng'r Co., 74 S.D. 476, 54 N.W.2d 472 (1952); Taxpayers Ass'n of Cape
May v. City of Cape May, 2 NJ. Super. 27, 64 A.2d 453 (1949) (taxpayer access to city
records); Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 319-21, 63 At. 146, 155 (1906) ("citizen and
taxpayer" seeking access to state records of expenditures); compare State ex rel. Lemon
v. Langlie, 45 Wash. 2d 82, 273 P.2d 464 (1954) (citizens and taxpayers of State have
standing to bring mandamus to compel location of state agency offices in state capital),
witht Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1962), under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act.
Compare Parks v. Simpson, 242 Miss. 894, 137 So. 2d 136 (1962) ("resident citizen
and taxpayer" held, without discussion, to have standing to seek injunction against allegedly
illegal sale of state property), with Texas Oyster Growers Ass'n v. Odom, 385 S.W.2d 899
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See also Warner v. Mayor of Taunton, 253 Mass. 116, 148 N.E.
177 (1925) (resident of a city lacks standing to bring mandamus to compel removal of an
allegedly illegal street obstruction).
In Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where there were overtones sug-
gesting citizen standing to challenge alleged violations of the Establishment Clause, stand-
ing was based more particularly on the right of persons able to reach a public park to
enjoy it without annoyance by the violation allegedly perpetrated there. See note 56 infra
& text accompanying.
50S.A. n Sarnar, JuDicmnL Rnvsw or ADmflssT AT IV AcrioN 428 (2d ed. 1968).
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in relation to the other writs have in fact often had more limited eco-
nomic or non-economic interests of their own to protect, on which their
standing was or could have been grounded.5' There are also numerous
statements and decisions which deny standing based simply on the
general interest.52 It cannot be said that any such standing, available
generally as a basis for judicial review of governmental action, had
come to be recognized58 before the Supreme Court decisively rejected
it again in 1974."4
51 Frequently the citizen interest as a basis of standing is accompanied by a taxpayer
interest in the finances of the governmental unit involved. In cases involving local action,
the inhabitants of a municipality who bring suit may be considered for historical reasons
to have a fictional special interest as members of the municipal corporation, instead of
merely the general interest of persons in relation to government See 1 J. Drr.ION, Mm crrM.
CORPORATiONS § 60 (5th ed. 1911); 4 J. DILLON § 1580 (5th ed. 1911); State ex rel. Weliford
v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 75 S.W. 948 (1903). The interest of members of an electorate
may also be more specific than that which stems from residency or citizenship. See State
cx rel. Shaw v. Harmon, 23 N.D. 513, 137 N.W. 427 (1912). In Union Pac. R. Co. v.
Hall, note 49 supra, the petitioners were shippers by the respondent railroad, seeking to
compel action that would enhance the quality of service to them. The actual presence
of specific interests of the plaintiffs in more recent cases which contain broad statements
as to standing under the Administrative Procedure Act was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, note 74 infra. As to the broad statement in Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), often cited as the
fountainhead of recognition of the standing of environmental groups to challenge allegedly
harmful agency action, and the holding which followed it in Citizens Comm. for the
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), see note 57 infra and notes 263-284
infra and text accompanying.5 2 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S.
633 (1937); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258
U.S. 126, 129 (1922); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Mottola v. Nixon,
464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960); People cx rel. Naughton v. Swank, 58 Ill.
2d 95, 317 N.E.2d 499 (1974); Topeka Bldg. & Constr. Co. v. Leahy, 187 Kan. 112, 353
P.2d 641 (1960); Glen Burnie Improvement Ass'n v. State Appeal Bd., 213 Md. 407, 132
A.2d 451 (1957); Fiske v. Board of Selectmen of Hopkinton, 354 Mass. 269, 237 N.E.2d
15 (1968); Donohue v. Cornelius, 17 N.Y.2d 390, 218 N.E.2d 285 (1966); Hidley v.
Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 439, 271 N.E.2d 520 (1971); Cole v. Langford, 221 Tenn. 458, 437
S.W.2d 562 (1968). Cf. Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 431 Pa. 199, 245 A.2d 238
(1968); Dupre v. Doris, 68 R.I. 67, 26 A.2d 623 (1942); Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 205, 281
S.W. 837 (1926).
58Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); S.A. DE S311T1, JuIcIA. REvIEw oF AD-
3aNisTRATmvE ACrION, 426-32 (2d ed. 1968); Garner, Locus Standi in Action for a Dedara-
tion, 16 MOD. L. REv. 512 (1968); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIISTRATIVE ACTION,
462-69 (1965); K. DAvIs, AD NIsTRATivE LAW TREATISE, 749-53, 756-59 (1970 Supp). Cf.
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE
L. J. 816 (1969). See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
Even in jurisdictions where a broad right of citizens to bring mandamus actions in
the general public interest has been enunciated, qualifications may be enlarged or new
ones attached in later decisions. See, e.g., Heghinian v. Ford, 209 Md. 113, 120 A.2d 339
(1956). Earlier Maryland cases, notably Levering v. Williams, 134 Md. 48, 106 A. 176
(1919), often correctly cited in support of citizen mandamus actions, had stated as an
exception that such actions would not lie to enforce public duties owed "to the govern-
ment as such." In Heghinian an alleged statutory duty of police officials to appoint both
male and female physicians to examine women prisoners on magistrates' orders was said
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A distinction needs to be drawn between the public interest in the
fullest sense of the term, which resides inherently in all citizens or
inhabitants, as does the interest in honest, competent government or
in maintenance of the public peace, and a variety of more specific interests
which are sufficiently broadly shared to be regarded as "public" in a
different sense.5 Such broadly shared interests may consist, for example,
of the rights of members of an electorate to exercise the franchise; of
taxpayers to have government funds conserved; or of persons within
reach of specific common facilities or resources such as highways, public
recreational areas, wild game, or public waters, to have the benefit of
their use. Similarly, neighborhood immunities from the adverse effects
of such official acts as the authorization of new structures or the licensing
of deleterious enterprises may be claimed. Such interests, shared by
many but not by all citizens or inhabitants, may or may not suffice to
bestow standing, according to legislative intent and the courts' appraisal
of particular situations.5" Where statutory standing is involved and the
case or controversy requirement is met, interpretation of the governing
statute lies at the base of standing to vindicate public or widely shared,
to be owed "to the magistrate or state's attorney," hence to the government, and not to
the public. Consequently a citizen could not bring a mandamus proceeding to enforce this
duty.Possidle citizen standing to secure judicial enforcement of particular provisions of the
United States Constitution which were claimed to be impliedly for the benefit of each
citizen in a special sense, was rejected in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), but was favored by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissenting
in that case, and by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), and by Justice Brennan as to Richardson in his dissenting opinion
in both cases. This issue was not considered by the majority in Richardson. As to these
two cases in relation to taxpayer standing see note 148, infra & text accompanying. As to
their relation to citizen standing to challenge agency action or inaction on statutory
grounds, see Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F. Supp. 1271 (5th Cir. 1975); Stanton v. Ash, 384
F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
54 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
5 5 Drawing on language in earlier opinions, the Court in Reservists Committee distin-
guished between "injury in the abstract," including "the generalized interest of all citizens
in constitutional governance," and "concrete injury," creating a more direct "personal stake"
in correcting governmental performance. Standing may be based on the latter but not on
the former.
56M. Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(interest of pers6nis in access to material sought to be broadcast); Joseph v. FCC, 404
F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (radio listener's interest in relation to change of ownership of
broadcasting station); State ex rel. St. Louis, SYF.R. Co. v. Boyett, 183 Okia. 49, 80 P.2d
201 (1938) (taxpayer interest bestows standing to compel officials to collect taxes from
all who owe them). Cf. Allen v. Board of Educ., 398 U.S. 544 (1969), Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962), and Brooks v. State, 162 Ind. 568, 577, 70 N.E. 980, 983 (1904)
(voter standing to challenge statutes affecting the franchise or its value in relation to
legislative representation); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974), and Nader v. Kleinschmidt, 375 F. Supp. 1138 (D.D.C. 1973) (same as to non-
enforcement of legislation combating undesirable influences in elections); District 65,
Wholesale Union v. Nixon, 341 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (workers assumed, without
discussion, to have standing to challenge the advocacy of the unemployment percentage
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as well as other, interests.5" Whether common statutory terms, such as
"persons adversely affected" or "aggrieved," should be construed with
maximum breadth to confer standing on persons, however numerous,
who sustain adverse consequences only as taxpayers, citizens, or mem-
bers of the total community is an important question which is discussed
below5 8
goal in the 1971 Economic Report of the President made pursuant to the Employment
Act of 1946).
With respect to consequences in a vicinity, produced by structures, offensive conditions,
or deleterious conduct carried on or sanctioned officially, the law relating to public nui-
sances resulting from private action provides an analogy. Under that law, "special damage"
to a plaintiff, or "harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the
public exercising public right," is required for standing to sue. See REsTATrMNT (SEcoND),
or TORTS § 8210 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). Under varying circumstances, official action
having consequences in the nature of a nuisance may be challenged in suits brought by
persons sufficiently affected against parties claiming valid governmental authorization,
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851) (see also Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865)), or against officials who have taken the
action, Levingston Shipbuilding Co. v. Ailes, 239 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tex. 1965). Standing
to challenge adjustments or changes in the zoning of another's property, allegedly injurious
to that of the challenger, turns on similar considerations under a variety of review auth-
orizations. See, e.g., Kramer v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 453 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.
1971); Dalton v. City of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1971) (standing up-
held); Township of River Vale v. Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968) (standing of ad-
joining local government unit in another state upheld); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967) (statutory standing upheld after full
discussion); State ex rel. Housing Authority of St. Louis County v. Wimd, 337 S.W. 2d
554 (Mo. App. 1960) (standing upheld); Appley v. Township Comm. of Bernards, 128
N.J.L. 195, 24 A.2d 805 (1942), aff'd, 129 N.J.L. 73, 28 A.2d 177 (1942) (standing
upheld), and three cases entitled 222 E. Chestnut St. Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Chicago,
10 I1. 2d 130, 139 N.E.2d 221 (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 132, 139 N.E.2d 218 (1957) and 14 Ill.
2d 190, 152 N.E.2d 465 (1958) (standing denied). Standing has been based in some
cases on sufficiently definite manifestations of interest in engaging in activities open to
the public without formal prerequisites. See Schiaffo v. Heltoski, 492 F.2d 413 (3d Cir.
1974) (standing to challenge congressman's alleged abuse of postal franking privilege held
to exist in defeated candidate for the congressional seat, because statute is intended to
protect all in a position to be injured); Gates v. Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C.
1973) (desire to attend agency advisory committee meetings, manifested by bringing action,
confers standing to seek review of failure to hold open meetings required by statute);
New York Coalition for Community Health v. Lindsay, 262 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(desire of persons previously active in relevant capacities to be considered for agency
advisory council 'membership confers standing to seek review of failure to establish
councils as allegedly required).
57 The holding and opinion in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), note 51 supra, rest on §313(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. §8251(b), which provides for judicial review at the instance of "any party . . .
aggrieved." Cf. Maurice v. London County Council, [1964] 2 Q.B. 362 (C.A.). Many
federal cases now involve interpretation of the language of the Administrative Procedure
Act, see note 38 supra & text accompanying. The Illinois and Missouri provisions for judi-
cial review of agency action in effect refer to other sources of "legal rights, duties or
privileges" in providing for standing. Winston v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 407 fI1. 588, 95
N.E.2d 864 (1950); Mast v. Deters, 357 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1962). The Federal Consumer
Products Safety Act provides for judicial review of any product safety standard at the
instance of any person "adversely affected?' or "any consumer or consumer organization."
15 U.S.C. § 2060(a) (1973 Supp).5 8 See notes 71-75, 151-52 infra & text accompanying.
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Statutory provisions that confer standing to secure judicial review
of agency action on persons adversely affected or aggrieved or on parties
in interest became significant in relation to public interest representation
when they were held to bestow standing on persons who have a distinct
private interest that cannot itself be asserted, so that they might urge
considerations relevant to the public interest. The position of broad-
casters under the Federal Communications Act is illustrative. The Act
does not authorize the Federal Communications Commission to protect
or advance the economic interests, per se, of licensed broadcasters or of
applicants for licenses; their welfare is of concern only in so far as it
enters into the capacity of the broadcasters in a given market to render
adequate broadcasting service." Nevertheless broadcasting enterprises,
pursuing private gain, may seek authority from the Commission to
engage in broadcasting and may, before the Commission, oppose grants
to others who would exclude or be in competition with them. The statute
expressly provides that they may bring review proceedings to challenge
denials of licenses to themselves.6" The same statute also authorizes
persons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" to chal-
lenge licensing orders. The question arises whether broadcasters chal-
lenging the licensing of other broadcasters in the same listening areas
come within this provision. It has been held that, being persons adversely
affected or aggrieved in fact, they do come within it, not to secure pro-
tection for their self-interest as such, but to urge other, relevant grounds
for challenging Commission action, including failure of the Commission
to take adequate account of the public interest in the maintenance of
financially viable broadcasting enterprises.6 "[T]hese private litigants
have standing only as representatives of the public interest" 2 and serve
as "private attorneys general" for this purpose.6 The same theory may
be applied under other statutes, both when the private interest which
forms the basis of standing is economic64 and when it is non-economic,
59FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Carroll Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Broadcast Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 390 F.2d
483 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
6047 U.S.C. §402(b) (1970).
61FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, note 59 supra; Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942).62 Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
6 3 Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), note 28
supra.
64d.; National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951), vacated as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Fuels
Research Council v. FPC, 374 F.2d 842, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1967); Juarez Gas Co. v. FPC,
375 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1967); larine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577,
590-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969), note 30 supra; Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, SA. v.
Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Seatrain Lines v. United States, 152 F. Supp.
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such as an interest in health or in the enjoyment of recreational oppor-
tunities or beauty in the environment.65 The private interest serves as
the basis of standing; furtherance of a distinct public interest becomes
the objective.66 Compatibility, at least, between the two interests may
be required."'
When an individual interest which is advanced as a basis of stand-
ing is itself entitled to consideration under the governing legislation, the
private attorney general theory is not needed to supply a purpose for
the standing. It has, nevertheless, been carried into some of the cases
brought by persons whose own interests were entitled to be considered,
when those interests were also part of a wider "public" interest. The
former would suffice as both the basis of standing and the object of
619 (D. Del. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 181 (1957), the court reasoned that the
private attorney general theory was applicable even though the statute which provided
for judicial review, § 17(9) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 17(9) (1970),
and the Judicial Code sections to which it refers, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 1321-1325 (1970),
did not authorize review at the instance of persons adversely affected or aggrieved or of
parties in interest. The Administrative Procedure Act (see note 38 supra & text ac-
companying), which was not cited, was applicable, however, and the competitive interest
of plaintiff Seatrain Lines arguably rendered it a "person adversely affected or aggrieved
within the meaning" of the governing Water Carrier Act, since that Act made direct
provision for equal treatment of competitors. In Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. United
States, 129 F. Supp. 472 (D. Ore. 1955), under the same statutory provisions for review,
the court rested the plaintiffs' standing as competing carriers in a rate case, seemingly in
the capacity of private attorneys general, partially on the APA provision, without stop-
ping to relate the plaintiffs' interest specifically to the governing Interstate Commerce
Act. Cf. note 44 supra. The Scanwell Laboratories opinion, cited there, regards the dis-
appointed bidder on a public contract, whose standing to challenge the contract award
was recognized, as a private attorney general in behalf of the public interest at least in
part. 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The same view was taken in National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), also cited in note 44 supra, except that
the court found it "unnecessary to designate the contractors [specifically] as private
attorneys general," but treated their contentions as those of persons occupying that status.
In contrast, competing shippers who used transportation facilities entirely different from
those directly involved in a rate proceeding were held to be without standing in Freeport
Sulphur Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
65Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1965)
(through citation of cases which developed the theory); Office of Communications of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 998-1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Reade v.
Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (family consumer interest in healthfulness of product);
Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641 (1885) (statutory standing of citizens to
attack illegal operation of a saloon is analogous to that of the attorney general proceeding
in behalf of the public).
66 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736-41 (1972); Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates
v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
67 In National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d at 655 (10th Cir. 1971), the court
discussed this aspect of the matter and found sufficient compatibility in a situation that
was "passing strange." In National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 205
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970), the court put aside doubts on this
score and decided the case on the merits. See also, Note, The New Law of Threshold Stand-
ing: The Effect of Sierra Club on Jus Tertii and on Government Contracts, 1973 DuXE
L.J. 219, 227-34.
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concern; but characterization of the plaintiffs as private attorneys gen-
eral calls attention to the breadth and importance of the interests which
are served. The theory has been invoked in this way when competitive
economic interest, including that of a franchise holder as against new
enterprise, itself entitled to consideration, has also entered into the public
convenience and necessity or other statutory standard governing agency
action,6" and when legally recognized individual interests in social bene-
fits or in preservation of the environment have been shared with many
other people.69 In other cases of the same nature standing has been recog-
nized without specific reference to a theory of representation of the
wider interests involved.7"
Some decisions and judicial opinions have held or stated that under
the formula of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, whereby
"persons adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute" have standing to challenge agency action, or under other
similar federal or state statutes, the requisite aggrievement or effect
arises by reason of injury to a specific interest which is shared by all
persons in the community.7' The role of private attorney general is in-
6 8 The opinions in the cases cited in note 64 supra, in which standing was recognized,
except National Helium Corp. v. Morton, indicate that the interests which were made the
basis of standing, unlike the competitive interests of broadcasters, were themselves en-
titled to consideration under the governing statutes, alongside the public interests which
could be represented by the same persons.69 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (housing project
tenants, challenging racial exclusion from the project, have standing as "persons aggrieved,"
"not only on their own behalf" because of denial of interracial contracts, "but also as
'private attorneys general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the
highest priority"); Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971), and cases cited in
note 65 supra.7 0 Compare American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 364 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1960),
with E. Brooke Matlock, Inc. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971); Alameda Conservation Ass'n
v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971); Ward v.
Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1211 (D. Md. 1972); Conservation Soc'y of Southern Vermont v.
Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated 96
S.Ct. 19 (1975); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238
(M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613, 625 (3d Cir. 1971); Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R. Co.
v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ill. 1962). Cf. People ex rel. N.Y. Edison Co. v.
Willcox, 207 N.Y. 86, 100 N.E. 705 (1912).71 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), note
65 supra, the health interest asserted by the plaintiffs was one they shared with all others
who live in the natural environment. In Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970), the court, referring to
earlier judicial pronouncements, stated that "the public interest in the environment," shared
by the plaintiffs, was "a legally protected interest affording" standing to them "as re-
sponsible representatives of the public." See also Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205
(D. Colo. 1970). Mr. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1970), would have been willing to adopt this view, limited to organizations displaying
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herent in standing that rests on this kind of interest.72 The prevalent
earlier interpretation of similar statutory language was less expansive,
however ;78 and the Supreme Court later adhered to it in Sierra Club v.
Morton, holding that persons challenging actions allegedly damaging
to the environment must, in order to establish standing under the APA,
show some direct, personal interest in an aspect or portion of the environ-
ment which is affected. 4 The precise scope of the limiting principle
underlying that decision is doubtful, since the Court viewed as controver-
sial the environmental policy on which the plaintiff, Sierra Club, based
its contention, which therefore turned on "value preferences" and not on
an interest common to all, such as, for example, the interest in the purity
of the nation's ambient atmosphere. The Court excluded public interest
suits of a more traditional variety under the Act by declaring that an
organization's "mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how outstanding
the interest, . . . is not sufficient by itself to render the organization
'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within the meaning of the APA."7 5
The Sierra Club opinion recognized that within the limits imposed
by the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution, Congress may
by statute create standing to seek review of agency action in the public
interest; but what the limits may be has not become clear. In all of the
instances referred to in the opinion, standing was based on individual
adequate credentials or, possibly, any person "who has a probable, sincere, dedicated,
and established status" relative to an environmental concern. 405 U.S. at 757-58. See also
Cape May County Chapter, Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J.
1971); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952) (any preson
may, as one "aggrieved" and "directly affected," assert a statutory interest of the public
in continued enjoyment of the scenic beauty of streams); Parker v. Brown, 195 S.C. 35,
44-45, 58-59, 10 S.E.2d 625, 628-29, 635 (1940) (citizen may be a person "aggrieved" by
failure by county treasurer to issue execution against another for the collection of taxes);
Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (court entertained statutory review proceeding,
brought by concerned congressmen, to challenge CAB rate order on procedural grounds
involving exclusion of the public from proceedings).
72 Cf. Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511
F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citizen suit authorized by statute).
78 U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943); Tyler v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958); Padilla v. Franklin, 70
N.M. 243, 372 P.2d 820 (1962); State ex rel. Skilton v. Miller, 164 Ohio St. 163, 128
N.E.2d 47 (1955) (citizen is not a "party beneficially interested," under a statute relating
to mandamus, in the enforcement of a Sunday closing law); Tri-State Milling Co. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 75 S.D. 466, 68 N.W.2d 104 (1955) (disappointed bidder on
a public contract, in common with citizens and taxpayers, is not a "person aggrieved" by
an allegedly illegal award to another); Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 191, 203 P.2d 637
(1923) (same in relation to payment of statutory mother's benefits).
74 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1970). The same limitation on the scope
of standing by virtue of the APA is applied in Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Simon,
390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1975), and Stanton v. Ash, 384 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
75405 U.S. at 739. See also Independent Investor Protective League v. SEC, 495
F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116 (10th
Cir. 1973).
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interests in fact, other than a share in the public interest which the
plaintiffs also sought to vindicate. 71 Supreme Court decisions in which
standing to vindicate a general public interest had previously been held
to be absent had not involved standing created by statute.7' There also
are instances in which legislative provisions for suits to challenge statutes
or official action have been held invalid because of the absence of a case
or controversy; but the reason has been the essentially advisory nature
of the judgments sought, rather than the absence of standing.7
Statutes sometimes authorize judicial review at the instance of
members of the public, as such, in behalf of completely public interests
which the statutes are designed to secure. 9 The basis of standing under
these statutes is not different from the basis for invoking some of the
more traditional remedies, such as mandamus, on similar grounds in
situations in which these remedies can be applied. 0 Against this back-
ground of previous recognition of public interest suits, the statutes
establishing standing on a similar basis for reasons thought by the legis-
76 405 U.S. at 736-40.
77 Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Doremus
v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Taxpayers' interests primarily, rather than policy
concerns of the individual plaintiffs, were formally at issue in the Frothingham and
Doremus cases; but policy considerations constituted the motivating force for the suits.
The interests asserted by the State in Massachusetts v. Mellon were both economic and
social.
78 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1906), and cases cited. The opinion in
Muskrat notes that injunction suits by the same plaintiffs raising the same issues, the
justiciability of which was not questioned, were pending at the time Congress invalidly
attempted to authorize the essentially advisory actions which were before the Court.
79 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (Clean Air Act) (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (Noise Control
Act) (1970), authorizing suits by "any person" against private and governmental violators
and against federal administering agencies with respect to nondiscretionary acts and duties,
subject to 60-day notice requirements; IND. CoDE § 13-6-1-1 (Burns 1973); MAss. ANN.
LAws, ch. 732, § 2, (supp. 1972) § 30A-10A; MICH. PUB. AcTs 1970, p. 390, Comp. L.
(supp. 1972) § 691.1201 et seq. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act provision,
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. IV. 1974), bestows similar authority on "any citizen" but defines
"citizen" to mean "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected." As to the limiting effect of this definition see Montgomery Environmental Comm'n
v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973).
Some state statutes authorize suits primarily against alleged polluters, including public
agencies, but under their terms may extend to review of agency action which may auth-
orize pollution by others. E.g., MzsN. L. 1971, pp. 2013, 2017, MIN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03
(1972-73 supp.) (actions for "relief . . ., for the protection of" the environment). As to
legislation having similar effect, applicable to radically different subject matter, see State
Bd. of Architecture v. Kirkham, Michael & Associates, 179 N.W.2d 409 (N.D. 1970);
Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. 2d 125, 173 P.2d 545 (1946) (standing to
challenge continuance of a liquor license, derived from statutory authorization of com-
plaint by "any person" to licensing agency); Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641
(1885); Barrows v. Furnum's Stage Lines, 254 Mass. 240, 150 N.E. 206 (1926).
s
0 See note 49 supra & text accompanying.
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lature to be sufficient are difficult to question."1 Statutes authorizing qui
tam actions, which are recognized as valid,' also supply analogies, es-
pecially when coupled with the common law antecedents of such rem-
edies.A It is true that under these statutes the financial stake of the
plaintiffs, normally fashioned out of whole cloth by the legislature, pro-
vides an independent foundation for adverseness in the controversies
brought to court. More often than not the defendants are private parties
who are alleged to have broken a law; but the legislative purpose in
relation to such suits is to vindicate public interests in the laws which
are being enforced. In some instances the defendants may be incumbent
or former public officials whose actions as such are questioned." It
would be odd to regard the controversies which are brought to court
in this way as more substantial or worthy of litigation than pure public
interest suits authorized by statute," merely because a financial interest
had been injected into them. Nevertheless, there probably are de minimis
constitutional limits to justiciability, applicable to statutory public in-
terest suits. Perhaps a resident of New York could not be authorized,
merely because of an interest in the legality of agency action affecting a
national asset, to challenge an allegedly unauthorized but otherwise in-
nocuous mineral lease on federal lands in Wyoming that had not been
dedicated to some specific use by the public. Such a question, however,
is not likely to arise, because statutes authorizing such challenges are
not likely to be enacted and, if any were, suits of this kind under them
would probably not be brought.
81 Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
YA=E L.J. 816 (1969), note 53 supra. Cf. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704
(2d Cir. 1943), suggesting that the private attorney general theory may be extended by
statute to situations in which the basis of standing consists only of a share in the general
public interest in preventing "action by an officer in violation of his statutory powers;"
Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Mr. Justice Powell, concurring, in
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180, at 193 (1974).
82 U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under
the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant in Public Actions, 67 Nw. U.L.
REV. 446 (1972)..
8 8 Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASM. U.L.Q. 81. Tax-
payers' suits in which the taxpayer economic interest is secondary to policy issues are also
analogous. See note 125 infra & text accompanying.
84 Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 155 (1970) (informer's share in penalty prescribed for Treasurer's
violation of conflict-of-interest provision). See also 31 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
85 By way of differentiation from the case before the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120, 131-32 (1968), stated effectively the reasons
why public interest suits authorized by statute should be regarded as constitutionally
permissible. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975); Blair v. Pritchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249-50 (1971).
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Standing of Officers and Agencies to Vindicate the Public Interest
Through Judicial Review of Agency Action
Public interests of many kinds are, of course, constantly represented
in litigation by officers and agencies charged with vindicating them. To
the extent this function is well performed by this means, the need and
the justification for private persons to engage in litigation for the same
purpose is reduced. There are limitations on official standing to secure
judicial review of agency action, some of which involve the same basic
considerations as the standiig of private persons. These relate to the
requirement that genuine controversies be presented to the courts, to
whether the interest possessed or represented by an officer or agency
seeking standing is legally recognized, to whether the agency is an ap-
propriate proponent of the interest, and to the need for the judiciary to
avoid unnecessary interference with the affairs of the executive branch.8"
Under some statutes an agency is not recognized as having or rep-
resenting an interest which entitles it to become a party to review pro-
ceedings involving its own action; rather, the proceedings are ex parte
appeals or may be brought against beneficiaries of the action, such as a
property owner who has been granted a zoning variance, a utility which
has been authorized to issue securities or increase its rates, or opponents
of an application who have been successful before the agency.87 If an
agency is a participant in such a review proceeding, it may be so merely
for the purpose of presenting the pertinent record, without an interest
entitling it to become a proponent of its action or to appeal from an
adverse decision of the initially reviewing court." Decisions which deny
standing to agencies are often based on the view that a particular agency
8 8 See F. Davis, The Standing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency Decisions: A
Unique Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 AD. L. REv. 163 (1964); L. JA z,
JUDIerM CONTROL OF ADMrNISTRAIW AcrzoN, 537-43 (1965). As to the increasingly
important question of standing of legislators to challenge allegedly illegal nullification of
their enactments or impairment of their authority by executive or agency action or in-
action see Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488
F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973); Williams
v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973); see further Williams v. Phillips, 482 F.2d
669 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Such standing on the part of legislators does not extend to chal-
lenging the interpretation or application of statutes by agencies. Korioth v. Briscoe, 523
F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975); Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974),
aff'd without opinion, 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975).87 Mies v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938) (board of zoning appeals);
In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 675, 171 N.E. 65, 68 (1930) (Public
Service Commission); Petition of Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d
580 (1950) (same).
88 Miles v. McKinney, 175 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938); Corn v. Board of Liquor
Control, 160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360 (1953).
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has acted "judicially" or "quasi-judicially," with no more reason to de-
fend its action than a court has with respect to its decision on appeal.89
This conceptual test produces variable results, however,90 and a better
criterion would be whether the agency is charged with furthering statu-
tory policy or a specified public interest to a degree that would enable
it to contribute usefully to the review process and to the attainment of
statutory purposes. 9' Some statutes are explicit in providing that a re-
view proceeding shall be against the agency as defendant. 2 In the ab-
sence of such a statutory provision, recognition that an agency has
standing to defend its decisions or to appeal from an adverse court deci-
sion may be based on practical or common-sense grounds93 or, when an
appeal from a lower-court decision in a statutory review proceeding, up-
setting the agency's action, is involved, on the conclusion that the agency
89 Board of Adjustment of Denver v. Kuehn, 132 Colo. 348, 290 P.2d 1114 (1956)
(local zoning board functions judicially and cannot appeal a reversal of its decision denying
an exception); State ex rel. Bringhurst v. Zoning Ed. of Appeal, 198 La. 758, 4 So. 2d 820
(1941); Miles v. McKinney, 175 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938); In re Getsug, 290 Minn.
110, 186 N.W.2d 686 (1971) (professional licensing board functions judicially in revoking a
license for misconduct); Minnesota Water Resources Bd. v. County of Traverse, 287
Minn. 130, 177 N.W.2d 44 (1970) (same as to board determining controversies over
the establishment and boundaries of local improvement districts); Public Serv. Interstate
Transp. Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 129 N.J.L. 94, 28 A.2d 199 (1942) (same
as to the Board of Commissioners in deciding whether a municipality validly revoked a
bus line permit); People ex rel. Steward v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 160 N.Y. 202, 54
N.E. 697 (1899) (early view that the determination of applications for certificates of
convenience and necessity is a "judicial" function; hence the Board has no standing to
defend its award on .review); Miller v. Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 100 Ohio St.
561, 117 N.E.2d 427 (1954) (Administrator of Unemployment Compensation could appeal
from reversal of decision of Board of Review, but the Board could not).
90 Compare Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 15 A.2d 6 (1940), reviewing practice
and authorities and recognizing conflict among jurisdictions with respect to boards of
zoning appeals wih Minnesota Water Resources Ed. v. County of Traverse, 287 Minn.
130, 177 N.W.2d 44 (1970). In Koehn v. State Ed. of Equalization, 50 Cal. 2d 432, 326
P.2d 502 (1958), an appeal board which exercised a limited reviewing function similar
to judicial review was held to possess standing to appeal as a "party aggrieved" from a
judgment in mandamus ordering it to set aside its reversal of an initial agency action.
9' Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974); Associated Gen-
Contractors, Okla. Chapter v. Laborers Int'l Union, 476 F.2d 1388 (Em. App. 1973);
Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 15 A.2d 6 (1940); Borough of Hasbrouck Heights v.
Division of Tax Appeals, 48 N.J. Super. 328, 137 A.2d 585 (1958); it re Taylor, 172
Ohio St. 394, 176 N.E.2d 214 (1961) (mayor as appellant from a decree invalidating his
removal of a police chief). As to the role of the agency in relation to that of other
parties see Minnesota Water Resources Ed. v. County of Traverse, 287 Minn. 130, 177
N.W.2d 44 (1970); DiCillo & Sons v. Chester Zoning Ed. of Appeals, 158 Ohio St. 302,
109 N.E.2d 8 (1952).
92See, e.g., Indianapolis Water Co. v. Moynahan Properties Co., 209 Ind. 453, 198
N.E. 312 (1935).
93Borough of Hasbrouck Heights v. Division of Tax Appeals, 49 N.J. Super. 328,
137 A.2d 585 (1958). The Supreme Court commented in FTC v. Dean Milk Co., 384 U.S.
597, 607 (1966), that, although "[tihere is no explicit statutory authority for the Com-
mission to appear in judicial review proceedings . . . no one has contended it cannot
appear in the courts of appeals to defend its orders." See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 442 (opinion of the Court), 466 (separate opinion) (1939).
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is a statutory "person or party aggrieved" or "party in interest," ex-
pressly or impliedly authorized by the statute to appeal. 4
If an agency's action has been superseded by the action of a re-
viewing administrative authority charged with serving the same ends,
the officer or agency that took the initial action is likely to be without
standing in court either to challenge or to support the decision on re-
view." If, by contrast, the initial and reviewing authorities are con-
sidered to be differently oriented and are not in the relation of sub-
ordinate to superior, a statutory basis for standing by the initial authority
to seek review and prosecute appeals may well exist. 6 If an officer or
agency serves primarily as an advocate before another agency, standing
to seek judicial review of an adverse decision would seemingly follow,
94 ICC v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nav. Co., 288 U.S. 14, 24 (1933); Zoning Ed.
of Adjustment v. Bragon Run Terrace, Inc. 59 Del. 175, 216 A.2d 146 (1965); Boyd &
Usher Transp. v. Southern Tank Lines, Inc., 326 S.W.2d 120 (Ky. 1959) (Dep't of Motor
Transportation); Workmen's Comp. Bd. v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S.W. 533 (1925);
Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n v. Ryan, 241 So. 2d 667 (Miss. 1970); Katz v. Dept.
of Liquor Control, 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294 (1957) (standing limited by statute
to specified issues); cf. also Mentor Marinas, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 1 Ohio
App.2d 219, 204 N.E.2d 404 (1964); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
260 Pa. 323, 103 A. 724 (1918).
9 5 Fadell v, Kovacik, 242 Ind. 610, 181 NE.2d 228 (1962) (local tax assessor in
relation to an assessment which a state board lowered); In re Proposed Assessment of
County Treasurer, 219 Iowa 1099, 260 N.W. 538 (1935) (same); Sprague Oil Serv., Inc.
v. Fadely, 189 Kan. 23, 367 P.2d 56 (1961) (Director of Revenue in relation to Board
of Tax Appeals); State ex rel. Rouveyard v. Donnelly, 365 Mo. 686, 285 'S.W.2d 669
(Mo. 1956) (state Commissioner of Finance whose decision refusing a bank charter hiad
been reversed by the Board of Review, under a statute which expressly conferred standing
to seek judicial review on applicants for charters); Scearce v. Simons, 294 S.W.2d 673
(Mo. App. 1956) (Director of Personnel in relation to decision of Civil Service Commis-
sion); State ex rel. Overton v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 81 N.M. 28, 462 P.2d 613
(1970) (local tax assessor in relation to State Tax Commission); State ex rel. Broadway
Petroleum Corp. v. City of Elyria, 18 Ohio St.2d 23, 247 N.E.2d 471 (1969) (local
building inspector in relation to board of zoning appeals); Dept. of Labor & Indus. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 362 Pa. 342, 67 A.2d 114 (1949); State ex rel.
Bates v. Board of Indus. Ins. Appeals, 51 Wash. 2d 125, 316 P.2d 467 (1957) (workmen's
compensation director in relation to board of appeals).
9 6 Town of Natick v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 341 Mass. 618, 171 N.E.2d
273 (1961) (town and its board of public welfare in relation to a state departmental
order requiring added payments to a welfare recipient); State Ed. of Retirement v.
Contributory Retirement Appeal Ed., 342 Mass. 58, 172 N.E.2d 234 (1961) (board ad-
ministering a retirement fund in relation to a review board's decision requiring a payment
from the fund); Kingsley v. Division of Tax Appeals, 76 N.J. Super. 531, 185 A.2d 42 (1962)
(Director of Division of Taxation in relation to tax appeal body); In re Halifax Paper
Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963) (state commissioner of revenue in relation to
tax review board); Gold Coast Realty, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 26 Ohio St. 2d
37, 268 N.E.2d 280 (1971) (building inspector whose action was sustained by a Board of
Zoning Appeals is a necessary party to review proceedings, entitled as such, by statute,
to appeal to a higher court; as to the inspector's standing to seek review of adverse board
action, see Balles v. Martino, 2 Ohio App. 2d 197, 207 N.E.2d 385 (1963)); State v. hix,
132 W.Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 108 (1949) (Director of Unemployment Compensation in rela-
tion to Board of Review).
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but may be excluded by the governing statute.97 The People's Counsel or
official bearing a similar title, who is charged by statute in several of
the states with representing the consumer interest before a public utility
commission, may have independent authority to bring judicial review
proceedings with respect to commission orders only if standing is specifi-
cally conferred by statute.98 Developing consumer legislation is likely to
confer standing to challenge agency action on officials having similar
functions who operate government-wide. 99
Judicial decision of controversies among agencies may seem anoma-
lous because the agencies are subject to some degree of common executive
control which, rather than the courts, should arguably be the means of
resolving policy conflicts among them. With respect to policy conflicts in
litigation, the attorney general or, on the appellate level in the federal
system, the Solicitor General, whose representational functions are gov-
ernment-wide, might be considered the proper instrumentality to effect
an accomodation among agencies. Traditionally the government's chief
law officer represents its interest and the general public interest in the
courts.100 In his own person or through his staff, he often represents
agencies in proceedings to review their actions and, in particular situ-
9 7 Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
lacks standing to seek review of Board dismissal of his complaint for suspension of air
pilots' licenses). The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board performs an
analogous role in some respects; but his responsibilities merge with the superior responsi-
bilities of the Board, once he has issued a complaint. Cf. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB,
357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966). The Secretary of Labor is specifically given authority by
statute to seek judicial review of decisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Board
overruling his actions. 29 U.S.C. § 660(b) (1970). See Brennan v. Southern Contractors
Serv., 492 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1974).
98 Bosley v. Driver, 191 Md. 229, 60 A.2d 691 (1948); cf. Martin v. Indianapolis
Water Co., 130 Ind. App. 416, 162 N.E.2d 709 (1959); compare Md. Acts 1955, c. 441
p. 750, Anno. Code (Michie 1969), art. 78, § 15; IND. CoDa (Burns Supp. 1971) 8-1-1-4,
by which the authority is bestowed.
9 9 The consumer protection legislation which was passed by both houses of the 94th
Congress but died in conference committee would have authorized the administrator of
the consumer protection agency it created to initiate or intervene in federal court pro-
ceedings for review of federal agency action, to the extent that any person, if aggrieved
by the action, could do so, when the administrator determined that the action might
substantially affect an interest of consumers. The Senate and House versions differed
somewhat in their details. See § 6(c) of S. 200 as passed by the Senate, 121 Cong. Rec.
S.8423-24 (daily ed. May 15, 1975) and § 6(d) of the same bill as passed by the House
with the text of H. 7575 substituted, 121 Cong. Rec. H. 10749-50 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1975).
100 Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426 (1925); United States
v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279-87 (1888); Florida v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1976); Illinois v. Associated Milk Producers, 351 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. I.. 1972);
United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972); State ex rel.
Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 Mont. 108, 283 P.2d 594 (1955); Petition of Pub.
Serv. Coordinated Transp., 5 N.J. 196, 208, 74 A.2d 580, 586 (1950) (Attorney General
and Governor); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 513, 53 N.W.2d 514, 523
(1952) (Attorney General and Conservation Commission); cf. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
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ations involving a challenge by one agency to the action of another,
might have responsibilities to both. It would be unrealistic to suppose,
however, that under modern conditions the chief law officer, even with
a large staff, could effectively represent all agencies of the same govern-
ment or that, if he could do so as a matter of sheer logistics, he would
command the knowledge to make wise adjustments among them in the
public interest. Consequently the agencies often are independently repre-
sented; and the history of the attorney general's office in this country,
both federal and state, reflects an uneasy and shifting adjustment between
vesting centralized power in that office and permitting the agencies to
develop their own legal opinions and to appear independently in court. 101
Cooperation such as prevails in the federal system, leading to the occa-
sional submission of irreconcilable differences to the courts, 1'02 probably
represents the optimum solution to this problem in so complex a govern-
ment.
In the states, the interpretation of constitutional and statutory pro-
visions, especially with reference to the bestowal of common law powers
upon the attorney general, may'03 or may not0 4 lead to the conclusion
that the authority of his office includes the initiation of proceedings to
review a specialized agency's action when the attorney general or the
chief executive considers this course necessary. The use of this authority
involves a danger of intrusion into responsibilities which the legislature
101 H. CUM3MNS & C. McFARLANW, FEDERAL JusncE (1937), 149-60, 219-29, 486-91,
509-20; NATIONAL Ass'N OF ArroRNE-is GENAL, REPORT ON TnE OFFIcE OF ArroNEY
GENERAL (1971), 7 (recommendation 34), 9 (recommendations 44, 45), 33, 35, 43-46,
49-51, 271-95, 335-37. See also Shepperd, Common Law Duties of the Attorney General,
7 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1955).
'
0 2 See Stem, The Solidtor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46
A.B.A.J. 154 (1960); Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARv. L. REv.
759 (1951). For an interesting instance of interagency litigation to determine the consti-
tutionality of a statute establishing one of the agencies, a "body corporate and politic," see
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 69 A.2d 875 (1949).
1o State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 Mont. 108, 283 P.2d 594 (1955);
Petition of Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d 580 (1950); Muench v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). In the first two of these
cases the opinions brush aside conflict-of-interest objections growing out of the attorney
generals' duties to represent the agencies whose orders were being challenged. For a recog-
nition that the conflict-of-interest problem may arise but need not be insurmountable, see
Attorney General v. Department of Pub. Util., 342 Mass. 666, 668, 175 N.E.2d 255, 257
(1961).
104Arizona State Land Dep't v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960); State
ex rel. McKittrick v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comn'n, 352 Mo. 29, 175 S.W.2d 857 (1943).
See also People v. Debt Reducers, Inc., 484 P.2d 869 (Ore. App. 1971), with reference to
the authority to sue a regulated private business in behalf of an interest of numerous
members of the public who had or might have dealings with it.
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has reposed in the specialized agency,'" and can be justified only when
the state alleges a proprietary interest, when some other important public
interest is alleged to have been overlooked or to have been disregarded
as beyond the agency's province,106 or when there is a likelihood of serious
failure of legal duty that could not be overcome by other means. 10 7 On
the other hand, a specialized officer or agency charged with advancing or
safeguarding a particular public interest may, in order to safeguard that
interest against another one which has been entrusted to another agency,
have standing to challenge in court an action or refusal to act of the
other agency.108
105 The Montana and New Jersey cases cited in note 103 supra, in which respectively,
the attorney general and the attorney general at the direction of the governor challenged
the merits of public utility rate increases allowed by a public service commission, exemplify
this danger. Compare the careful opinion in State ex rel. McKittrick v. Missouri Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 352 Mo. 29, 175 S.W.2d 857 (1943), holding that standing on the part
of the Attorney General would arise only when he represented a proprietary interest of
the State or a public interest that transcended the interests of consumers which the Com-
mission was itself charged with safeguarding. It can be argued, however, that the review
proceedings are merely a means of bringing to court issues which properly belong there,
and that the danger of harmful intrusion is outweighed by the need for vigilance on behalf
of consumers by the general officers of the government. As to a county's standing to seek
judicial review of the action of a state agency affecting county revenues, see County of
Bergen v. Port of New York Authority, 32 N.J. 303, 160 A.2d 810 (1960).
106 In Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952), the
court concluded that, as a matter of the interpretation of several interrelated statutes
which were applicable, the Attorney General rather than the Commission was primarily
responsible for safeguarding public fishing rights that would be affected by the Commis-
sion's authorization of a dam for electric power generation. To protect those rights, he
had appeared before the Commission as a representative of the Conservation Commission.
The hierarchy of interests which the attorney general may represent does not extend,
obviously, to the level of individual interests which those possessing them can vindicate
in ordinary litigation. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia
Psychiatric Clinic, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 96
S. Ct. 2333 (1976); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976).107 See State ex rel. Morrison v. Thomas, 80 Ariz. 327, 297 P.2d 624 (1956), in which
the Attorney General was held to be empowered to seek appellate review by means of
certiorari of an otherwise unappealable lower-court decision reversing an administrative
denial of a liquor license, when the licensing authority declined to petition for the writ.
Abuse of discretion on its part was not alleged. A dissenting opinion argued cogently that
the Governor possessed sole authority to overcome any agency failure involved and that,
subject to this possible safeguard, the matter was committed by statute to the licensing
agency.
108 United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953) (Secretary of
the Interior's interest as a distributor of power from public projects); Nuesse v. Camp,
385 F.2d 694, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (state banking commissioner as intervenor in rela-
tion to national bank branching); Board of Social Welfare v. Los Angeles County, 27 Cal.
2d 98, 162 P.2d 627 (1945); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of Netcong, 108 N.J.
Super. 564, 262 A.2d 21 (1970), aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971). Standing is conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to
Interstate Commerce Commission rate orders and orders dealing with carrier practices by
7 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). In Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967), the standing of the Secretary
of the Interior was recognized without discussion, in relation to his duties to protect fish
and wildlife, even though the Federal Power Commission as the deciding agency, differently
oriented and equipped, was also charged, by the Court's interpretation, with safeguarding
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Intra-governmental litigation in fact has a long history. In the
Anglo-American system, the courts have traditionally been called upon
in prerogative writ proceedings to effectuate the authority of the general
government over its subordinates with reference to certain litigable
matters. The disposition of criminal charges against public officers for
offenses connected with their official status, of which the government is
often the victim, is another example of judicial action to settle disputes
arising within the government. Consequently, -statutes which call upon
the courts to entertain and decide similar intra-governmental disputes
in additional ways, such as the determination of controversies growing
out of the disciplining of public officers, may well be valid. In these in-
stances the personal interest of the officers involved, adverse to the in-
terest of the government, renders the controversies suitable for judicial
determination; but there is no difference in principle between entrusting
this kind of dispute to judicial determination, as has become quite usual,
and entrusting other genuine disputes arising within government and
presenting otherwise justiciable issues. The standing of an agency to
bring a dispute over the action of another agency to court requires
that the challenging agency possess or represent a litigable interest which
is alleged to have been damaged and that the agency be not itself a sub-
ordinate one incapable of acting independently of the respondent agency.
The question whether these prerequisites are met arises in a wide range
of situations.
An officer or agency in charge of a segregated public fund or enter-
prise is quite likely to have standing to seek review of the action of
another agency which would impair the assets of the fund or enter-
prise.10 9 Similarly, the sovereign may in its own name invoke judicial
remedies to vindicate its financial interests as against agency action im-
posing costs upon it or withholding funds from its treasury. 110 Apart
the same interest in relation to the hydroelectric project involved in the case. Citizens'
advisory groups attached to agencies and entitled by statute to be consulted have been
held to possess standing to challenge agency failure to maintain and consult them. See
Comprehensive Group Health Serv. Bd. v. Temple University, 363 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
1 0 9 Summerfield v. CAB, 207 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd sub nor. Western Air
Lines v. CAB, 347 U.S. 67 (1954); Delta Airlines v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954);
Police Pension & Relief Bd. v. Goldman, 486 P.2d 469 (Colo. App. 1971); compare
Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 242 A.2d 506 (1968) (fund not made a
separate entity in the hands of the state treasurer).
10United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949). The governmental standing in this
regard may exclude that of a subordinate agency of the same government which is
involved in the same matter. See Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 242 A.2d
506 (1968); King v. Stark County, 72 N.D. 717, 10 N.W.2d 877 (1943) (agency does
not have standing by virtue of its interest, adverse to liability under a money judgment
growing out of its operations, payable from the state treasury).
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from such situations involving governmental proprietary interests, gov-
ernmental standing to litigate often involves the question whether the
unit of government presenting the issue does so in behalf of an interest
falling within its province. As respects the states of the Union, standing
to sue private defendants in order to protect natural resources within
a state's boundaries without regard to their ownership was recognized
in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company."' A state's interest in the
health of its economy was recognized as a basis of standing to sue pri-
vate defendants under the Sherman Act in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road Company." 2 The standing of one state to sue another, otherwise
than in traditional boundary dispute situations, in order to protect the
public interest in the welfare of all or part of its society or economy as
against action by the other state, has also been recognized." 3 The interest
of a state in maintaining its economy or the general welfare within its
borders," 4 or its ability to control specific matters of state concern within
its boundaries," 5 as against past or threatened federal agency action,
Ill 206 U.S. 230 (1907). See also State of Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.
1971); Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060
(D. Md. 1972). As to standing of the states and federal government to invoke the federal
question jurisdiction of the federal courts against infractions of a developing federal
common law of nuisances on the navigable waters, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 103-08 (1972); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F.
Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See also State ex rd. Shartel v. Humphreys, 338 Mo. 109,
93 S.W.2d 924 (1926).
112 324 U.S. 439, 445-55 (1945). See also Cascade Nat'l Gas Co. v. El Paso Nat'l Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967) (intervention by California in proceedings to fashion an antitrust
divestiture, decree); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (state's
remedy for injury to its economy is limited to injunction). As to the standing of the
United States to sue to enjoin obstructions to interstate commerce, see In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 584 (1895).
113 llinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553, 591-92 (1923) (interest in preventing curtailment of natural gas supply from
another state); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208 (1901). See also New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
1141ew York v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 856, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 331
U.S. 284 (1947) (interest in the state's economy as affected by an I.C.C. railroad rate
order); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) (recognizing without
discussion the interest of a state and of municipalities in the local availability and cost
of natural gas and hence in the Federal Power Commission's regulation of production and
prices); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (same as to interest of states in
federal river-water allocations for their areas); Government of Guam v. FMC, 329 F.2d
251 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (interest of territorial government in its economy, as affected by a
Maritime Commission order establishing shipping rates).
11 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1923) ("quasi sovereign rights" of the state
with respect to wild game, as against federal action under a migratory bird treaty with
Canada); Hopkins Federal Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 339-40 (1935)
(interest of a state in creating and regulating corporate savings institutions, as against
federal assumption of control over them); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
324 (1966) (recognizing without discussion the interest of the state in maintaining its
election laws, as against federal interference). The federal courts must, of course, reach
their own judgments as to the adequacy of the state interest which is alleged as the basis
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has also been increasingly recognized. It follows that a state or local
agency to which a particular matter of state interest has been entrusted
may have standing in a federal court in behalf of that interest, to chal-
lenge federal agency action." 6
The capacity of a state, local unit of government, or specialized state
agency to represent an interest in federal proceedings is limited to in-
terests that are differentiated from nation-wide interests which have been
committed wholly to federal consideration and determination. Conse-
quently a state lacks standing to litigate in behalf of its citizens in opposi-
tion to federal welfare expenditures" 7 or, in behalf of federal taxpayers
or of voters within its boundaries, to challenge federal actions allegedly
harmful to them," 8 or to seek to protect those of its inhabitants who are
subject to call for federal military service against allegedly unconstitu-
tional demands upon them.119 The State or one of its agencies may, on
the other hand, vindicate in federal court the relevant interests of its
inhabitants who are users of federally regulated utility services, if their
needs are distinguishable from those of users elsewhere and have not
been committed wholly to federal protection.'" The inhabitants collec-
of standing in those courts. The state cannot, merely by providing for state representation
of a private interest, transform it for this purpose into a governmental one. Oklahoma
ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. La. 1958). See also note 108 supra.
116 See Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1145-53 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. deided sub nom. National Ass'n of Regulatory Comm'rs v. FCC, 423 U.S.
836 (1975); Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967), note 108 supra
(case involved intervention; but held also, state banking commissioner has standing to
sue, based on the state's interest, recognized by Congress, in maintaining the banking
industry structure provided by its laws, as against impairment by action of the Comptroller
of the Currency); Leuchtold v. Camp, 405 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1969) (standing in behalf
of the same interest recognized by virtue of the Administrative Procedure Act); Wood v.
National Ry. Passenger Corp., 341 F. Supp. 908 (D. Conn. 1972). Cf. Jackson v. First
Nat'l Bank, 349 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1965); Idaho v. First Sec. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 274
(D. Idaho 1970). The standing in a federal court of a state-created local unit of govern-
ment may be recognized in opposition to the state itself, on the basis of federal recognition
of its interest in relation to federal statutory matters. See Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (intervention by a city in a suit challenging federal-state public
assistance arrangements, because of fiscal consequences to the city).
Apart from such federal recognition for specific purposes, the state controls the role
in litigation of its officials and subordinate units. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp.
462 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified & aff'd, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1146 (1974), applying the principle of Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933);
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 933, 441 (opinion of the Court), 466 (separate opinion) (1939).
117 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).
118South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (voters); Florida v.
Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927) (taxpayers).
19 Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (semble); Massachusetts v. Laird,
451 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1971).
2 0 See Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied sub nom. National Ass'n of Regulatory Comm'rs v. FCC, 423 U.S. 836 (1975);
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tively, one supposes, may be similarly represented as subjects of regu-
lation or as participants in the economy in some distinctive way, if their
interests differ in identifiable respects from those of persons in the nation
as a whole and, again, have not been entrusted wholly to federal auth-
ority.1"1 The standing of municipal governments to challenge state
agency decisions in behalf of their inhabitants in the state courts is
similarly confined to the representation of interests which are separable
from those for which the state agency involved is exclusively respon-
sible.122 Fine distinctions are involved in these situations; yet adherence
by means of them to prescribed allocations of government responsibility
is not unimportant.
Taxpayer Suits
The taxpayer interest, as has been noticed,"' is basically an economic
interest in securing and conserving government assets or limiting the
costs of government to legitimate ones, so as to hold taxpayer burdens
to proper levels. This interest is narrower than the citizen interest in
keeping governmental action legal for a variety of reasons. Typically,
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. v. FPC, 436 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Public Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y. v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964); Detroit
v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); Wisconsin v.
FPC, 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S.
672 (1954). Compare Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States, 356 F.2d 236, 241
(9th Cir. 1966) (dictum that state agency lacks standing to assert procedural rights of
state citizens in federal agency proceedings); San Juan County v. Russell, 340 F. Supp.
1006 (D. Utah 1971) (county lacks standing in behalf of citizens with respect to federal
public lands policy); Jersey City v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1950)
(interest of local residents in interstate transit fares is wholly entrusted to the ICC and
City lacks standing to challenge its action).12 1 Kelley v. Butz, 404 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Mich. 1975); National Indus. Traffic League
v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 456 (D.D.C. 1975). Doubts expressed by the court in
Pearce v. Freeman, 238 F. Supp. 947, 955 (E.D. La. 1965), as to the standing of a state
commissioner of argiculture to represent the interests of state dairy farmers in opposition
to a federal marketing order which preempted a differing state order, appear to be well
founded. The standing of a local governmental unit by reason of a proprietary interest
or function of its own should be evident under most statutes. See, e.g., City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670-72 (9th Cir. 1975).
122 Town of Milford v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 139 Conn. 677, 96 A.2d 806
(1953) (town represents welfare of inhabitants in challenging the commissioner's licensing
of a gasoline filling station); Town of Sudbury v. Department of Pub. Util., 351 Mass.
214, 218 N.E.2d 415 (1966) (same as to location of power line); Town of Wilmington v.
Department of Pub. Util., 340 Mass. 432, 165 N.E.2d 99 (1960) (same as to discontinuance
of passenger station); Town of East Ridge v. City of Chattanooga, 191 Tenn. 551, 235
S.W.2d 30 (1950) (town lacks standing in relation to bus rates fixed by neighboring city
under statutory power and extending into the territory of the town); County of Bergen
v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 23 N.J. 303, 160 A.2d 810 (1960); cf. City of New York v.
New York Tel. Co., 261 U.S. 312 (1923). As to the standing of the state as parens patriae
to challenge the actions of local authorities, see Pennsylvania v. Flaberty, 404 F. Supp. 1022
(W.D. Pa. 1975).
123See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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state court decisions and those of the federal courts with respect to the
territories employ this economic test in determining taxpayer standing
to challenge agency action.124 Nevertheless the interest of taxpayer plain-
tiffs is often in policy issues rather than in any cost to them as tax-
payers or loss to the government which they might have to make up,
stemming from a challenged course of action. 5 Hence the foregoing
reasoning unrealistically gives them standing which others equally con-
cerned may not have, if but only if economic consequences to them as
taxpayers can be identified. 2 '
In relation to the governmental economics involved, taxpayer suits
concern a variety of agency actions which may be challenged as detri-
mental: (1) allegedly illegal expenditures draining or endangering the
124Reynolds v. Wade, 249 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1957); Henderson v. McCormick, 70
Ariz. 19, 215 P.2d 608 (1950); Bryan v. City of Miami, 56 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1951); Daly
v. Madison County, 378 IlL 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941); Price v. City of Mattoon, 364
Ill. 512, 4 N.E.2d 850 (1936); Funk v. Mullan Contracting Co., 197 Md. 192, 78 A.2d 632
(1951); Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Ass'n v. Board of License Comm'rs, 171
Md. 426, 189 A. 209 (1937); Richards v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 319 Mass. 672, 67
N.E.2d 583 (1946) (taxpayers' suit under limiting statute); Hinds County v. Johnson,
133 Miss. 591, 98 So. 95 (1923); Badgett v. Rogers, 436 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. 1969); S.D.
Realty Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n, 15 Wis. 2d 15, 112 N.W.2d 177 (1971).
125 Reynolds v. Wade, 249 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1957) (challenge to use of territorial
funds for transporting pupils to non-public schools); Cusack v. Howlett, 44 Ill. 2d 233,
254 N.E.2d 506 (1969) (challenge to legislative investigation of alleged judicial impropriety);
Turkowich v. Board of Trustees, 11 Ill. 2d 460, 143 N.E.2d 229 (1957) (challenge, sup-
ported by private broadcasters, to use of state university funds for television station);
Funk v. Mullan Contracting Co., 197 Md. 192, 78 A.2d 632 (1951) (challenge by contractor-
taxpayers to statute requiring payment of prevailing rate of wages by contractors with
the government); Golding v. Armstrong, 281 Miss. 899, 97 So. 2d 379 (1957) (challenge
to compensation of legislator for services in a second state position); S.D. Realty Co. v.
Sewerage Comm'n, 15 Wis. 2d 15, 112 N.W.2d 177 (1971) (challenge by owner of shipping
center to expenditure benefiting competing center).
126In Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), doubts as to
taxpayer standing under an economic test were put aside, but prevailed in the Supreme
Court, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), in relation to its own jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.
In Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), the Court entertained an appeal by
taxpayers and others which, as to taxpayer standing, is indistinguishable from Doremus,
but as to the other appellants presented other issues. See the discussion in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), which
has sometimes been characterized as in conflict with Doremus on the standing issue, the
taxpayer plaintiff was an appellee in the Supreme Court and a clear controversy existed
between the appellants who had an economic interest in the outcome as salaried teachers
whose retention of their jobs was at issue, and Oklahoma officials who were also appellees.
For other instances of both sufficiency and insufficiency of taxpayer economic interest in
challenges to the validity of statutes or ordinances on largely non-economic grounds see
Annot., 174 A.L.R. 549, 555-68 (1948). Some statutes confer standing on taxpayers to
challenge official action or inaction having little or no relation to fiscal burdens. See the
instances cited in Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YAm L.J. 895, 903 n.42
(1960); Smith v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 329 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1964), followed
in Smith v. Virgin Islands, 329 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1964), and Holmes v. Virgin Islands, 370
F. Supp. 715 (D.V.L 1974).
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general treasury ;127 (2) expenditures under an allegedly unconstitutional
law or an otherwise invalid arrangement which also provides income
that will fail if the challenge is successful ;"'s (3) illegality for procedural
or other limited reasons of expenditures for necessary purposes, the cur-
ing of which will not prevent equivalent expenditures from being under-
taken; 129 (4) allegedly illegal expenditure of money or alienation of
property involving only segregated funds or assets to which the plain-
tiff's taxes have no relation ;180 (5) failure to collect taxes allegedly due
or to secure needed assets allegedly belonging to the government;...
and (6) alienation of government property or diversion of property
reserved for specific, necessary uses, with or without full financial com-
pensation to the government."' 2
Among the foregoing situations, the first and fifth involve actual
or threatened deprivation to the taxpayers as such; the second and sixth
could involve similar deprivation if the offsetting revenues under the
127See cases cited, note 125 supra; Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Funk v. Mullan Contracting Co., 197 Md. 192, 78 A.2d 632 (1951); Sears v. Trea-
surer & Receiver General, 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.2d 621 (1957); Arens v. Village of Rogers,
240 Minn. 386, 61 N.W.2d 508 (1953). In such matters as nonobservance of statutory
procedures for letting public contracts, danger of loss to the treasury, rather than demon-
strated loss in the individual instance, suffices as the basis of taxpayer interest. See Waszen
v. Atlantic City, 1 N.J. 272, 63 A.2d 255 (1949).
128Krebs v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N.E.2d 761 (1944) (standing to challenge
statute regulating practice of professional engineering, which provided for license fees
probably in excess of costs of regulation recognized); Hinds County v. Johnson, 133 Miss.
591, 98 So. 95 (1923) (standing to challenge grade crossing elimination for which the
county was to be reimbursed held lacking).
129 Cf. Daly v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 371-74, 38 N.E.2d 160, 167-69 (1941)
(success of taxpayer action would result in greater expenditures than those attacked).
180 Price v. City of Mattoon, 364 Ill. 512, 4 N.E.2d 850 (1963); Crews v. Beattie,
197 S.C. 32, 14 S.E.2d 351 (1941). Cf. State ex rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing
Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 366, 123 N.E.2d 1 (1954).1 31 Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n v. Timmons, 252 Iowa 163, 105 N.W.2d 209
(1960); State ex rel. Miller v. Price, 3 Ohio St. 2d 177, 209 N.E.2d- 578 (1965) (statutory
mandamus); State ex rel. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co. v. Boyett, 183 Okla. 49, 80 P.2d 201 (1938).
Cf. Stietenroth v. Managhan, 239 Miss. 376, 123 So. 2d 534 (1960) (statutory mandamus
at suit of taxpayer does not lie).
182 Alienation or diversion of property with less than full compensation for the
interest lost involves the same kind of injury to the taxpayer interest as other losses to
the treasury. Watson v. City of East Point, 223 Ga 185, 154 S.E.2d 15 (1967); Heilig
Bros. Co. v. Kohler, 366 Pa. 72, 76 A.2d 613 (1950). Nevertheless, in Booth v. Metro-
politan Sanitary Dist., 79 Ill. App. 2d 310, 224 N.E.2d 591 (1967), taxpayers were held
to lack standing to challenge transactions relating to property for either this reason or
an alternative reason, asserted in some cases, that taxpayers have an equitable interest in
the preservation of public uses to which particular government property may have been
dedicated (cf. Harvey v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 101 Fla. 273, 133 So. 868 (1931);
Matson v. Town of Caledonia, 200 Wis. 43, 227 N.W. 298 (1929)). This restrictive view
as to the second basis of standing and probably as to the first basis also was abandoned
in Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 341, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970). The
resulting taxpayer interest, however, was held not to be a property interest protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Booth v. LeMont Mfg. Corp., 440
F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 916 (1971).
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challenged statute or compensation for property fail to equal the loss
sought to be prevented; and the third and fourth do not involve economic
deprivation to the taxpayers. As might be expected, a court which pur-
ports to apply the economic theory of taxpayer standing may occasionally
depart from it in order to decide an issue which needs to be decided in
the public interest, 8' as may well be the case in the second kind of situ-
ation."84 In the third and fourth types of situation, although the tax-
payer economic interest does not support standing, 85 a broader tax-
payer interest in preventing all illegal disbursement of funds or dissipation
of assets by the government, which may be characterized as economic in
a different sense or as identical to the citizen interest, is recognized in
a number of jurisdictions."8" Such a merging of interests, together with
the frequent avowed or unavowed non-economic motivation of taxpayer
plaintiffs, causes numerous references to be made to a merged category
of citizen-taxpayer proceedings.
Taxpayer standing on one or another of the foregoing theories is
more frequently recognized by court decisions or by statute with rela-
tion to the actions of local authorities than with reference to the actions
of agents of the general government.117 The reasons lie partly in the
somewhat larger relative share the individual taxpayer has in the trea-
sury of a local unit of government than in that of the general govern-
ment; partly in a fictional analogy which is sometimes drawn between
municipal taxpayers and shareholders in private corporations who pos-
sess proprietary interests in relation to corporate affairs;... and partly in
a diminished judicial reluctance, when local authorities are concerned,
188 Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 71 A.2d 474, 483 (1950) (court, adhering
generally to the view that taxpayer standing requires tax consequences from challenged
actions, determines emergency clause issue which involves no such consequences).
184 Compare the two cases cited in note 128 supra.
285 See cases cited notes 129 & 130 supra.
186 Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 267-70, 486 P.2d 1242, 1248-50 (1971) (statutory
action, but principle more broadly stated); Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401,
290 P.2d 237 (1955); McGinty v. Pickering, 180 Ga. 447, 179 S.E. 358 (1935); Haines v.
Burlingion County Bridge Comm'n, 1 N.J. Super. 163, 170-73, 63 A.2d 284, 287-88 (1949),
cited with approval, Driscoll v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 8 N.J. 433, 478, 86
A.2d 201, 222 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952) (See also Haines v. Burlington
County Bridge Comm'n, 8 N.J. 539, 86 A.2d 236 (1952)); Faden v. Philadelphia Housing
Authority, 424 Pa. 273, 227 A.2d 619 (1967). Cf. Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill.
2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 232 Ore. 238, 245, 366
P.2d 533, 537 (1961).
187 Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 Y=.L L.J. 895 (1960).
18 8 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923); Mauldin v. City Council,
33 S.C. 1, 11 S.E. 434 (1890); Victoria v. Village of Muscoda, 228 Wis. 455, 279 N.W. 663
(1938); J. DnLox, MinciPAL CoRpoRAZoxs §§ 1579-87 (5th ed. 1911). Originally appli-
cable to taxpayers to incorporated municipalities, this analogy has been conveniently ex-
tended to those in other kinds of units of local government. See, e.g., Lamar v. Croft, 73
S.C. 407, 53 S.E. 540 (1906).
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to interfere with government operations, because of the subordinate
status of local units and of a somewhat greater need to check malad-
ministration in them than in the general government.39 The standing,
on some suitable ground, of state taxpayers to challenge state agency
action is, however, recognized in most states, but not in some. 140 Non-
resident taxpayers may share in taxpayer standing based on economic
grounds, including not only increased taxes but also, in some cases, loss
in the value of a taxpayer's property, allegedly stemming from the chal-
lenged governmental action.141
The standing of federal taxpayers to challenge federal action was
rejected altogether by the Supreme Court because of reluctance to inter-
fere with the concerns of the coordinate branches of government and
because of the relative minuteness of each taxpayer's interest in federal
funding,'42 until the decision of Flast v. Cohen in 1968.1"' There, fed-
eral taxpayer standing was upheld in relation to a challenge to the use
of the spending power in alleged violation of the clause of the first
amendment forbidding "an establishment of religion," because that
clause is specifically applicable to the spending power and a "nexus"
exists between the concern a taxpayer has in holding that power in
check--despite the minuteness of his interest-and the constitutional
protection he invokes.
The actual decision in Flast related only to the establishment clause,
which the framers of the first amendment envisaged in part as limiting
the use of government money; but the reasoning embraces any additional
'59 The courts are empowered to declare municipal ordinances adopted by virtue of
implied powers to be void on the ground of unreasonableness--a wider authority than
exists with respect to statutes or, seemingly, with respect to most agency actions. See 2
J. DILLON, MuNiciAL CORPORAIONS § 589 (5th ed. 1911). As to the origin in municipal
corruption of the New York statutes authorizing taxpayer suits to enjoin threatened
illegal acts of local officials see 4 J. Dn.LoN, MuNicrPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1578, 1585;
Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 898-99 (1960).
140 See Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YAIZ L.J. 895, 900-902
(1960); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 108-09 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). This issue
has been prominently before the New York Court of Appeals which by a narrow division
has adhered to the view that taxpayer suits, along with citizen suits, may not be brought
to challenge state agency action. Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 439, 271 N.E.2d 530
(1971). But see Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945), where the im-
portance of the issue sought to be litigated led the court to disregard the question of
standing. The issue was unnecessarily raised in a contemporaneous case involving a tax-
payer's challenge to the method employed in valuing his property for tax purposes, Bloom
v. Mayor of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 952, 271 N.E.2d 919 (1971). See Note, New York and
the Non-Hokfeldian Plaintiff; Taxpayers' Standing to Sue the State, 36 ALB. L. Ray.
203 (1971).
141 Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 415 P.2d 769 (1966); Zuckerman
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 160, 128 A.2d 325 (1956).
14 2 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
148 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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constitutional limitations that apply "specifically" to the spending
power.' The Court's formulation supplies at best an arbitrary basis
for distinguishing cases; for, as Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in dis-
sent, realistically the taxpayer interest attaches to all federal expenditures
and to restrictions on the purposes for which they may be made, not just
to those which rest on the spending power. Many expenditures, more-
over, such as those on the postal service, on government-owned trans-
portation, on the elimination of social evils in interstate commerce, on
social security, on the development of atomic energy, and on preservation
of the environment, rest in varying degree on the power to tax and spend
for the general welfare as well as on other powers of Congress.
What, then, of federal taxpayer standing to invoke constitutional
limitations on the kinds of measures just suggested? What, further, of
taxpayer standing to challenge alleged excess of statutory rather than
constitutional authority on the part of spending agencies, especially
when the statutory provisions invoked are designed to protect the trea-
sury? Some lower-court decisions, including one affirmed by the Supreme
Court, have applied the principle of Flast v. Cohen by denying standing
with respect to expenditures that were thought to rest on powers other
than the spending power 45 or where an exercise of the spending power
was challenged as an invasion of state authority rather than as otherwise
forbidden. 4" Other decisions have recognized taxpayer standing in situ-
ations similar to that in Flast.47 In two companion cases the majority
of the Supreme Court rejected contentions that taxpayers as such had
standing to secure judicial enforcement of constitutional provisions other
than restrictions on the use of the spending clause, which were claimed
to have the specific purpose of safeguarding the federal fisc (as clearly
the provision involved in the first of the two cases did have), along with
144 The Court adduced historical evidence that in providing against an "establishment of
religion" the framers were consciously concerned with prohibiting governmental subsidies
to religion, 392 U.S. at 102-03, and specifically reserved the question whether other, sim-
ilarly applicable limitations on the spending power exist, id. at 105. Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring specially, stressed the consequent narrowness of the issue decided; Mr. Justice
Fortas, also concurring, stressed the importance of so limiting the scope of the decision.
Id. at 114-15.
'
45Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 920 (1971); Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975); Velvel v. Nixon,
415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) (military expenditures);
Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 901 (1971)
(salary increases for members of Congress).
14SLamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202 (loth Cir. 1972) (highway beautification law,
attributable also to the commerce power).
147 Protestants & Other Americans United v. Watson, 407 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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other possible purposes. 4 s Taxpayer standing to invoke statutory pro-
visions allegedly imposing taxes on others or safeguarding the expendi-
ture of funds has been denied,' 49 in the absence of a statutory bestowal
of standing.'50 Citizen standing, if it were bestowed by the Administrative
Procedure Act' or some other statute,15 2 would take the place of tax-
payer standing.
Organizational Representation of Broad Interests
Representation of the general public interest or the common interest
of numerous persons, in challenges to agency action as well as other
litigation, is aided if established or ad hoc organizations of persons con-
cerned with those interests can, as representatives of their members and
perhaps of others similarly situated, take part directly. The organizations
in effect pool the resources of their members in behalf of a common
interest, to finance litigation which otherwise might not be feasible,
leading to judgments which will, as the case may be, either benefit the
members or bind them by an adverse outcome. An established organiza-
tion may also have standing in its own interest when agency action deters
membership participation-e.g., by disclosure of names to a hostile public
---or impairs certain organizational activities, such as the provision of
services to members or to other persons, by prohibiting the activities or
attaching conditions to them. Apart from these kinds of litigation by
organizations acting in their own names, class actions provide a means
whereby persons having common interests which are litigable, perhaps
aided by organizations to which they belong, may join together as plain-
tiffs. Developments have occurred which expand all the foregoing means
for a plurality of people acting together to secure judicial review of
agency action.
148 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
149Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1975); Civic
Awareness of America, Ltd. v. Richardson, 387 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Lind v.
Staats, 289 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (competitive bidding requirements in relation
to federal projects). But see Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
15o The court in Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in
relation to the standing of a disappointed bidder to challenge the bid procedures that were
followed, found a basis in the Administrative Procedure Act, note 44 and text at notes
71-73, supra, but suggested also that the rationale of Flast v. Cohen supports the standing
of persons (including taxpayers?) injured by agency violations of statutes even though no
statutory provision for review is made. 424 F.2d at 871-72. See also West Coast Constr.
Co. v. Oceano Sanitary Dist., 311 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (same as to interest of
a creditor of a governmental unit, said by the court to be more immediate than the
interest of a taxpayer).
151 See notes 71-75 & text accompanying.
152 See notes 79-80 & text accompanying.
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Enlargement in recent years of the standing of organizations to
represent their members in the federal courts in relation to agency action
has been especially important It began with recognition under varying
circumstances of standing on the part of trade associations and similar
organizations which had as a central purpose the furtherance of the
economic interest of their members,' and spread from these to estab-
lished' 4 and ad hoc 5 5 groups which were formed to promote non-
158 Merchants & Mfrs' Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 231 Fed. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1915),
rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 178 (1916); Land O'Lakes Creameries v. McNutt, 132
F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1943); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2n 694, 712-13 (2d Cir. 1943),
vacated as possibly moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462
(D.C. Cir. 1951); American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 364 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1960);
National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963); State Chartered
Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Lodge 1858, American
Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970); National Automatic
Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Virgin Islands
Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 465 F.2d 1272 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (standing of organization assumed on the basis of that of
its members). See also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); and the same cases in the district courts, Abbott
Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855, 860-61 (D. Del. 1964), and Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Celebrezzi, 235 F. Supp. 648, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). But see Utah Citizens Rate
Ass'n v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D. Utah 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 549 (1961),
and Teamsters Joint Council 40 v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 301, 307-08 (W.D.
Pa. 1965).
154NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 523 (1960); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972);
Alston v. School Bd., 112 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693 (1940);
Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
936 (1954); National Hells Canyon Ass'n v. FPC, 237 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1965); Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 998, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d
770, 777 (8th Cir. 1966); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937
(2d Cir. 1968); Citizens Assn of Georgetown v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 3259 M Street, Inc. v. Citizens Ass'n, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Citizens Comm. for
the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Washington
Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nor. National Ass'n of Regulatory Comm'rs v. FCC, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); Pennsylvania
Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Cape
May County Chapter, Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971);
Seafarers Int'l Union v. Weinberger, 363 F. Supp. 1053 (D.D.C. 1973); Percy v. Brennan,
384 F. Supp. 800, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Cf. Conservation Society v. Volpe, 345 F.
Supp. 761 (D. Vt 1972).
155 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (issue of standing
not raised; see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, n.7 (1972)); Nashville 1-40 Steering
Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Road
Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Powelton Civic Home
Owners Ass'n v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 827 (E.D. Pa.
1968); Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D.
Cal. 1968); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Citizens Comm. for
the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 US. 949 (1970).
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economic interests, welfare, or personal concerns of their members. The
courts may, however, as a prerequisite to according standing to an
organization in a representative capacity, determine whether its author-
ization to represent those for whom it purports to speak and its capacity
to conduct the litigation adequately justify recognizing it. 5 '
In the leading Supreme Court case recognizing the standing of a
non-trade organization to represent its members, the decision on this
point was placed on the ground that deterrents to action by the members
themselves were present, supplemented by threatened injury to an interest
of the organization in maintaining its membership.'57 The presence of
similar factors has contributed to decisions to the same effect in some
of the later cases, 5 ' and the absence of these factors results at times in
decisions that deny standing which is sought on the simple ground of
organizational purpose to serve the relevant interests of members.'59
In other instances this simple ground of decision suffices, in accordance
with a dominant trend.8 0 A slight question remains whether the wording
of the principal jurisdictional statute authorizing federal district court
suits "by any person" to vindicate civil rights "of citizens or of all
156 Cf. Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113 (1933); Citizens Comm.
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
499 (1970); Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (D.
Minn. 1970), subsequent judgment rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 497 F.2d 849 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
157 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-460 (1958).
15B Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1966); Elk Grove Fire-
fighters Local v. Willis, 391 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Robinson v. Conlisk, 385 F.
Supp. 529 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
159 Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. State of California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971); Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. Wallace, 362 F. Supp. 682, 684
(M.D. Ala. 1973); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1346
(E.D.N.Y. 1969).
160 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (semble); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473
F.2d 1090, 1099 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); National Automatic
Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Seafarers
Int'l Union v. Weinberger, 363 F. Supp. 1053 (D.D.C. 1973); State v. Direct Sellers Ass'n,
108 Ariz. 165, 494 P.2d 361 (1972); Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
34 Cal. App. 3d 17, 109 Cal. Reptr. 724 (1973); White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City
of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d 473, 476-78 (Mich. App. 1970); Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v.
Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971). Contra, Citizens Planning
& Housing Ass'n v. County Executive of Baltimore County, 273 Md. 333, 345, 329 A.2d 681,
687-88 (1974); Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County v. District Title Insurance Co., 224
Md. 474, 168 A.2d 395 (1961). In many instances the standing of organizational parties
is not contested. See, e.g., the cases listed in Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 777
(8th Cir. 1966). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), where the standing of
the Club was denied because the alleged injury to the interest it represented was not
sufficiently direct, the Court stated broadly that "[i]t is clear that an organization whose
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review."
405 U.S. at 739. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) ("Even in the absence
of injury to itself, an organization may have standing solely as the representative of its
members.").
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persons in the United States" against conduct which impairs these rights
under color of state law, permits such suits to be brought by organiza-
tions solely in behalf of their members. '
The opportunity for membership organizations to challenge agency
actions in court in behalf of members and often of others as well has
been enlarged by recognition of the status of organizations to institute
class actions in behalf of members. Although technically an organization
is not a member of a class into which its members may fall, so as to
entitle it to sue in behalf of the class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the dominant view seems now to be that it may substi-
tute for those members by initiating a class action in their place.'6
Alternatively, it may be a co-plaintiff, not claiming to represent the
class, with members or others who institute a class action or with mem-
bers who sue individually. 63 When the members of an organization fall
into a class extending beyond the membership, which has a common
interest, the court may require that, through individual co-plaintiffs,
an organizational suit in behalf of members become a class action, so
as to embrace all interested persons. 6
4
As a result of the foregoing decisions and despite some remaining
technicalities, membership organizations have effectively become "the
collective embodiment" of their members6 5 for purposes of standing to
161Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1146 (1974); National Organization for Women v. Goodman, 374 F. Supp. 247, 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Where, however, as is often the case, the challenged statute or agency
action injures both the relevant interests of organizational members and correlative activi-
ties or interests of the organization itself, the standing of the organization to sue to redress
the resulting Civil Rights violation in its own behalf and in behalf of its members is
established. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 819 n-13 (1974); id. at 829 (concurring
opinion); Percy v. Brennan, 384 F. Supp. 800, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See the discussion
in Elk Grove Firefighters Local v. Willis, 391 F. Supp. 487, 490-91 (N.D. Ill. 1974), note
158 supra.
162Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968);
Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 777-78 (8th Cir. 1966); English v. Town of
Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99,
110 (D. Alaska 1971) (class seemingly viewed as confined to members of the organization
suing); Local 186, Int'l Pulp, Sulphite & Paper M Workers v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Merchants & Manufacturers Traffic
Ass'n v. United States, 231 Fed. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1915), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S.
178 (1916) (suit by association in behalf of its members viewed as a form of class action);
Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433, 434 (N.D. Cal.
1968). Compare Rock Drilling Laborers' Local Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d
687, 693 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955); Organized Migrants for Com-
munity Action v. James Archer Smith Hospital, 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Clark
v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
163 See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, n.10, 819 n.13 (1974).
16ASee National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'
65 Sedier, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71
YmAr L.J. 599, 652 (1962).
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invoke remedies in the federal system and in most states, once the
standing of the members, the relevance of the organization's purposes
to their interest which is asserted, and the competence of the organiza-
tion to act in behalf of that interest appear.166 The standing of organiza-
tions in their own behalf when organizational interests are at stake has
also been recognized increasingly.16T
In addition to the common representation or joinder in litigation of
individuals possessing identical interests, which these developments fa-
cilitate, the relation of an interest of one person to a connected but not
identical interest of another may provide a basis for the one, without
joinder of the other, to present both interests in challenging an injury
to both (ordinarily without res judicata effect as to the other person's
interest) in suits over agency action. In these situations the basic theory
that standing rests on injury to an interest of the person claiming it is
augmented. 6 Such situations arise when one person has responsibility
relating to the other's interest, as school authorities may have in rela-
tion to the interests of students,6 9 or when the two interests are factually
connected. 70 They may be connected because of a professional or ad-
166 In addition to cases previously cited, see Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d
1233 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated as moot, 500 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1974) ; North City Areawide
Council v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. to later decision denied, 406
U.S. 963 (1972); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1016-18 (5th
Cir. 1968); Morningside-Lenox Park As'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132, 137 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Federation of Homemakers v. Hardin, 328 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1971); Coalition
for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742, 748 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See also
Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't., 446 F.2d 1013, 1019 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
16T NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41 (Burton and Douglas, JJ.), 142-43 (Black, J.), 159-60
(Frankfurter, J.), 198-99 (Reed, J., Vinson, Ch. J., and Minton, J.) (Jackson, J., at 184,
regarded the standing of the organizations in their own behalf as "very dubious" under
the circumstances) (see also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
389-90 (1950)); National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 777 (8th Cir. 1965); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965); National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal voluntarily dismissed,
400 U.S. 801 (1970).
168 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1975); Tyler v. Judges of Court of Regis-
tration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609-13 (1973).
169 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956) (suit against non-official
wrongdoers). Cf. Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1975).
'
7 0 I.T. & T. Corp. v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Del. 1975). An addendum
to the theory, often stated, is that circumstances should render it "difficult or impossible" to
vindicate the interest of the absent person directly. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan,
dissenting, in Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1974), quoting from
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1965), the leading authority to this effect. Difficulty
is a matter of degree, however, and it is not at all clear that the stated circumstance has
actually been present in some of the cases where it has been alluded to or that it has
played a significant role in determining decisions. Cf. further Singleton v. Wulff, 96
S. Ct. 2868, 2871 (1976).
[Vol. 51':817
1976] PREREQUISITES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 957
visory relationship, such as that between physician and patient, or be-
cause a common concern is involved, such as student-faculty concern
over racial desegregation of faculty in schools, the interest of members
of different races in racial desegregation in housing, or varying interests
in the dissemination and use of a given body of information.1 1' Often
the interest of members of an organization in, for example, not having
their membership known or continuing to enjoy the benefits of their
association, which may be threatened or impaired by agency action, is
linked to an interest of the organization in maintaining its roster and
funds or continuing its services. When such is the case, the effects on
the members as third persons may supplement the representative character
of the organization as a basis for standing on its part to challenge the
action in court.'
7 2
Miscellaneous Aspects of Standing
In addition to the most frequently litigated aspects of the law of
standing which have been discussed, several rather technical features of
the subject require mention. These involve the questions (1) of whether
standing differs for would-be plaintiffs, defendants, and intervenors,
respectively; (2) whether standing relates to jurisdiction; and (3)
whether in certain instances standing is a matter of federal or of state
law.
In the bulk of instances in which standing to challenge agency
action becomes an issue, the challenger is the plaintiff or petitioner
seeking review of the action. It may make a difference when, instead, he
is the defendant in court, seeking to defeat an enforcement action against
him. The right of the defendant to be a party in court and the over-all
17 1 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Parkview Heights Corp. v.
City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1972); Freeman & Bass, P.A. v. State
of N.J. Comm'n of Investigation, 359 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (D.N.J. 1973L, vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 486 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1973); Sisters of Providence v. City
of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 401 (N.D. IM. 1971); Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873,
877-78, 484 P.2d 1345, 1348 (1971). Compare United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
20-24 (1960); United States v. Taranowski, 467 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). Even when
the interests are not factually related but are threatened in the same manner by a statute
or regulation restrictive of constitutional freedom, one whose interest may not, on the
merits, be entitled to protection can challenge the measure on the ground of its effect
on others. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 486 (1965); Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973).
Compare Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759-61 (1974). See generally Sedler, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Ius Tertii in the Supreme Court, 1 YA=m L.J. 599 (1962). See also
Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 403 and (Bazelon, Ch. J.,
dissenting) 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
172NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), note 157 supra.
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existence of a case or controversy are not in question in such an instance;
the question relates, rather, to competence to raise particular issues de-
fensively. The consequences to the defendant of a denial of standing to
raise such an issue, involving a liability which otherwise might be
avoided, militate in favor of permitting the issue to be raised, 178 often
with reference to some of the same considerations as are relevant to
standing to sue.' 74 Similar questions may arise in a proceeding to re-
view an order, which the plaintiff or petitioner has or would have stand-
ing to bring on proper grounds, with respect to particular grounds which
he advances ;17- here too the case or controversy aspect of standing is
hardly a factor. The relevant considerations in both kinds of situations
relate to the possible nonreviewability of the issue, the ability of one in
the position of the would-be challenger to handle the particular issue
if it is reviewable, the availability of alternative ways to secure a decision
of the issue, the social importance of the issue,176 and the appropriateness
in relation to the separation of powers of the court's entering into the
matter.
The problem is similar when intervention in a pending judicial re-
view proceeding is sought ;177 but intervention usually depends on statutes
or rules of court other than those which determine the standing of
primary parties. 78 If intervention can be had by "any party in in-
173 Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (defense to a prosecution
under an allegedly invalid statute); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (defense on constitutional grounds to enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenent), with United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-24 (1960).
174 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-31 (1961). Compare the treatment
of challenges to statutes by plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie,
262 U.S. 404 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923).
175 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 107 (1946); Akers v. Resor,
339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
176See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 244, 257-60 (1953). In NLRB v. Highland
Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951), the question was whether an employer, against
whom the Board brought proceedings to enforce an unfair labor practice order, could
defend on the ground that the union which had brought charges originally was ineligible
to do so because its officers had not filed non-Communist oaths required by statute. In
holding that the employer could, the Court stressed the undesirability of causing the
courts to enforce orders tainted by illegality. See also Nuclear Data, Inc. v. AEC, 344 F.
Supp. 719 (N.D. Il. 1972), where a potential user of the technology covered by a patent
was held to have standing to challenge the Atomic Energy Commission's assignment to a
private assignee of the government's rights in the patent, partly because of the concern
of Congress in the Atomic Energy Act with developing the use of nuclear energy.
177 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510-17 (1975), where the court discusses
the standing of original plaintiffs and of would-be intervenors in the district court without
differentiation as to the determining considerations.
178 Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113, 120 (1933).
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terest,' 7 9 it will be governed by the same principles as apply under
statutes applicable to standing which are similarly worded; but different
wording or the absence of a specific prescription as to intervention
would lead to a determination that was differently based.' Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs intervention in the United
States District Courts. A growing number -of states are adopting the
same rule. Aside from recognition of unconditional rights of intervention
under some statutes, the Rule provides for intervention "as of right"
under criteria which require judicial interpretation, and for permissive
intervention in the appealable exercise of discretion by the courts, both
guided by standards contained in the Rule. The Rule emphasizes prac-
tical considerations in relation to both intervention as of right and per-
missive intervention.' A statute may inferentially preclude intervention
if the interest which the applicant for intervention wishes to advance
has been committed by the statute to another party, usually a government
agency.'
82
As is true of ripeness,'88 standing is commonly stated to be a matter
of jurisdiction, open to consideration by a court at any stage of a case. 84
The primary reason for this view is that standing of the party bringing
a suit is linked to the existence of a case or controversy 8 5 which is
179 Section 8 of the Review Act of 1950, 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1970), provides for inter-
vention by "persons whose interests are affected by the order of the agency," in addition to
appearance as of right by "any party in interest in the proceeding before the agency."
180 Cf. International Union, U.A.W. v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 210, 216-17 (1965);
Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 255 (1930).
181 Cf. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972); Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 528-31 (1971); SEC v. United States Realty Co., 310 U.S. 434, 458-60
(1940); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973); Bennett v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 437 F.2d 554
(5th Cir. 1970); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Hinds v. McNair, 153
Ind. App. 475, 287 N.E.2d 767 (1972); American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc.,
81 Wash. 2d 34, 499 P.2d 869 (1972); Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 518 (1970); Shapiro, Some
Thoughts on Intervention Before Agencies, Courts, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. Rav.
721 (1968).
18 2 Air Lines Stewards Ass'n v. American Air Lines, 455 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1972). Cf.
the opinion of McGowan, J., in Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
18 3 See Introduction supra.
184 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192, 197 (1956); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); FCC v.
National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239, 246 (1943). Ramspeck v. Federal Trial
Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953), is sometimes cited in support of the contrary
position that the issue of standing is not jurisdictional, because in that case the issue was
not raised by the parties and was therefore not decided by the Court. The issue related
to only one of the plaintiffs in the district court (respondents in the Supreme Court).
However, there were others whose standing was evident, the same counsel represented all
of the plaintiffs throughout, and the case was decided without trial on motions for
summary judgment. Consequently, nothing would have been changed by the Supreme
Court's consideration of the standing question, except for a dismissal as to one of the
respondents.
185 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 101 (1968).
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a prerequisite to jurisdiction. In addition, however, standing conven-
tionally requires that statutory or other legal recognition have been given
to the particular interest possessed by the plaintiff. " This element is
less clearly jurisdictional, because it does not involve the constitutional
power of the court but, rather, the court's authority to act by virtue
of the applicable body of law. Standing has been stated not to be juris-
dictional where this aspect of it has been the disputed element," 7 as it
was in the leading power company cases of the 1930's."'& It ought to be
determined at the inception of litigation in order to avoid as fully as
possible the burden of unfruitful judicial proceedings which the pre-
requisite of standing exists in part to forestall;"89 but its purpose can
still be partially fulfilled if the presence of standing remains open to
determination throughout a case, even though actual injury to an interest
of the challenger of agency action is sufficiently alleged and the question
is whether the interest is legally cognizable. Initiative to consider this
issue should continue in the court, along with opportunity for the parties
to raise it, whether or not the issue is characterized as jurisdictional. If
it does not involve power to act at all, it at least concerns the basis for
considering the claim to relief-not merely the merits of that claim as
they may emerge.
The existence of standing to challenge state action in a state court
on federal constitutional grounds has traditionally been regarded as
presenting a question of state law."'9 On review by the United States
Supreme Court, however, standing in that Court is determined by federal
188 See text at note 6 supra.
187 Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F.2d 986, 997-99 (4th Cir. 1936), 91
F.2d 665, 676 (4th Cir. 1937); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d
533 (1961).1 8 8 In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938), the Court decided,
302 U.S. at 478, that "petitioner has no such interest and will sustain no such legal
injury as enables it to maintain the present suits," and, at 482, "was without legal
standing to maintain the suit." The opinion also spoke of the absence of "a basis for
judicial relief" by way of injunction, id. at 481, and of the inability of the petitioner to
raise particular issues. Id. at 483. It also cited lower-court cases involving the same precise
question in which the standing issue was not treated as jurisdictional. Id. at 484. Among
other cases, the Court cited Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F.2d 986 (4th Cir.
1936), in which it was said that although standing "is frequently treated as going to the
question of jurisdiction, it really goes to the right of plaintiff to relief . . . ." Id. at 999.
Hence the court in Duke dismissed the case on the merits, rather than for want of juris-
diction. The Duke Power Co. decision was itself ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court,
302 U.S. 485 (1938), at the same time as Alabama Power Co. was decided, on the ground
that the opinion below "upon this branch of the case is in harmony with the views we have
just expressed." The Supreme Court may or may not have addressed itself to the question
of whether the standing issue was jurisdictional.
189 Cf. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 H]Av. L.
REv. 645 (1973).
19o Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
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requirements,' 9' as it is at the district court level when the same kinds of
cases are brought there.'92 The issue of standing in such cases in the
state courts could be regarded as a federal question,9 3 involving rights
under federal law, instead of as an issue under state law; but this view
has not been followed. Uniformity of decision would be desirably en-
hanced if it were.
The Developed Law of Standing
As it has evolved through the foregoing developments, the law of
standing to challenge agency action, particularly in the federal system,
displays several noteworthy features. One relates to the current criteria
for determining standing, compared to those which formerly prevailed;
the others relate to the scope of standing in several areas of litigation
over matters of large political, economic, and social significance.
The Data Processing decision and its companion case, Barlow v.
Collins, although they were decided under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act and construed its language, made a new start in basic
reasoning about standing to challenge agency action. Previously injury
to a "legal right"--i.e., under the Act, a "legal wrong"-and injury to
interests which statutes made the basis for instituting review proceed-
ings were alternative foundations of standing; the opinion in Data Pro-
cessing replaced both by "injury in fact" to an actual interest of the
person claiming standing, provided the interest falls "arguably within
the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the applicable statute
or constitutional guarantee."' 9 This formulation contains two, major
innovations in addition to its consolidation of the kinds of injury which
were separately stated before: (1) it asserts that to bestow standing,
191 Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 282 (1961); Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Columbus & Greenville R.R. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96 (1931);
Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138 (1903); Tyler v. judges of the Court of Registration, 179
U.S. 405 (1900).
192 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Williams v. Mayor & Council of Baltimore,
289 U.S. 36 (1933).
1'9 Cf. Harlan, J., dissenting, in Flast v. Cohen, at 392 U.S. 132.
194 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp., 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See notes 6, 17, 27, 186 supra & text
accompanying. The opinions do not distinguish clearly between the interest which is made
the basis of standing and the sometimes different interest sought to be protected, such as
a represented public interest; but clearly the Court did not intend to exclude standing
to engage in this type of representation. In the Data Processing and Barlow cases only
the interests of the plaintiffs themselves were involved. The "applicable statute" usually
is the one under which the agency operates, but may be another, such as the Environ-
mental Policy Act, which is applicable and from which the challenger's interest may stem.
See Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (ED. Va. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, Ely v.
Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
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an interest need only "arguably" be recognized by prior law;'95 and (2)
it bases statutory recognition of an interest, sufficient to bestow standing,
on regulation as well as on protection of the interest.
Except for this last innovation, the changes in the new formulation
are not analytically very significant. Under the previous formulation,
actual interests necessarily underlay the recognition of legal rights or
of legal injuries by constitutional provisions, the common law, or sta-
tutes, 96 upon which standing rested. The question of whether a right
existed or an injury had occurred was necessarily arguable in many
cases; and changing interpretations had already accommodated new
interests. Neither aspect of the law of standing has become inherently
different by virtue of Data Processing and Barlow. Regulation of an
interest by a statute as an element of standing to vindicate that interest
was newly included in the Data Processing formula, however, and the
scope of this addition is not yet apparent. Regulation is evident and adds
nothing as an element of the standing which is clearly apparent when
a statute authorizes actions bearing directly on interests, such as license
refusals or cease-and-desist orders ;197 but the scope of the term "regu-
lated" becomes doubtful when the interest relied on is only collaterally
affected by action involving a person other than its possessor, such as
a competitor, an employer or employee, or a supplier or buyer of goods
or services.' 98
In the Data Processing and Barlow cases themselves, the interests
195 The omission of any reference to recognition of an interest by the common law
ywas probably inadvertent. The new formulation also speaks of "zone of interest" instead
of simple "interest." No significant consequence has so far resulted from this change.
196 See notes 7-17 supra.
197Cf. Klanke v. Camp, 320 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1970), where the court, in
part, based its decision in favor of standing of applicants who had been denied a national
bank charter on the irrationality of denying it to them while according it, as other deci-
sions had done for a variety of reasons, to opponents of the issuance of such authoriza-
tions. A rationale based on the regulatory effect of the governing statute on the plaintiffs
seems equally applicable. The long-standing exclusion of the standing of producers to
challenge most kinds of provisions of orders under the Agricultural Marketing Agreements
Act, which arises by inference from the Act's bestowal of specified standing on handlers,
is inconsistent with the newer rationale, but rests on its own statutory foundation. Benson
v. Schofield, 236 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 976 (1957); United Milk
Producers of N.J. v. Benson, 225 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Inter-State Milk Producers
Coop. v. St. Clair, 314 F. Supp. 108 (D. Md. 1970); Uehlman v. Freeman, 267 F. Supp.
842 (E.D. Wis. 1967). Cf. Calhoun v. Freeman, 316 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
198 Cf. Walker v. Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 372 (1957) (dealer in automobile
trailers has standing, because of threatened loss of business, to challenge a municipal zoning
ordinance because it eliminated trailer parking in an area four miles way). Defendants in
actions to enforce agency orders were permitted to challenge the orders on the ground they
illegally imposed economic disadvantage on the challengers by favoring others who were
involved in the same orders, in NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951),
and United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1939). There the "regulated"
status of the defendants was evident.
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which were recognized as the basis of standing were, rather obliquely,
"protected" rather than "regulated" by the applicable statutes. In Data
Processing an association of independent firms engaged in selling data
processing services was held to have standing to challenge a ruling of
the Comptroller of the Currency that a national bank might engage in
the business of rendering the same kinds of services to customers, on
the ground that the Bank Service Corporation Act"' was intended to
prevent banks, as well as the bank service corporations with which it
dealt specifically, from engaging in this kind of venture. In Barlow the
plaintiffs were tenant farmers who were held to have standing to chal-
lenge a regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture which permitted them
to assign certain anticipated federal crop benefit payments to their lessors
as security for rent, thereby enlarging their capacity to incur debt
under economic pressure, despite a statutory purpose to have tenant
interests safeguarded. The economic realism of the two decisions in
relation to the facts involved, and the non-technical language of the new
formulation, are the main reasons for the liberalizing effect of these
cases on the law of standing.
Several later cases indicate the potential reach of statutory regula-
tion of an interest as a basis for standing. An employer denied access
to a supply of alien labor commuting across the Mexican border, by
restrictions placed upon the aliens to prevent their working for the
employer during a strike of his employees, was held entitled to challenge
the restrictions even though their purpose was to protect the striking
workers, without concern for the employer's interest; for his interest
was "regulated" when his access to labor and "the very economy" of his
operation were limited.200 Similarly, federal agency action excluding
199 The Act, in order to enable small banks to cooperate in providing costly electronic
and related services to themselves, authorized any two or more of them to establish and
own corporations to render these services to banks exclusively. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1865 (1970).
200Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 326 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on the
merits, 457 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1972). See Horn Sin v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), where, apart from an issue of procedural due process, an alien for whom his
employer sought permanent immigrant status was held, by dint of strained reasoning, to
have stading to challenge denial of the status on substantive grounds, because of his
otherwise unprotected interest in remaining in this country. Under the Andrews reasoning,
which rests on the intervening Data Processing decision of the Supreme Court, the Hom Sin
decision could have been based simply on the ground that the alien's employment was
being regulated. Prior to Data Processing, would-be employers were held to be without
standing to challenge exclusions of aliens resident abroad, when the exclusion was based on
the availability of qualified workers in the relevant domestic labor market. Braude v. Wirtz,
350 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Cobb v. Murrell, 386 F.2d 947 (Sth Cir. 1967).
Subsequently several Court of Appeals have upheld the standing of resident aliens, Ratna-
yaki v. Mack, 499 F.2d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 1974); Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 492 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1974), and of would-be employers of aliens who were
residents, Yong v. Regional Manpower Adm'r, 509 F.2d 243, 245 (9th Cir. 1975) ;- Secretary
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the authority of federally funded organizations to do business for certain
purposes with profit-seeking enterprises has been held to bring these
enterprises within the "regulated zone" for purposes of standing to chal-
lenge the action."° The courts have not said whether agency action
"regulates" an enterprise indirectly by regulating the entry of competi-
tors into the same business or controlling their conduct solely for the
protection of members of the public. In the usual sense of the word
"regulated" it does not; but a broader interpretation is possible.
The expansion of standing in specific areas of litigation, especially
in the federal system, has been particularly noteworthy in relation to
agency action which impinges on (1) business enterprises by contributing
to the competitive strength of rivals, (2) personal welfare as affected by
housing and urban development projects under federal-aid legislation,
and (3) the environment in relation to its use and enjoyment by people.
In all three of these areas courts, in order to establish standing, have
gone far in finding statutory recognition of interests, or in some instances
have interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act to dispense with the
need for other statutory recognition of an interest as a basis of stand-
ing.202
In relation to standing based on the interest of business enterprises
of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1973), and non-residents, Pesikoff v.
Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038
(1974), to challenge unfavorable determinations by the Secretary. As to the standing of
competing American workers to challenge the admission of alien commuters for purposes
of employment, where protection to the domestic labor market was a statutory purpose,
see Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970), applying the Data Processing formula.
The reasoning of the Andrews case would seemingly require recognition of standing in a
case such as Montgomery v. Ffrench, 299 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1962), where the adopting
parents of an alien infant were held to have no right to a. review of action excluding the
infant because of circumstances in the American couple's home. The action might still,
however, be considered non-reviewable because made so by statute or committed wholly
to agency discretion. The decision in Harry H. Price & Sons, Inc. v. Hardin, 425 F.2d
1137 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971), involving the standing of a
tomato importer to challenge regulations which limited imports collaterally to regulating
domestic marketing, rests easily on the ground that imports, along with domestic marketing,
were specifically regulated. The result in Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Ass'n v. SEC,
442 F.2d 132 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971), is similar inasmuch as the agency
action there had specific reference to business transactions with the plaintiffs who sought
review.
201 Gotoveski-Caplan Physical Therapy Ass'n v. United States, 507 F.2d 1363 (7th
Cir. 1975). The decision in Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 382 F. Supp. 362 (D.D.C.
1974), which recognized the plaintiffs' standing on another theory, could have been placed
on this ground. The challenged agency action was a "set aside" of timber under the Small
Business Act, for harvesting by small lumber companies with consequent exclusion of the
plaintiffs who could not qualify. They were held to possess standing because the over-all
purpose of the act was said to be to enhance competition generally, including competition
on the part of large as well as small firms. It might have been said that large firms
were "regulated" by limitation of their business opportunities.20 2 See note 44 supra.
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in overcoming agency aid to competition by rivals, the traditional view is
founded on a policy of exposing "free enterprise" to the hazards of not
only the conduct of private competitors, subject to liability on their part
for legally unfair competition, 203 but also of actions by government which
authorize competitors to operate or which aid them in some way, unless
statutes afford protcetion. ° Hence standing on the part of an established
concern to challenge the intrusion of a public enterprise into its market °s
or an agency's authorization ofa°6 or assistance to2°0 such an intrusion
203 Unfair competition does not traditionally include competition from another busi-
ness, merely because that business has not validly secured a required legal authorization.
See Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. 166, 174 (1881). The holder of a franchise or
other authorization for doing business which is designed to be wholly or in part an
exclusive benefit to the franchisee may, however, bring suit for an injunction to prevent
invasion by an unauthorized or invalidly authorized competitor. Whitney Nat1 Bank v.
Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 323 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds,
379 U.S. 411 (1965); Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515, 521 (1929);
National Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1958), erl.
denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134 (MD. Ga.
1965); Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank of Westfield, 211 F. Supp. 604 (D.N.J. 1962).
Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 282 (1966); cf. text accompany-
ing notes 11-15 supra.
2 04 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939); Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 923 (1970); Lexington Retail Beverage Dealers Ass'n v. ABC
Bd., 303 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1957); Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345
(1967) (discussion of standing based on competitive business interest to challenge zoning
decisions aiding rivals, citing other cases); Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Albuquer-
que, 82 N.M. 164, 477 P.2d 602 (1970) (under declaratory judgment act); Ritter Fin.
Co. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 160 A.2d 246 (1960); Lampinski v. Rhode Island Racing &
Athletic Comm'n, 181 A.2d 438, 440 (RI. 1962) (business competitors are not statutory
"persons aggrieved"). But see Elizabeth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488,
132 A.2d 779 (1957), where the standing of banking institutions to challenge agency
action benefiting competitors was upheld, principally on the ground that otherwise judicial
review with relation to the public interests at stake would be difficult to achieve.
2
°
6 Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 397 U.S. 923
(1970); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
206 C. Brooke Matlock, Inc. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
American Surety Co. v. Jones, 284 Ill. 222, 51 N.E.2d 122 (1943); Nantucket Boat, Inc.
v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, etc. S.S. Auth., 345 Mass. 551, 188 N.E.2d 476 (1963);
Colantuoni v. Selectmen of Belmont, 326 Mass. 778, 96 N.E.2d 870 (1951); Hubbard
Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 164, 477 P.2d 602 (1970); National
Motor Club v. State Ins. Bd., 393 P.2d 511 (Okla. 1964).
207 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Rural Electrification Administra-
tion v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
945 (1967); Rural Electrification Administration v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 384 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1966); Berry v. Housing & Home Fin. Agency, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 884 (1955). The decision to the same effect in Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec.
Coop., 394 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968), seems questionable
in its rejection of the plaintiff's reliance on having furnished central station electric service
in territories that would be invaded as a result of the Rural Electrification Administration's
challenged financing of extensions of competing cooperative service in alleged disregard
of a statutory limitation of such financing to the creation of facilities "for the furnishing of
electric energy to persons in rural areas who are not receiving central station service." See
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by a private or semiprivate venture, does not arise merely by virtue of
the resulting economic injury, unless a statute affords a basis for the
challenge. Similarly, government action which strengthens an existing
competitor cannot under the traditional view be challenged merely for
the same reason by another concern which considers itself injured."'
Noteworthy expansion of this restricted view of standing based on
competitive interest has taken place under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, with consequent enlargement of the standing of business
enterprises, either in their own right or as private attorneys general, to
challenge agency actions favorable to competitors. Under the provision
of the Act, whereby standing is conferred on persons "adversely affected
or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute," the search for
a basis of standing turns to other legislation, where the basis may be
found either in express provisions for standing or in an ascertainable
purpose to protect the interests asserted." 9 The Supreme Court has
noted that, over all, "[w] here statutes are concerned, the trend is toward
enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative
action."21  Previously in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Company,211 legis-
lative history and the wording of a recent statutory provision lent them-
selves to a generous interpretation in favor of a power company's stand-
ing to challenge T.V.A. expansion into the company's territory, which
contrasted in result with earlier T.V.A. decisions. Although a less
generous interpretive technique was afterward applied by the Fifth Cir-
cuit under a similar statute, 12 the general tendency to find statutory
provisions for competitive business interests to receive consideration has
been strong in a variety of situations before and after Hardin.213 Never-
7 U.S.C. §§ 902, 904, quoted indirectly in n.27 of the opinion of Godbold, J., dissenting,
394 F.2d at 687. Cf. Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), which is differ-
entiated in the majority opinion in the principal case, at 675 n.5.
208Union Nat'l Bank v. Home Loan Bank Board, 233 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
209 See text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
210Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970).
211390 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 12 Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968). See also Rural Electrification Admin. v. Northern States
Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967).
218 Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1970) (interest of domestic
steel producer in challenging a customs duty advantage to foreign producers); National
Aviation Trade Ass'n v. CAB, 420 F.2d 209 (1969); National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v.
FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970); Safir v. Gibson,
417 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1969) (interest of water carrier in government recovery of subsidy
previously paid to plaintiff's competitors); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir.
1958); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd 393 U.S. 18 (1968) (interest of carriers in challenging a regulation which
facilitates rate reductions by competitors). As to competitor standing under state law, see
Keating v. State ex rel. Ausebel, 173 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1965); People ex rel. Buffalo Util.
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theless, contrary decisions when statutory recognition. of a competitive
interest seemed absent or competitive injury from agency action in the
particular case seemed minimal have not lost all force.214
Decisions involving the banking laws, of which the Data Processing
case is one, have been especially important in the recent expansion of
standing of business enterprises to challenge agency action which aids
competitors. In Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, travel agencies challenged
a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency that national banks might
render travel agency services to their customers. The Supreme Court
at first remanded the case for further consideration in the light of its
Data Processing decision.215 The Court of Appeals then ruled in a care-
fully reasoned opinion that Congress in enacting the Bank Service Corpo-
ration Act216 had not manifested a concern for all kinds of enterprises
with which banks might compete, but only for those rendering the kinds
of services which a bank service corporation might perform. Travel
agencies were not among these and consequently lacked standing to
challenge the Comptroller's ruling.217 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
held to the contrary, attributing to the Bank Service Corporation Act
a broader purpose to protect non-banking enterprises from competition
by banks.218
Later in Investment Company Institute v. Camp219 the Court dealt
with a statutory limitation on the authority of national banks, which
restricted their purchase and sale of securities to transactions without
recourse for the accounts of customers upon their order.22 The Institute,
Co. v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 85 III. App. 2d 382, 229 N.E.2d 401 (1967); Indianapolis
& Southern Motor Express, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 Ind. 377, 112 N.E.2d 864
(1953). See also L'Enfant Plaza North, Inc. v. D.C. Redev. Agency, 437 F.2d 698 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
• .
2 14 Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 923
(1970); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1975). Cf. Associa-
tion of Fair Competitive Practices v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 372 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n v. Urban Redev. Authority, 309 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1962); Sapp
v. Hardy, 204 F. Supp. 602 (D. Del. 1962); North Carolina Natural Gas Corp. v. United
States, 200 F. Supp. 745, 751-52 (D. Del. 1961). The holding on this point in South
Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969), seems
wrong in the context of applicable provisions of the Urban Mass Transportation Act. See,
however, Bradford School Bus Transit, Inc. v. Chicago Transit Authority, 537 F.2d 943
(7th Cir. 1976).
215 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 315 (1970).
2 1 6 See note 199 supra.
217 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1970).
218 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970). See also American Soc'y of Travel
Agencies v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 1084, 1092 (N.D.
Cal 1974).
219401 U.S. 617 (1971).
220 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1970), as amended from 48 Stat. 184 (1933).
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composed of mutual investment fund enterprises, challenged a regulation
and an approval by the Comptroller of the Currency which authorized
the National City Bank of New York to establish and operate a collective
investment fund. The Court held that because Congress "had arguably
legislated against the competition that the petitioners sought to chal-
lenge," they had standing to bring a proceeding to review the Comptrol-
ler's action even though the purpose of the legislation was to guard
against abuses and conflicts of interest on the part of banks and not to
protect competitors or prevent abuses in the securities industry. Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, pointed out the distortion involved in
the Court's unacknowledged shift from reliance in Data Processing on
legislation specifically intended for the protection of competitors to re-
liance on legislation which for unrelated reasons forbade conduct that
involved competition with others. The fact that the statute contained an
express prohibition, although relied upon in the Court of Appeals,"2
is hardly significant; for an implied limitation, such as follows from
the National Bank Act's empowerment of only such activities as are
"necessary to carry on the business of banking," operates quite as fully
as a prohibition "against [the] competition" which it prevents. 22 2 If so,
the Investment Company Institute case means that business enterprises
confronted by competition which agency action has either established or
aided have standing to challenge the action on the ground that the
competition transgresses statutory limits which exist for any reason.
Standing because of the business interest involved, to challenge the
agency action on procedural or other collateral grounds not touching
the challenger, might still be lacking; but the former policy of not per-
mitting standing to arise at all, merely because of such an interest, would
have been curtailed to a significant extent.
Standing of existing banks to challenge authorization of the entry
of new ones or extension of the establishments of competitors into
their territories has undergone a parallel expansion. Authorization of
new national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency depends on their
221 National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also
Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub twm., Port of
N.Y. Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
222 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1970). This provision has been construed to exclude the
banks from activities not necessary to the business of banking in order to prevent diversion
of the attention of management and impairment of financial soundness, because of col-
lateral interests. Logan County Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 73 (1891); National
Bank v. Mathews, 98 U.S. 621, 625-26 (1878); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Smith, 56
F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1932). See also Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, 399
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), involving this implied prohibition and a statutory authorization
for national banks to engage in the insurance agency business in "any place the population
of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants."
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compliance with federal requirements related to their structure and
financial soundness and, under the Act as interpreted since 1909, on
community need for banking services. 223 Existing national banks in the
same localities, with which a new one would compete, would seemingly
lack any interest of their own in exclusiveness, which they had standing
to defend. Nevertheless both they and state banks which are subject
to similar statutory provisions for entry into business" 4 have in some
instances been accorded standing, without specific statutory provision
for it, to oppose the authorization of new entries, either in their own
behalf or as private attorneys general to represent the public interest in
adapting banking service to need.22 5 As to national bank branches, the
Act expressly subjects the Comptroller's authorization of new branches
by such banks to the same restrictions as state law may place on state
bank branches in the same areas.22 Since these restrictions are imposed
for reasons that include the protection of established banks from un-
warranted invasion of their markets by branches of outside banks, the
established state or national institutions which are confronted by branch
authorizations in their areas by state agencies227 or by the Comptrol-
ler,22" have standing to challenge the authorizations.
22312 U.S.C. §§ 26, 27 (1970); Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism
31 LAw & CONTENT. PROB. 749, 757 (1966). The Banking Act of 1935 requires a similar
showing of need on the part of banks newly admitted as insured banks to the Federal
Deposit Insurance system. 49 Stat. 687-88 (1935), as continued, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1814(b),
1816 (1970). See Smith & Greenspun, Structural Limits on Bank Competition, 32 LAw &
CoNTENT. PRoB. 41, 43 (1967).224 See Smith & Greenspun, note 223 supra, at 43-45; Comment, Bank Charter, Holding
Company and Merger Laws: Competition Frustrated, 71 YAix L.J. 502, 509-16 (1962);
D. AX.AHADEPP, MONOPOLY AND CONTEITION nr BANKING 205-06 (1954).
225 Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1968); Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp. 406 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd as
to other issues, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also North Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Becker, 24
Ill. 2d 514, 182 N.E.2d 155 (1962) (standing to challenge change of location of competitor).
Standing is accorded without discussion in Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971); Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52
(6th Cir. 1968), and Application of State Bank, 61 N.J. Super. 150, 160 A.2d (1960).
Compare Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 81 N.M. 379, 467 P.2d 395 (1970); State
ex rel. Rouveyrol v. Donnelly, 365 Mo. 686, 285 S.W.2d 669 (1956); see also Comment, 71
YALE L.J. 502 at 512, supra note 224.
22612 U.S.C. §36(c) (1970); First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385
U.S. 252 (1966); Marion Natl Bank v. VanBuren Bank, 418 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1970);
First Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 326 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1971), af'd, 465 F.2d 586 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973).
227 South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 351 Mass. 363, 220
N.E.2d 899 (1966); Application of Summit & Elizabeth Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 154,
268 A.2d 21 (1970); Newport Natl Bank v. Provident Institution for Sav., 226 A.2d 137
(R.I. 1967) (competing bank as "person aggrieved" under state administrative procedure
act).
228First Nat'l Bank of Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252
(1966); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965); Whitney
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Emerging recurringly in the cases involving competitor standing
are two reasons which were enunciated in Judge Bazelon's concurring
opinion in the Investment Company Institute case in the Court of Ap-
peals. These are (1) that important questions which are raised in an
adversary setting should be decided and (2) the "fortuitous" nature
of statutory differences which, if not overcome, would leave some in-
terests without the standing that was accorded to others under similar
circumstances. 229 The earlier case of Pennsylvania Railroad Company
v. Dillon,2 0 where standing was denied, was distinguished on the ground
that it involved merely "[m] inor or speculative economic injury," giving
rise only to "skirmishes among businesses over comparative advantages
resulting from allegedly illegal agency action," with which it was "not
worth burdening the agencies and the courts. ' 23 ' The difficulty with
relying on such a difference between cases is that it requires the courts
to decide in various instances, on the basis of relative importance,
whether they should entertain challenges to agency action on such
competitive grounds. A more sweeping recognition of standing on the
ground of competitive interest, subject to a de minimis limitation, would
be simpler and would confer the same benefit of more ready review of
agency action at the instance of enterprises having pertinent data and
argument to offer. At the federal level, in the absence of new legislation,
the problem in justifying such a formulation is to avoid doing violence
to honest interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and of
the relevant statutes to which it refers.
Also illustrative of the problem of standing to challenge agency
action because of its bearing on business rivalry is the situation that
surrounds the standing of bidders and would-be bidders on transactions
with the government to challenge allegedly illegal specifications, proce-
dures, purchases, contract awards, or sales or leases of property, which
have either conferred advantage upon rivals, placed a plaintiff under a
handicap, or withheld business from him. Traditionally there is no
right to do business or even to be accorded equal opportunity to do
business with the government, upon which standing might be based.23 2
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 323 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 379 U.S. 411 (1965); National Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank,
252 F.2d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958); State Chartered
Banks in Washington v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Bank of
Sussex County v. Saxon, 251 F. Supp. 132 (D.NJ. 1966).
229 National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 95-100 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
230 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom, American S.S. Co. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
231420 F.2d at 97.
232 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 126 (1940); Colorado Paving Co. v.
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Statutes and ordinances designed to secure equal opportunity and fair
consideration for suppliers and contractors have been looked upon as
enactments in the interest of economy and efficiency in government, not
of competitors for business with the government.283 Consequently stand-
ing has in many instances been denied to would-be contractors to chal-
lenge contract awards to competitors. 34 Nevertheless, the injustice in-
flicted by favoritism or error in awards of public business is often ap-
parentV5-- increasingly so as government transactions come to account
for growing portions (in some fields, such as road building and military
weapons supply, virtually all) of the available business. In relation to the
public interest in governmental economy and efficiency as well, no one
else is as informed or as likely to institute litigation to check abuse as
is the enterprise threatened with loss, even if there are others who have
standing to do so. For whatever reason, some territorial and state deci-
sions have sustained the standing of enterprises seeking government
business to challenge illegality in the contracting process or in the award-
ing of business to others.2 8 In relation to federal processes, the United
Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897), appeal dismissed, 166 U.S. 719 (1897); Crawford v.
United States Dep't of the Interior, 160 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1958). Compare, however,
Gotoveski-Caplan Physical Therapy Ass'n v. United States, 507 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1975).
283Id. But see Black Hotel Co. v. Froehlke, 351 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
2 3 4 Adelman v. Federal Housing Admin., 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967); Colorado
Paving Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897); Malan Constr. Corp. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 187 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Waszen v. Atlantic City, 1 N.J.
272, 63 A.2d 255 (1949); Noonan v. School District, 400 Pa. 391, 162 A.2d 623 (1960);
Tri-State Milling Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 75 S.D. 466, 68 N.W.2d 104 (1955).
285 Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Housing Authority
v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959); Rudolph F. Matz-r & Associates v.
Warner, 348 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 432
(E.D. Pa. 1971); Shaw-Henderson, Inc. v. Schneider, 335 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Mich.
1971), afd, 453 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1971). See also Merriam v. Kunzig, 347 F. Supp. 713
(E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 476 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. dewed, 414 U.S. 911 (1973).
Breach by federal officers of an implied obligation to consider a bid fairly and honestly
has been recognized increasingly as a basis for limited government liability for the costs
of bid preparation. Hence one who alleges such a breach "has the right to come into
court to try and prove his cause of action." Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d
1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. United States, 514 F.2d 402 (9th
Cir. 1975); Paul Sardella Constr. Co. v. Braintree Housing Authority, - Mass.-,
329 N.E.2d 762 (1975).
236Creque v. Government of Virgin Islands, 354 F. Supp. 849 (D.C.V.I. 1973);
Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, 426 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1967) (because of strong legis-
lative policy to safeguard disposal and leasing of state land); Housing Authority v. Pittman
Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959) (Louisiana law); School City of Gary v.
Continental Elec. Co., 149 Ind. App. 416, 273 N.E.2d 293 (1971); Dictaphone Corp. v.
O'Leary, 287 N.Y. 491, 41 N.E.2d 68 (1942); State ex rel. United Dist. Heating, Inc. v.
State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E. 138, 125 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E.
138, 125 Ohio St. 806, 181 N.E. 129 (1931-32); State ex rel. Wailer Chem., Inc. v. McNutt,
152 W. Va. 186, 160 S.E.2d 170 (1968); Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1382, 1394-97 (1932). See also
Callaghan & Co. v. Smith, 304 Ill. 532, 130 N.E. 748 (1922). Occasionally the standing
of an unsuccessful bidder challenging the legality of specifications is rejected because of an
estoppel to attack provisions of which one has sought the benefit. Waszen v. Atlantic
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:817
States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 2 7 taking a position
later endorsed by some other federal courts,23 has brushed aside the
Administrative Procedure Act's restriction of standing to persons ad-
versely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of other relevant
statutes,289 and has held that seekers of government business, alleging
injury because of violations of statutes that regulate purchasing, con-
tracting, or selling or leasing procedures, have standing by virtue of
the Act. Other federal courts have declined to adopt so broad a theory
and have looked instead for specific statutory concern for would-be
contractors' interests as a basis of standing;24 but a growing volume
of litigation challenging the actions of federal purchasing and contracting
agencies at the instance of disappointed seekers of government business
seems certain to arise in any event.24'
City, 1 N.J. 272, 65 A.2d 255 (1949). This principle, however, does not affect one who
challenges action which foreclosed his bid or involved inadequate consideration of it. Inn
Operations, Inc. v. River Falls Motor Inn Corp., 261 Ia. 72, 152 N.W.2d 808 (1967); J.
Turko Paving Contractor, Inc. v. City Council, 89 N.J. Super. 93, 213 A.2d 865 (1965).
The larger estoppel principle, whereby one who accepts a license or other governmental
benefit is foreclosed from attacking an allegedly illegal condition attached to it, usually
defeats recovery rather than withholds standing to seek it. An enterprise may, of course,
be a citizen or taxpayer with standing as such, to the extent it is recognized in the juris-
diction, to challenge action which also operates to its detriment as a would-be contractor
with the government. State ex rel. Journal Publishing Co. v. Dreyer, 183 Mo. App. 463,
167 S.W. 1123 (1914); Heilig Bros. Co. v. Kohler, 366 Pa. 72, 76 A.2d 613 (1950);
Bellingham American Publishing Co. v. Bellingham Publishing Co., 145 Wash. 25, 258
P. 36 (1927).
237 Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970); M. Steinthal & Co.
v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d
1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1970). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1969); McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).238 Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Armstrong &
Armstrong, Inc. v. United States, 514 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1975); Rossetti Contracting Co.
v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 1974); Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates v.
Warner, 348 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Fla. 1972). See also Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233
(3d Cir. 1973) (in which the court, at 1242, also ascribed to the governing statute a
purpose to protect competitors for leases of office space to the government), followed in
William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973), and
Davis Associates, Inc. v. Secretary of HUD, 498 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1974); Hayes Int'l
Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1975); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971)
(would-be contractors may challenge a bid requirement which, if retained, will impose
burdens on performance of contract).
239 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
240 Cincinnati Elec. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1975) (standing
of would-be contractor must rest on a statute additional to the A.P.A.). Cf. Pullman, Inc.
v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 432, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and Shaw-Henderson, Inc. v. Schneider,
335 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (no standing of would-be contractors under A.P.A.
to challenge federal approval of local contract awards). For the Second Circuit position,
see Morgan Associates v. United States Postal Serv., 511 U.S. 1223, 1225 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975).2 4 1 See Pierson, Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards:
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The enlargement of standing of business enterprises to challenge
agency action favoring competitors has generally been prompted by
considerations of fairness and by a policy of increasing the opportunities
for judicial vindication of the public interest involved. Attendant dis-
advantages of this development have been the unpredictability of deci-
sions, distortion in some of the judicial reasoning involved, and some
added burdens on the courts. Few would advocate, on balance, that this
development continue to the point where business rivalry would become
a basis for litigation to compel the equal enforcement among competitors
of all kinds of tax and regulatory laws that affect business capability;
consequently, this kind of basis for standing must have limits. A principle
is evolving imperfectly through the decisions and commentaries, how-
ever, whereby competitive interest would become a proper basis of
standing to challenge governmental action which is intended to take
into account or protect either that interest or a public interest in adequate
service by a class or classes of enterprises that includes the one for which
standing is sought. Under this principle, would-be contractors with the
government would have standing with respect to contract procedures or
awards to others affecting either a statutory interest of theirs or the
cost and quality of goods and services the government receives.242
Franchisees and holders of certificates of convenience and necessity
would have standing to challenge agency actions favorable to rival enter-
prises, supposedly based on the public interest in the quality and quantity
of the goods or services offered. The enterprises that would receive
standing on this basis could more clearly contribute to sound decisions,
because of both motivation and knowledge, than mere citizen plaintiffs
could. Denial of standing would occur in some instances in which recent
decisions have bestowed it, such as the Investment Companies Institute
case; for in that case neither the interest of the plaintiffs nor the public's
need for the kinds of service the plaintiffs were rendering, but only the
sound conduct of the banking business, was legally relevant. More fre-
quently, standing of existing enterprises to oppose the authorization of
new competition with them would be recognized because intertwined
private and public interests, either or both of which were to be taken
Its Origins, Rationale and Effect on the Procurement Process, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv.
1 (1970); Speidel, Judicial and Administrative Review of Government Contract Awards,
37 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 63 (1972); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. McLucas, 364 F. Supp.
750, 756 (D.N.J. 1973).
2 42 The influence of the decision in Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859
(D.C. Cir. 1970), results at least partially from emphasis on this factor in the opinion, of
the court which, in turn, draws heavily on K. DAVIs, ADmt IITATIVE LAW TRaATnis
(1958 and Supp. 1965).
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into account, were involved.248 In short, the principle of the Sanders
Brothers Radio Station case,2 44 which rested on statutory language be-
stowing standing, would become generally applicable to situations in
which there was no such language but legally relevant interests were at
stake and could be furthered by bestowing standing.
In another important area of litigation, federal legislation providing
financial assistance for housing, urban renewal, and similar local projects
has increasingly conditioned the assistance on administrative determina-
tions that the welfare of three groups of persons, in addition to sponsors
and participants in the projects, will be protected or served in specified
ways. These groups are previous residents and business proprietors in
the areas directly involved, who would be displaced by the projects;
persons in the vicinity whose environment would be affected; and those
to whom the projects were intended to offer benefits.2 45 Their standing
to challenge the procedures and determinations of federal, state, and
local agencies involved in carrying out the projects has become solidly
established. Initially their standing to seek relief in the federal courts
against alleged failures of federal authorities to carry out their statu-
tory duties toward these groups was withheld.24 Standing to seek relief
in the federal courts against the execution of noncomplying projects
by local administrators was likewise denied, with statutory relief in
the state courts a possibility. 47 However, the Second Circuit in Gart v.
Cole248 had recognized the standing of residents of an area affected by
a project to challenge the withholding of procedural rights allegedly
243 Cf. Elizabeth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 132 A.2d 779 (1957).
See also the broad view expressed in Dvorine v. Castelberg jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661,
185 A. 562, 565 (1936); Fitchetti v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934), that
members of professions have standing to challenge unauthorized practice by others. This
view, if accepted, might be extended to include challenges to allegedly illegal agency
action which sanctioned activities the governing statute was designed to prevent in the
interest of the public, as the statute in Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 923 (1970), was not.
244 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See notes 59-67 supra & text accompanying.
245 Pertinent provisions of the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949, of subsequent legisla-
tion for expanded urban projects, and of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 are contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1455, 1469,
1469c, 4601, 4602, 4604-4638 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1415 and 4603 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. IV 1974).
2 4 6 Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing & Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d
99, 104 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 914 (1963); Green Street Ass'n v. Daly,
373 F.2d 1, 5-8 (7th Cir. 1967). Cf. Allied City Wide, Inc. v. Cole, 230 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); Gibson & Perrin Co. v. Cincinnati, 480 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
247 Johnson v. Redev. Auth., 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915
(1963). See also Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n v. Urban Redev. Auth., 309 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.
1962).
248 263 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
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secured to affected persons by the Housing Act, at the same time as it
denied standing to vindicate the purely public interest in adherence to
bidding requirements in the sale of property involved in the project.
In 1968, building on this foundation and on Road Review League v.
Boyd, to be discussed below,249 Powelton Civic Home Owners Associa-
tion v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "5 followed
closely by two other influential decisions,25 supplied convincingly the
rationale whereby persons displaced or threatened with displacement by
projects under the legislation in question were held to be persons suffer-
ing injury to a legal right and "adversely affected or aggrieved within
the meaning of a relevant statute," as contemplated by the Administrative
Procedure Act. This view was thereafter firmly established. 252
By a parity of reasoning, persons in the vicinity of a project whose
neighborhood may be affected adversely in ways which by statute are
supposed to be taken into account in project planning and execution
have standing to challenge determinations which allegedly fail to con-
sider these factors in the manner required. 58 Needless to say, also,
standing arises on the part of intended or direct beneficiaries of ongoing
projects to challenge the withholding from them of requisite procedures
or of statutory benefits and rights.-"' Similarly, persons entitled by sta-
tute to consultation or participation in projects, who allege that they
have been denied their due in this respect, have standing to challenge
the denial.2"
249 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see text accompanying mote 266 fara.
250 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
251 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Western
Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), pre-
liminary injunction dissolved, 320 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
252 M . Crockin Co. v. Portsmouth Redev. & Housing Auth., 437 F.2d 784, 787-88
(4th Cir. 1971); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971);
English v. Town of Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Talbot v. Romney,
321 F. Supp. 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Coalition for United Community Action v.
Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Triangle Improvement Council v.
Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. W. Va. 1969), aff'd 429 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
dismissed, 402 U.S. 497 (1971).
258 Shannon v. Department of HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Northwest Resi-
dents Ass'n v. Department of HUD, 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Compare Fletcher
v. Romney, 323 F. Supp. 189, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). As to similar factors in highway
location, see Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1122-26 (9th Cir. 1972).
254Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 259 (1969); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360
(3d Cir. 1974); Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970); Mandina v. Lyons, 357 F.
Supp. 269 (W.D. Mo. 1973).255 North City Areawide Council v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970); Coalition
for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Cf. Gains v.
Martinez, 353 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (participation in Economic Opportunity
Administration).
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Standing in relation to the foregoing kinds of urban projects relates
closely to standing to challenge agency action because of concern for
its effects on the natural environment. Litigation with respect to these
environmental matters rests on legislation that directs agencies whose
primary focus is on regulation or promotion of economic activity or on
authorization or execution of engineering projects to take environmental
factors into account. Such legislation emerged in the 1930's after earlier
conservation laws, providing for management of the public domain, had
occasionally involved private persons as defendants in penal proceed-
ings2' 5 or as plaintiffs in litigation to secure permits or grants which
had been administratively denied. In 1934 a rudimentary Fish and Wild-
life Coordination Act257 was adopted, authorizing research and planning
with reference to the preservation of natural species and the provision
in connection with federal dam projects of facilities for the migration of
anadromous fish. In the same year the Taylor Grazing Act 5 s authorized
the creation of grazing districts embracing public lands, and their regu-
lation "to preserve the land and its resources from destruction and
unnecessary injury.... "25 9 In the following year the Federal Power Act,
which in 1920 had required that hydroelectric dams be licensed in ac-
cordance with comprehensive waterway development plans for com-
merce, power, and "other beneficial uses," 2" was amended to specify
that these uses should include "recreational purposes."'261
Taken in conjunction with statutory judicial review provisions or
with the subsequent Administrative Procedure Act as construed in the
Data Processing and other decisions, the foregoing statutory provisions
would be sufficient to bestow standing on persons possessing the requisite
interests in preservation of the particular natural resources involved,
to challenge agency action on the ground that it did not comply with
the statutory requirements. The briefly stated conclusion in Washington
Department of Game v. Federal Power Commission2 62 was that both
the Department and the Washington State Sportsmen's Council, a corpo-
ration, were "parties aggrieved" within the meaning of the Federal
Power Act's review provision,26 entitled as such to challenge a Com-
mission license for a dam that allegedly threatened -to destroy the fish
in the waters affected, "which they, among others, are interested in pro-
2 5 6 The leading case of this variety is United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
257 48 Stat. 401.
25843 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. (1970).
25943 U.S.C. § 315a (1970).
260 41 Stat. 1068.
26116 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970).
262 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
263 16 ILS.C. § 825m(b) (1970). See note 26 supra.
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tecting." This theme under the same statute was developed to maximum
effect in the first Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference decision of the
Second Circuit,284 involving the Federal Power Commission's licensing
of the Consolidated Edison Company's Storm King Mountain pumped
storage power facility, in which the Conference, a private organization
of persons and groups having the interests which the name of the Con-
ference implies, was held to have standing to challenge the Commission's
order because of a wide range of environmental effects of the project.
Equivalent reasoning as to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved"
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act in conjunction
with statutes not containing explicit provisions for judical review was
developed not long afterward, in relation to persons having environ-
mental interests, in Road Review League v. Boyd.2 5 The Federal High-
ways Act, applicable to the highway project involved in the case, con-
tained provisions which, as construed administratively and by the court,
required the. Secretary of Commerce (later of Transportation), in de-
ciding whether to approve such a project, to consider the conservation
and development of the natural environment ;216 but the Act did not
provide specifically for judicial review of approvals. At issue was the
effect of the project on a wildlife refuge in New York State and on
scenic beauty in the vicinity. The Court held that individuals and groups
in the locality, interested in scenic beauty and wildlife preservation in
the area, and alleging adverse consequences with respect to these interests,
could seek relief in a United States District Court against alleged non-
compliance with the Act's protective provisions. 87
Many cases have followed the lines of reasoning developed in Scenic
Hudson and Road Review League. 6s Congress during a roughly con-
284 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). An order approving a modified project, entered by the
Commission after further proceedings pursuant to remand, was sustained by the court,
453 F.2d 463 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
285 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). On the merits, the court sustained the legality
of the Secretary's action.
266 The court cited 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV. 1975); 23
U.S.C. §§ 134 and 138 (1970). Only the last of these sections was explicit as to the natural
environment, and it had been enacted after the challenged decision was made administratively.
The earlier provisions had been construed to permit conservation of natural resources to
be considered. See 25 Fed. Reg. 4162 (1960), 23 C.F.R. § 1.6(c).
287 270 F. Supp. at 660-61.
28 Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Parker v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969), decsion on the
merits, 309 F. Supp. 593 (1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989
(1972); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd as to the merits,
415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969); Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Md. 1972). Cf.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970) (standing assumed
without discussion).
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temporaneous period touched the interests of vastly greater numbers of
people by enacting statutes, supplemental to those empowering agency
action, which require attention to a wide range of environmental factors
and, in that connection, the observance of specified procedures in rele-
vant proceedings, by federal agencies generally.26 The Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act270 was expanded in 1946 and 1958,71 to amplify the
required procedures for consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service
and equivalent state agencies and to provide for indicated conservation
measures in connection with all federal or federally licensed projects
affecting streams or other bodies of water. The National Historic Pres-
ervation Act of 1966 includes a provision for federal agencies having
jurisdiction with respect to proposed public or federally licensed private
undertakings to "take into account" the effects of an undertaking on any
areas, sites, or structures included in a National Register of such loca-
tions which is authorized by the Act.' The comprehensive National
Environmental Policy Act of 19707 and the implementing Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3 of 19704 require procedures and methods whereby
inter-agency consultation shall take place, a detailed statement concern-
ing environmental impact and possible alternative measures shall be
prepared, and "appropriate consideration" shall be given to "presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values," as well as "economic
and technical" factors, in the proceedings of all federal agencies prepara-
tory to "proposals for legislation and other major federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment."275 The central
purpose is to give effect to a continuing policy "to use all practicable
means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony.. ,,2. By virtue of
the foregoing legislation, in conjunction with the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, individuals and groups possessing interests affected by factors
in the environment which Congress sought to safeguard have success-
fully claimed standing to challenge alleged agency failure to comply with
209 The Department of Transportation Act, enacted in 1966 and revised in this respect
in 1968, 82 Stat. 824, requires the Secretary to give all possible effect to environmental
protection in his approvals of the various transportation programs and projects which
are subject to his authority. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). This provision is carried into
the Highways Act by 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).2 70 See note 257 supra.
271 16 U.S.C. § 661 et seq. (1970), esp. § 662. See also 16 U.S.C. § 4601-12 et seq. (1970)
(affirmative provision for wildlife enhancement in connection with water resource projects).
27216 U.S.C. § 470f (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
27342 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
274 5 U.S.C. Appendix (1970).
27542 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
27-642 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). Further specifications as to the governing policy am set
forth in the statute.
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the foregoing statutory requirements. '77 As might be expected, standing
and a right to relief under these laws often arise in situations- in which
narrower statutes, such as those relating to highway location, supply
an additional basis of standing on the part of the possessors of the
same interests.2
78
Limits to the Development
The scope and effect of the foregoing broad recognition of standing
to vindicate environmental and other broad interests, especially in light
of the standing of organizations to represent the interests of their mem-
bers, 9 were enhanced by the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures."' That case
gives a broad interpretation to the kind of interest which the earlier deci-
sion in Sierra Club v. Morton 8' recognized as a basis of standing to
bring review proceedings under the National Environmental Policy Act
in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act, subject to the
limitation which was imposed by that decision. Sierra Club, as has been
277 United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Conservation Council v. Costanzo,
05 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974); Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156
(8th Cir. 1974); Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973); Upper
Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated as moot, 500 F.2d 17 (10th
Cir. 1974); Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (National Historic Preservation and National Environmental
Policy Acts); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D.
Miss. 1972); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971); Sierra Club v. Hardin,
325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,
324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971) (Fish and Wildlife Coordination and National Environ-
mental Policy Acts); Delaware v. Pennsylvania, N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 323 F. Supp.
487 (D. Del. 1971) (Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act primarily). As to limitation of
the spread of shared interests which can be the basis of standing, see Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1970), discussed at notes 74-76 supra. Compare Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp.
1088 (E.D. Va. 1971), with South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454
6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970), and Kent County Council for Historic
Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
278 West Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th
Cir. 1971) (Wilderness Act); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 355 F. Supp.
280, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (Rivers & Harbors Act); Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v.
Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (highway location legislation); Cape May
County Chapter, Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971)
(statutes protecting water resources); Brooks v. Volpe, 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972) (highway location legisla-
tion); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa.
1970), affd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971) (same). Compare Rhode Island Comm. on Energy
v. General Serv. Adm., 397 F. Supp. 41 (D.R.I. 1975) (statute relating to disposal of
federal land).27 9 See note 153-64 supra & text accompanying.
280412 U.S. 669 (1973). For the later decision of the Court on the merits, see
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
281405 U.S. 727 (1970).
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noted,282 excluded mere ideological or citizen interest, but not direct per-
sonal interest in an environmental situation, from the category which
bestows standing; the SCRAP case holds that the actual personal interest
which will suffice may be quantitatively very slight and only remotely
affected by the action complained of. The suit challenged an action of the
Interstate Commerce Commission which allowed a nationwide railroad
freight rate increase to go into effect. The increase, it was alleged, height-
ened at least slightly an economic disincentive to the recycling of solid
wastes, or scrap material, which the rate structure as a whole was said to
impose. The resulting stimulation to the use of new materials would in
addition to raising product prices, enlarge the continuing drain on natu-
ral resources, including forests in the vicinity of Washngton, D.C. which
the members of SCRAP used for outings and enjoyed aesthetically. This
interest of theirs, the Court held, sufficed to bestow standing upon them
to challenge the agency's omission of procedures required by the
N.E.P.A. In pursuing their remedy the students must, of course, bear
out their allegations as to environmental consequences affecting them
and establish their contention that the N.E.P.A. applied; but the suit
could not be dismissed at the outset, merely on the ground that they
lacked standing to make the attempt.
Given the breadth of the environmental benefits, including the con-
tinued purity of water and air, which are the concern of the National
Environmental Policy Act, potential standing to challenge action in
order to safeguard these benefits attaches to everyone because of normal
day-to-day existence, as the Court recognized. 283 In this area of concern,
personal interest, sufficient to bestow standing because protected by
statute, is shared by all within relevant geographical limits. Consequent
problems of securing adequate presentation of cases in court by indi-
viduals who come forward, of preventing undue strain on the judicial
system, and of avoiding unhelpful judicial intrusion into agency action,2 "
must be solved by means not made clear in the SCRAP case.
The question arises whether the protection accorded by statute to
widespread personal interests in the environment is more convincingly
282 See notes 74-76 supra & text accompanying. As to standing on similar principles
under environmental protection statutes without reference to the procedural requirements
of the National Environmental Policies Act see Campaign Clean Waters, Inc. v. Ruckels-
haus, 361 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Va. 1973), remanded, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973); Friends
of the Earth v. Armstrong, 360 F. Supp. 165 (D. Utah 1973), vacated & remanded, 485
F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974).
283 412 U.S. at 687.
284 As to the relation of the standing requirement to judicial self-limitation for these
various reasons, see Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court--A Functional Analysis, 86
HARv. L. REv. 645 (1973).
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a basis of standing than the interest in personal safety which much of
the criminal law, including its administration, protects, or the interest
in the availability of goods and services and of employment, which fiscal,
monetary, grant-in-aid, and regulatory administration are in large part
designed to secure. Neither of these two interests, broadly speaking,
suffices. 8 Because of the recency of environmental legislation, its pur-
poses are often explicitly set forth in the statutes themselves or in legis-
lative history, whereas the aims of more traditional enactments and
of non-statutory and constitutional provisions of law are taken for
granted; but such formal differences should hardly be decisive in de-
termining standing.
In another area of recent concern, a group of decisions has founded
standing to challenge agency action on the interest shared by all persons
as members of society, if not simply as individual human beings, in the
maintenance of prescribed governmental processes for effective partici-
pation in decisionmaking or for access to officials who engage in making
decisions, on the part of all persons who wish to assert themselves. This
interest is broader and more abstract than one in retaining office,
as to which additional personal interests may be said to arise, and than
the interests of electors ;287 but simply because of the general interest in
effective access to governmental decisionmaking, legislators as repre-
sentatives of the public have been held to have standing to sue to in-
validate the outcome of behind-the-scenes agency processes which had
supplanted those, prescribed by statute, which were required to be open.28
For the same reason a group lobbying for particular legislation was held
to have standing to challenge the forbidden use of government money
in lobbying by an opposing group.28 9 An increase in suits of this nature
seems likely.
Courts can, of course, avoid much unsuitable judicial intrusion
2 8 5 See notes 53-55 supra & text accompanying. But see District 65, Wholesale, etc.,
Union v. Nixon, 341 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
286 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 480 (1969); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 US.
236, 241 (1968); Local 2677, Amer. Fed. of Govt. Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60
(D.D.C. 1973).
287 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook
County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).2 8 8 MOSS v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970). This interest of persons generally
under a statute, which congressmen choose to represent in court, is different from that
of a legislator as such in having his vote on a measure given its due effect under the
Constitution and, no doubt, under any applicable statute or rule, which was recognized
as the basis of standing in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See also Kennedy v. Jones,
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It is different too from a legislator's interest in not having
his power usurped, which at least contributed to the basis for standing on the part of
congressmen in Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
289 National Ass'n for Community Action v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
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into nonjusticiable controversies that might result from the enlargement
of standing, by resort to the doctrines of unreviewable action and poli-
tical questions; but many issues that can be raised through broad stand-
ing-for example, alleged abuse of discretion in the performance of
official duties under licensing laws which bear on welfare in the com-
munity-fall easily within the judicial province. As to such issues, the
law of standing affords the most available means of screening cases,
using criteria which turn on plaintiffs' interests or on the relation of
agency action to those interests. The costs of litigation are in them-
selves a deterrent to suits,29 ° which arguably might suffice; but resources
to meet these costs are increasing.2 91 In any event, the availability of
funds to litigants is a somewhat fortuitous factor, reflecting intensity
of concern but hardly ability to contribute well to the decision of cases.
A more rationally based gauging of the suitability of the challenging
interests in particular cases remains desirable.
To retain effectiveness in the law of standing as a screening device
despite frequent enlargment of interests to be recognized, the require-
ment previously mentioned, 2  that injury to the interest sought to be
vindicated be not too remote from the action complained of, has emerged
as crucial in several recent decisions. In Rizzo v. Goode,"3 where police
abuse of individuals in the community was the conduct complained of
by residents of Philadelphia, the plaintiffs' claim of standing suffered
in the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court from two deficiencies:
(1) failure to identify adequately the probable future sufferers from the
abuses complained of, in whose behalf a remedy was sought,294 and (2)
absence of a firm basis for predicting that, because of some identified
causal factor, the abuses which had occurred would be repeated to a
significant extent. Hence the Court concluded that, even after a full
hearing in the district court, no case or controversy between the parties
involving sufficiently probable injury to any right of the plaintiffs
existed. The decision, questionable on the record, nevertheless empha-
sized rightly the need for specific allegations of probable injury to
specific plaintiffs' interests in order to establish standing to bring actions
to prevent official oppression of persons.
Shortly afterward the Court decided that indigent plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge a Revenue Ruling affecting non-profit hospitals'
290 As to this factor, see Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court--A Functional Analysis,
86 HtAv. L. REV. 643 (1973).
291 Judge Henry J. Friendly points to this development in his Foreword to B. ScHwaTrz
& H.W.R. WADE, LzcAL CONTROL OF GovmNemaumNT at xx (1972).
29 2 See text at note 4 supra.
23423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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tax exemption, which, under an allegation accepted as true by the Court,
"encouraged" the hospitals to deny them free service. There was no
averment that the Ruling would necessarily result in denials. Other fac-
tors influencing hospital policies rendered the threatened injury too
speculative in the eyes of the Court to warrant standing based upon it.25
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Marshall
joined, is surely right in contending that the decision conflicts with the
one in United States v. SCRAP29 and with some of the decisions in-
volving plaintiffs who alleged competitive injury through agency action
benefiting business rivals. Yet the SCRAP decision, although not over-
ruled, required limitation if standing was to continue to perform a use-
ful function and the courts be protected from entertaining a wide range
of disputes among citizens over economic, social, and tax policies.
In Warth v. Seldin," 7 involving challenges by variously interested
persons to a zoning ordinance which virtually excluded low-cost housing
from a Rochester suburb, the sharply divided Court dealt somewhat
earlier with the requirement of probable injury to the plaintiffs from the
measure under attack. As to builders and would-be tenants and pur-
chasers of homes whose opportunities were denied, the majority of the
Court seems to have been unduly prone to find that adequate averment
of probable injury to their interest resulting from the ordinance was
lacking; as to plaintiff-taxpayers in nearby Rochester who alleged cost
burdens to them in coping with the regional housing problem which
the ordinance intensified, the decision seems right.
It must be confessed, over all, that a requirement of sufficiently
probable injury, such as the foregoing cases involve, requires subjective
judgments on the part of both judges and prospective litigants.9 8 Yet
2 94 There were similar failures in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), involving
allegations of official abuses after valid arrests, which was cited as analogous in the
majority opinion, and Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), involving allegedly military
surveillance of civilians. As Mr. Justice Brennan points out in his dissent in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), there was less basis for predicting that the plaintiffs in O'Shea
might be arrested and subjected to abuse than that the Rizzo plaintiffs, as persons going about
their business under police surveillance, might become victims of police brutality. In
Laird v. Tatum, the alleged surveillance extended only to certain group political activities
in which the plaintiffs did not allege they were involved.
295 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S. CL 1917 (1976).
2H4.2 U.S. 669 (1973).
297 4 2 2 U.S. 490 (1975).29sSeveral recent cases in the lower courts illustrate the difficulty further. In one,
Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), standing was rightly withheld, in the
eyes of the writer, from persons in need of housing who challenged a federal grant for
a non-housing purpose, because it allegedly would curtail somewhat the creation of addi-
tional future housing. In Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973), standing was rather oddly recognized to challenge an official failure to
carry out an international measure (embargo on trade with Rhodesia) which was designed
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with ripeness for review and the requirement of exhaustion of admini-
strative remedies having become more relaxed, and with ranges of in-
terest which form the basis of standing as broad as they are, there needs
to be an efficacious, if not rigid or certain, requirement that challengers
of agency actions (and of statutes or ordinances) be proximately affected
or threatened by the measures or the conduct they attack, as a condition
of access to court. The decision of controversies as to this aspect of
standing is at least, when undertaken at the outset of litigation, less
burdensome than the resolution by the courts of larger controversies
over policy. Guidelines as to the degree of probable injury which is
required in various contexts are not beyond attainment. As an escape
from unsatisfactory decisions, the legislature can make specific provision
as to standing if it wants to--unless Mr. Justice Brennan is right in the
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights"°9 case in interpreting the decision of
the majority as foreclosing legislative liberalization of the case or con-
troversy requirement as construed in the opinion.
to coerce the government of that country to honor certain human rights, including those
asserted by the plaintiffs. In First National Bank of Homestead v. Watson, 363 F. Supp.
466 (D.D.C. 1973), standing should have been withheld, but was not, from a bank
allegedly representing the interest of individuals in the environment, which asserted that
the challenged authorization of a new bank without an environmental impact inquiry
might result in financing of real estate development which would be environmentally
harmful. See further District 65, Wholesale, etc. Union v. Nixon, 341 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.
N.Y. 1972). The decision as to standing in Carman v. Richardson, 357 F. Supp. 1148
(D. Vt. 1973), although possibly supportable by analogy to local taxpayer standing, also
seems extreme. In it a local user of hospital services was permitted to challenge a federal
loan guaranty to a hospital, which allegedly would result, contrary to statutory require-
ments, in a costly duplication of facilities. In American Civil Liberties Union v. F.C.C.,
523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975), the court rightly recognized the standing of a representative
of cable television viewers to challenge a regulation which allegedly would limit invalidly
the programming to which the viewers would have access in the future. In Paton
v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975), standing of a high school social studies
director to challenge alleged FBI investigations of students because of their inquiry into
radical causes, such as the director might wish to include in future curricula, was ques-
tionably denied on the ground that the deterrent effect on his policies, which he alleged,
was purely subjective. See further, note 4 supra.
299 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
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